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This paper aims to investigate the disclosure of fraud-related activities in public sector organisations in Australia. Specifically, the study reviews and evaluates the level and nature of fraud control information in annual reports of Commonwealth agencies and bodies.

The study uses a qualitative approach with the aim of expanding the body of empirical literature on disclosure of fraud control information in annual reports. The study further uses the theory of accountability – an essential concept for organisations that exist for public interest.

The results show that there is some prima facie evidence of public accountability. However, these results suggest that current disclosures of fraud-related activities in annual reports are failing to ensure the public is aware of activities used to combat fraud and its implications for the public interest.

The results have important implications for developing a framework for good reporting of fraud control activities.

This research study adds to the limited body of knowledge regarding how public entities discharge their accountability in relation to their fraud control activities.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of fraud prevention disclosure on the Malaysian public universities’ websites.

The level of fraud prevention information disclosure was examined using content analysis of all 20 public universities in Malaysia based on the university fraud prevention disclosure index (UFPDi) previously developed by the authors’ research team.

The disclosures of eight aspects of fraud prevention policies, responses, initiatives and mechanisms were not satisfactory. Possible reasons could be because of lack of awareness and appreciation on the institutional mechanisms and lack of formal pressure from the relevant authority.

Data collection for analysis was conducted during a period of one month only due to rapid changes of the information on the websites.

The low level of disclosure using UFPDi will prompt the Malaysian public universities to take proactive actions in promoting transparent and good governance among the university staff hence assisting the government in addressing the fraud problem that is plaguing the nation.

This paper is an extension to the authors’ previous work on UFPDi. It further explains and highlights the extent of fraud prevention disclosures among academic institutions who are receiving financial resources from the government.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that a period of sustained supernormal firm performance (for up to five years before fraud commission) creates financial pressure on actors/agents so they have a propensity to behave fraudulently to keep the good times (apparently) rolling.

Applying the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using a range of calendar time portfolio methodologies, the authors measure abnormal drifts in stock performance in periods up to five years before alleged fraud commission dates. The authors examine a sample of 561 US firms subject to enforcement actions initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) over 1968-2009.

The authors find that sustained firm-specific positive stock price performance for up to five years followed by the almost inevitable adverse shock, which eventually brings the good times to an end, generally precedes corporate fraud. Fraud occurs when firm managers engage in misconduct in a misguided attempt to keep the good times (apparently) rolling despite the negative shock.

The sample is restricted to firms with trading histories on the stock market prior to the misconduct, and to firms contained in the Federal Securities Regulation database of US firms subject to enforcement actions initiated by the SEC and the DOJ over 1968-2009.

The desire to keep the good times rolling appears to be a very important driver of fraudulent behavior, even after controlling for the executive compensation incentive effects and business cycle effects emphasized in prior studies. The robust findings of positive abnormal returns for up to five years preceding initial fraud commission suggest that regulators and investors would be well-advised to scrutinize the behavior of firms that exhibit surprisingly persistent superior performance over an extended period. If the financial results appear too good to be true, a closer examination might just reveal that they indeed are.

While most investors generally like to see the “good times keep rolling” this pressure can create ethical dilemmas for managers.

Unlike most other papers in this area of the literature, which concentrate on the pre-fraud disclosure, the authors investigate the firm’s performance in the pre-fraud commission period. The authors find that the commission of the alleged fraud is preceded by a sustained period of surprisingly good performance of up to five years in length. The authors believe that the paper provides empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that a period of sustained supernormal firm performance (for up to five years before fraud commission) creates financial pressure on actors/agents so they have a propensity to behave fraudulently to keep the good times (apparently) rolling.

This study aims to combine two fraud-related streams of the literature on guanxi and overconfidence into an integrated framework, which is the fraud triangle, to interpret the mechanism of fraud commission and detection.

A bivariate probit model with Partial Observability (POBi Probit) is applied. Moreover, the POBi Probit model is adjusted to the Chinese context. The China-specific POBi Probit model is constructed using data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2014, with a total of 15,109 firm-year observations.

Overconfidence induces fraud commission and worsens fraud detection; overconfidence mediates the relationship between fraud and guanxi; the “white side” of guanxi comes from alumni networks, while the “dark side” is derived from relatives-based networks; overconfidence induces fraud commission in accounting and disclosure and benefits the detection of disclosure frauds. Guanxi suppresses fraud commission in management and disclosure, however, it worsens fraud detection given fraud in management and disclosure; overconfidence induces fraud commission in both state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOEs, and benefits fraud detection in SOEs. Guanxi suppresses fraud commission and worsens fraud detection in SOEs and city-owned firms.

There are two drawbacks of the partial observable bivariate probit (POBi-Probit) method that must be mentioned here. On one hand, the ex ante variable selection is one of the most difficult parts of applying the POBi-Probit model and different variables are included in different studies. On the other hand, the POBi-Probit model might not converge if too many variables are included. Thus, many widely accepted factors can be included in the model. Thus, this study initially sets the POBi-Probit model based mainly on Khanna et al. (2015) and then adjusts the model for the Chinese context (e. g. considering government ownership) according to Yiu et al. (2018) and Zhang (2018) and the local study of Meng et al. (2019). Considering the observability of fraud, on one hand, the observability of fraud commission is a widely accepted limitation, especially when accounting opacity comes across with regulatory efficiency (Yiu et al. (2018). On the other hand, the observability of relationships is another obstacle to this study. Future studies can go further by revealing the presently unobservable relationships using Big Data technology.

This paper theoretically and practically contributes to the literature on both corporate fraud and corporate governance. Theoretically, by introducing integrated principal-agent resource-reliance theory (IPRT) and upper echelon theory (UET), this paper broadens the framework of fraud triangle theory (FTT) and testifies the availability of the broaden FTT in the transitional and emerging-market context of China. Practically, this paper provides evidence that guanxi and overconfidence are two of the factors affecting corporate fraud. Thus, this paper provides a governance approach opposing corporate fraud in China, which may help the other emerging economies in transition.

A private right of action is not expressly mentioned in either §10(b) or Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and hence such a right must be implied. To justify a reasonable cause of action, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a material omission or misstatement; (2) made by the defendant with “scienter” (defined later); (3) which was the actual and proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff; (4) and was relied upon by the plaintiff.³ To reach the issue of damages, defendants’ liability in terms of satisfying the above four elements must be assumed.

This paper aims to explain the development of fraud prevention disclosure index (FPDI) for Malaysian public universities.

The paper reported a comprehensive review on fraud prevention and control plans of several international policies and of local and international universities.

The final 8 categories and 100 items under review have been developed in an instrument, the proposed FPDI, to measure the level of commitment of public universities in preventing fraud.

The FPDI will serve as an evaluation tool to measure the level of commitment of public universities toward preventing fraud practices through disclosure practices.

The FPDI is hoped to inculcate anti-fraud culture amongst public universities and to promote accountability, widen and strengthen good organization’s ethics, create ethical work place environment and enhance corporate governance framework by instilling a culture of professional conduct that is free from corruption.

This paper is among the first paper that develops the index specifically to measure the universities’ level of commitment to prevent fraud.

The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between accounting fraud and corporate sustainability.

Companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2019 are used to estimate a pooled ordinary least square regression model using panel data. Accounting fraud is represented by accounting disclosure, which is measured by its quality and timeliness, while corporate sustainability is measured by earnings management and corporate social responsibility.

Empirical findings support the hypothesis that the quality and timeliness of accounting disclosure have a statistically favorable impact on the management of company earnings and corporate social responsibility, respectively. Accounting fraud also has an impact on the sustainable development of the company.

Although the inferences of this study are limited to Chinese listed companies, this study may interest other scholars to explore similar topics.

The purpose of this paper is to show a significant overlap in the models accounting research uses for fraud and the models other research disciplines use for greenwashing, and show how researchers and policymakers interested in the application of effective sustainability policy can draw from fraud accounting literature to better understand, and therefore, combat greenwashing. This is illustrated by showing multi-actor information-asymmetry models from other branches of accounting literature and synthesizing them with the fraud triangle model to suggest new avenues for reducing greenwashing and strengthening corporate social responsibility (CSR).

This paper reviews the current literature surrounding the greenwashing aspect of corporate camouflage compares the legal and technical definitions of fraud and synthesizes a new variant fraud triangle that more usefully describes greenwashing.

This paper is able to show that other areas of accounting research in North America have already tackled similar systems of multiple actors in an information-asymmetric environment and that a recurring trait is the emergence of a more robust reporting system. CSR reporting is currently in the process of emerging and could develop more swiftly by copying extant fraud-fighting tools. This is particularly salient given the increasing amount of liability legal regimes are giving to both sustainability activities and sustainability reporting from firms, as evidenced in both guidelines and scandals over the past decade.

Sustainability reporting is not unique in comprising a large number of interrelated entities with non-financial information asymmetry between actors. Previous researchers have encountered similar situations in government accounting and public administration and developed network models to study these relationships as a result. In government accounting, this led to the development both of better diagnostic tools for further research and better models for local governments to use to prevent fraud and malfeasance. This paper suggests that using such research methods in the area of CSR will allow for the development of similarly-useful tools and models.

Visualizing greenwashing as a form of fraud allows policymakers to use tools from the fraud-fighting literature to improve CSR reporting and produce a more robust regime in the future. As governments increasingly seek to respond effectively to material misstatements with an intent to deceive in sustainability reports, understanding the underlying information asymmetry as it is found in other private-public interfaces is critical. Similarly, researchers can analyze CSR reporting through the lens of fraud researchers to gain novel insights into how information asymmetry in CSR reporting works.

Greenwashing is not traditionally seen as a form of fraudulent reporting, even though it often meets the same technical test used to determine fraudulent reporting. The realization that the two are structurally similar allows the authors to better understand how CSR reporting works and how CSR reporting can be falsified. By understanding the latter, governments, firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can develop tools to prevent CSR reporting from being falsified.

This paper suggests a new suite of tools with which to study greenwashing, and with which to fight greenwashing in a sustainability accounting context.

This paper aims to focus on the role of financial analysts in corporate fraud in the Chinese stock market.

Data on the analyst coverage and all the types of corporate fraud were obtained for 16,284 company-year observations of Chinese companies. The sample was subsequently divided into those of state-owned enterprises, before and after financial crisis.

The overall results indicate that analyst coverage effectively deters the occurrence of fraud. The sub-sample results suggest that the impact of analysts on deterring fraud is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, especially after the financial crisis. The path analyses show that analyst coverage can deter corporate frauds by affecting information transparency and investor attention. Furthermore, the results show that the deterrence role of financial analysts varies with fraud types: it is more pronounced in deterring disclosure fraud, but not as effective in illegal guarantees and illegal insider dealing. Moreover, analyst coverage can deter the occurrence of fictitious reporting, intentional postponement and material omission.

This paper not only examined the overall fraud probability but also taking into consideration the heterogeneity of the information availability and research focus of financial analysts and examined the analysts’ impact on the occurrence of difference types of fraud. Moreover, this paper explored why financial analysts can deter corporate frauds through path analyses.

This paper examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to deter and detect fraud, domestically and abroad. Specifically, it focuses on the role played by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the US Government Accounting Office (GAO), and other national and foreign professional associations, in promulgating auditing standards and procedures to prevent fraud in financial statements and other white‐collar crimes. It also examines several fraud cases and the impact of management and employee fraud on the various business sectors such as insurance, banking, health care, and manufacturing, as well as the role of management, the boards of directors, the audit committees, auditors, and fraud examiners and their liability in the fraud prevention and investigation.