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The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions.

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared.

The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare.

These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules.

This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how emission constraints imposed by the emission trading scheme (ETS) in the European Union, as well as transmissions capacity, can affect the outcome of the generation scheduling. The aim is to demonstrate the application of the generation scheduling tool which includes both the ETS and transmission constraints, and helps evaluate their effect on emission reduction, costs, and generators' behavior and availability. It can also be used to help generators make strategic decisions regarding utilization and purchases of carbon allowances.

The paper extends the generation scheduling formulation to allow for additional constraints modeling. The formulation is based on the mixed integer programming approach with linearization of generation cost and emission functions, and the possibility to split the system into zones in order to investigate transmission congestion.

The paper presents six case studies that include unconstrained and constrained operation, both from the emission and transmission points of view. It also illustrates the effect of free allocations versus auctioning. The case studies look into the system with wind generation that can be constrained due to transmission limits, and their impact on emission reductions. This is often the case in systems where most of the wind generation is located in the area which does not have sufficiently strong links to the rest of the system where the majority of loads are.

The extension of the work will be inclusion of stochastic nature of emission prices and wind availability. It will also be used for further studies on systems with high wind penetration and insufficient transmission capacity.

The generation scheduling tool and the results from the paper could be useful for generators when making decisions on how to use or purchase their emission allocations, as well as for evaluation of the adverse affect of transmission congestion on carbon emission reductions.

The purpose of this paper is to overview the development of China's emission trading, which is transforming environmental policy measures from traditional command and control regulations to business‐led decision making within government initiated environmental markets, and investigates the main factors that affect China's policy making with regards to further climate changes.

This paper is based on the authors' review of the literatures on emissions trading program in China and their critical analysis.

Initially China's environmental protection policies were focused principally upon the reduction of sulfur dioxide (SO₂) emissions for improving air quality. Since the authorization of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, project‐based activities such as Clean Development Mechanism producing carbon credit developed rapidly. However, the implementation of carbon dioxide emission trading is still under discussion and research is much inferior to that of SO₂ emission trading. The barriers of and suggestions for designing future emissions trading market are also discussed.

This review helps to raise awareness and understand possible scenarios for emission trading in China.

This study aims to propose a set of institutional frameworks, as well as practical polices and steps, with a view to facilitating the establishment of a unified carbon trading market in China.

Based on existing empirical studies and reviews of the socioeconomic contexts, this study followed a qualitative approach consisting of secondary data collection and analysis, semi-structured interviews to collect primary data and comparative analysis.

The establishment of a national carbon trading market in China is a systemic and complex process which requires coordination among various concerned government agencies and supporting mechanisms. Currently, the development of a unified national carbon market has been impeded by the lack of coordination among local pilot programs, and there is no specific law passed by the People’s Congress or by its Standing Committee to regulate the emerging carbon trading market. It is of vital importance for China, in terms of both practical and strategic aspects, to take a gradualist approach in establishing laws and institutions to guide and support the development of its emerging carbon market.

This present study forms a part of a regional research project aiming to identify sound policy approaches for the establishment of a carbon trading market in China. Due to scope reasons, it focuses only on policy analysis and recommendations.

China’s emerging national carbon trading market has attracted much research attention. However, little has been done from the perspectives of legislations and policies.

The purpose of this study is to investigate which of the two carbon allowance allocation methods (CAAMs), i.e. grandfathered system carbon allowance allocation (GCAA) and baseline system carbon allowance allocation (BCAA), is more beneficial to capital-constrained supply chains under the carbon emission allowance repurchase strategy (CEARS).

Adopting CEARS to ease the capital-constrained supply chains, this study develops two-period game models with manufacturers as leaders and retailers as followers from the perspective of profit and social welfare maximization under two CAAMs (GCAA and BCAA), where the first period produces normal products, and the second period produces low-carbon products.

First, higher carbon-saving can better use CEARS and achieve a higher supply chain profit under the two CAAMs. However, the higher the end-of-period carbon price is, the lower the social welfare is. Second, when carbon-saving is small, GCAA achieves both economic and environmental benefits; BCAA reduces carbon emissions at the expense of economic benefit. Third, the supply chain members gain higher profits and social welfare under GCAA, so the government and supply chain members are more inclined to choose GCAA.

By analyzing the profits and total carbon emissions of capital-constrained supply chains under GCAA and BCAA, this study provides theoretical references for retailers and capital-constrained manufacturers. In addition, by comparing the difference in social welfare under GCAA and BCAA, it provides a basis for the government to choose a reasonable CAAM.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the continued viability of the European Union emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) as a tool for climate control in the face of continued criticisms.

This evaluative study makes use of connected existing studies and other secondary data from economics, management, politics and law.

The study found that though there were various flaws in the scheme in its initial launching phase, the insights gained are being applied in the second and subsequent phase of the EU ETS. It is also ascertained that despite initial doubts, a market for carbon finance is successfully established in the EU albeit with various limitations. The scheme is also poised to link with other regional schemes to address climate control.

Though the study relied primarily on secondary data, the findings were sufficiently triangulated with perspectives from economics, politics, management and law. The findings would also provide useful and relevant information to those engage in the theory and practice of carbon finance.

This paper updates on the legal and economic significance of the EU ETS as a market mechanism to address climate change.