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Accounting-based financial scandals caused by fraudulent financial reports negatively affect the financial markets and cause loss of confidence in investors. Financial reporting quality needs to be improved in order to build and maintain trust in financial markets. To increase the quality of financial reports, fraudulent financial reporting risks should be defined. At this point, regulators, practitioners, and researchers are in constant search.

There are improved approaches to the detection of financial reporting frauds in the literature. Many studies have been conducted on the “Fraud Triangle Theory” and the “Fraud Diamond Theory” approaches. The Fraud Triangle Theory argues that while fraudulent action is taking place in defining the elements of press, rationalization, and opportunity, the Fraud Diamond Theory approach argues that in order to achieve these three elements, the capability to carry out a fraud in individuals must be improved.

In this study, it is aimed to investigate the effect of Fraud Diamond elements on fraudulent financial reports. For the scope of the research, data of 26 companies from Manufacturing Industry enterprises operating in BORSA ISTANBUL between 2013 and 2017 were used. Financial reports of the companies are divided into two groups: (1) Fraudulent Financial Reports and (2) Non-Fraud Financial Reports. The hypotheses developed within the scope of the research were tested using the Logistic Regression analysis in IBM SPSS Statistic 20 program.

As a result of the study, it has been determined that there is a negative correlation between borrowing level, asset profitability, independent audit firm, auditor exchanges and institutionalization level, and fraudulent financial reports. It was understood that the change in assets and the size of the audit committee did not have any effect on the fraudulent financial reports.

This study aims to trace the impact of corporate governance and its mechanisms in preventing companies from turning to fraudulent financial reporting.

For this purpose, using the systematic elimination pattern, the information of 187 listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange over six years from 2013 to 2019 were collected, and the hypotheses were examined using a linear regression model. To measure fraudulent financial reporting, the adjusted model of Beneish (1999) was used to evaluate corporate governance. Its mechanisms based on nine corporate governance mechanisms, including board independence, board remuneration, CEO financial expertise, expertise in CEO industry, board financial expertise, board industry expertise, board effort, CEO duality and managerial ownership, have been examined. These mechanisms are calculated as a combined index of corporate governance.

The findings indicate that robust corporate governance significantly reduces companies’ intention toward fraudulent financial reporting. In the same way, a negative and significant relationship was observed between each of the nine corporate governance mechanisms, except for board compensation and fraudulent financial reporting.

This study’s findings provide valuable insight into the importance of strengthening companies to prevent companies’ managers from engaging in fraudulent financial reporting activities. Hence, it is suggested that professional references bodies more seriously follow the rules to dictate to companies for using and empowering their corporate governance.

This paper aims to explore the effectiveness of an artificial neural network (ANN) in predicting fraudulent financial reporting in small market capitalization companies in Malaysia.

Based on the concepts of ANN, a mathematical model was developed to compare non-fraud and fraud companies selected from among small market capitalization companies in Malaysia; the fraud companies had already been charged by the Securities Commission for falsification of financial statements. Ten financial ratios are used as fraud risk indicators to predict fraudulent financial reporting using ANN.

The findings indicate that the proposed ANN methodology outperforms other statistical techniques widely used for predicting fraudulent financial reporting.

The study is one of few to adopt the ANN approach for the prediction of financial reporting fraud.

In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of recent financial reporting scandals, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 mandates that audit committees be fully independent and have at least one financial expert. The SEC adopted rules implementing these Sarbanes‐Oxley provisions. This paper contributes to the literature on the association between audit committee characteristics recommended by SOX and the likelihood of fraud in two ways. First, we focus on audit committee composition and the extent of the underlying nature of the firm (e.g., firm size, growth) and the contracting environment (e.g., managerial ownership, leverage) of the firm on the likelihood of fraud. In particular, we find that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is negatively related to audit committee independence, number of audit committee meetings and managerial ownership and positively related to firm size and firm growth opportunities. Second, we separately examine firms with totally independent audit committees and fraudulent financial reporting. This sample is interesting because these are firms that had good corporate governance and yet still had fraudulent financial reporting. By separately examining firms with totally independent audit committees, we find that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting given a totally independent audit committee is inversely related to the level of managerial ownership and the number of audit committee meetings.

This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.

Explores the impact that recent fraudulent financial reporting has had on the capital markets. Attempts to examine the stock market reaction, both to return and risk, to fraudulent financial reporting that has occurred in major corporations during the decade 1990‐1999. Finds that capital market impact is significant in dollar terms with strong negative announcement effects the day before and on the day of a news event. Concludes that auditor and regulator vigilance needs to be strongly maintained in monitoring firms’ financial reporting.

Purpose – This study investigates the nature, types, and methods of fraudulent financial reporting committed by Chinese listed companies with a view to understanding corporate behavior relating to management fraud in China. Such an understanding is important for preventing frauds and achieving better financial reporting compliance.

Design/Methodology/Approach – This study adopts a descriptive research approach using the data based on 182 punishment bulletins issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission from 2002 to 2006. The study considers three categories of frauds (i.e., false income statements, false balance sheets, and insufficient or false disclosure) and uses these categories to describe and analyze the fraud cases.

Research findings/Insights – Based on the sample of 83 cases over the 5-year period from 2002 to 2006, this study finds that all the frauds in the sample involved the manipulation, alteration, and falsification of reported financial information. Fraud schemes often contained more than one technique to misstate financial statements, typically through overstating revenues and assets, and understating liabilities and expenses. Most of the sample companies committed several frauds simultaneously. This study also reveals that most of the frauds committed by Chinese listed companies lasted more than 2 years, with the longest being 9 years, and common intervals between the initial fraud year and the announcement year of punishment were more than 3 years, with the longest being 11 years.

Theoretical/Academic implications – This study provides an empirical analysis of fraudulent financial reporting cases committed by Chinese listed companies. These cases were rarely studied in the Western literature. This study contributes to the extant literature by providing an insight into management fraud in China. Research into fraudulent financial reporting in the largest developing economy is certainly of interest as prior research into this area is mostly based on developed economies.

Practitioner/Policy implications – The implications drawn from this study could be useful for a better understanding of the management behavior of companies in developing and transitional economies. This study has a potential to assist regulators and accounting professional bodies to set guidelines facilitating corporate compliance of regulated financial reporting.

Whistleblowers have been credited for uncovering financial scandals in companies globally, including Enron, Olympus Corporation, and WorldCom. Despite increasing support and incentives for whistleblowing, there generally remains reluctance to blow the whistle. Thus, the purpose of this study is to review: (1) the determinants of internal and external whistleblowing on accounting-related misconduct, (2) U.S. whistleblowing legislation on accounting-related misconduct and related research, and (3) the effects of whistleblowing on firms and whistleblowers. Within each area, suggestions for future research are offered.

We conduct an experiment to examine the occurrence of the bystander effect on willingness to report a fraudulent act. Specifically, we investigate the impact of evidence strength on managers’ decisions to blow the whistle in the presence and absence of other employees who have knowledge of the wrongdoing. Results indicate that when there is strong evidence indicating a fraudulent act, individuals with sole knowledge are more likely to report than when others are aware of the fraudulent act (the bystander effect). However, the bystander effect is not found when evidence of fraud is weak. Further, a mediated moderation analysis indicates that perceived personal responsibility to report mediates the relation between others’ awareness of the questionable act and reporting likelihood, suggesting that the bystander effect is driven by diffusion of responsibility. Our results have implications for all types of organizations that wish to mitigate the detrimental effect of fraud. Specifically, training or incentives may be necessary to overcome the bystander effect in an organization.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between fraudulent financial reporting and firms' characteristics, i.e. size, type of ownership and audit quality in companies audited by the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) after the implementation of a self assessment system in Malaysia.

The paper employs an empirical research design, using data on companies audited by IRBM. The hypotheses of the study are tested using both univariate and multivariate statistical methods.

It was found that company size and audit quality have significant negative relationships with fraudulent financial reporting.

The sample of companies used in this study is unlisted companies and the results are not generalisable to listed companies. Listed companies may have more stringent rules for listing and have better corporate governance mechanisms within the company as control.

The paper's findings may assist IRBM in identifying possible cases for audit in the future.

The paper describes the first empirical study that uses real tax cases where the non‐compliance with the Malaysian statues and tax laws are used as the measurement of the fraudulent financial reporting.