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In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing “overreactions” to public signals as shown by Morris and Shin (2002). Recent experiments on games with strategic complementarities show that subjects attach a lower weight to public signals than theoretically predicted. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the welfare effects of public signals accounting for the weights observed in experiments.

Aggregate behavior observed in experiments on games with strategic complementarities can be explained by a cognitive hierarchy model where subjects employ limited levels of reasoning. They respond in a rational way to the non-strategic part of a game and they account for other players responding rationally, but they neglect that other players also account for others’ rationality. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public information under such limited levels of reasoning.

In the model by Morris and Shin (2002) public information is always welfare improving if strategies are derived from such low reasoning levels. The optimal degree of publicity is decreasing in the levels of reasoning. For the observed average level of reasoning, full transparency is optimal, if public information is more precise than private information. If the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private actions, the government should secretly respond to its information without disclosing or signaling it to the private sector independent of the degree of private agents’ rationality.

This paper takes experimental evidence back to theory and shows that the main result obtained by the theory under rational behavior breaks down if theory accounts for the bounded rationality observed in experiments.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the upcoming symposium on experimental macroeconomics in the November issue.

Experimental, survey of articles in the symposium.

The paper describes how experiments can be used in macroeconomics.

The paper discusses the rationale for using behavioral experiments in macroeconomics, and summarizes the papers in the symposium.

Measuring risk aversion is sensitive to assumptions about the wealth in subjects’ utility functions. Data from the same subjects in low- and high-stake lottery decisions allow estimating the wealth in a pre-specified one-parameter utility function simultaneously with risk aversion. This paper first shows how wealth estimates can be identified assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Using the data from a recent experiment by Holt and Laury (2002a), it is shown that most subjects’ behavior is consistent with CRRA at some wealth level. However, for realistic wealth levels most subjects’ behavior implies a decreasing relative risk aversion. An alternative explanation is that subjects do not fully integrate their wealth with income from the experiment. Within-subject data do not allow discriminating between the two hypotheses. Using between-subject data, maximum-likelihood estimates of a hybrid utility function indicate that aggregate behavior can be described by expected utility from income rather than expected utility from final wealth and partial relative risk aversion is increasing in the scale of payoffs.

How can laboratory experiments help us understand banking crises, including the usefulness of various policy responses? After giving a concise introduction to the field of experimental economics more generally, the author attempts to provide answers. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

The author discusses methodology and surveys relevant work.

History is often too complicated to be meaningfully revamped or modified in the lab, for purposes of insight-by-analogy. But as people argue about how to understand financial history, they bring ideas to the table. It is possible and useful to test the empirical relevance of these ideas in lab experiments.

The paper pioneers broad discussion of how lab experiments may shed light on banking crises.

The purpose of this paper is to consider whether asymmetric information about correlations between assets can induce financial contagion. Contagion, unjustified by fundamentals, would arise if participants react in one market to uninformative trades in the other market that actually convey no relevant information. The authors also consider whether the market accurately disseminates insider information about fundamental value correlations when such information is indeed present.

The authors employ experimental asset markets to answer the research questions. The experimental markets allow participants to simultaneously trade two assets for multiple rounds. In each round, a shock occurs, which either have an idiosyncratic effect on the shocked asset, or a systematic effect on both assets. Half of the time, there exist insiders who know the true nature of the shock and how it affects the value of the other asset. The other half of the time, no agent knows whether there is a correlation between the assets. In such cases, there is the potential for the appearance of information mirages. Uninformed traders, in either condition, do not know whether or not there exist insiders, but can try to infer this from the market activity they observe.

The results of the experiment show that when inside information about the nature of the correlation between assets does exist, it is readily disseminated in the form of market prices. However, when there is no private information (PI), mirages are common, demonstrating that financial contagion can arise in the absence of any fundamental relationship between assets. An analysis of individual behavior suggests that some unprofitable decisions appear to be related to an aversion to complex distributions of lottery payoffs.

The study focusses on one of the triggers of unjustified financial contagion, namely, asymmetric information. The authors have studied financial contagion in a controlled experimental setting where the authors can carefully control information, and specify the fundamental interdependence between assets traded in different markets.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the ability of monetary policy to generate real effects in laboratory general equilibrium production economies.

To understand why monetary policy is not consistently effective at stabilizing economic activity, the author vary the types of agents interacting in the economy and consider treatments where subjects are playing the role of households (firms) in an economy where automated firms (households) are programmed to behave rationally.

While the majority of participants’ expectations respond to monetary policy in the direction intended, subjects do form expectations adaptively, relying heavily on past variables and forecasts in forming two-steps-ahead forecasts. Moreover, in the presence of counterparts that are boundedly rational, forecast accuracy worsens significantly. When interacting with automated households, updating firms’ prices respond modestly to monetary policy and significantly to anticipated marginal costs and future prices. The greatest deviations in behavior from theoretical predictions arise from human households (HH). Households persistent oversupply of labor and under-consumption is attributed to precautionary saving and debt aversion. The results provide evidence that the effects of monetary policy on decision making hinge on the distribution of indebtedness of households.

The author present causal evidence of the effects of potential bounded rationality on agents’ consumption and labor decisions.

This article discusses the methodology of using laboratory methods to address macroeconomic questions. It also provides summaries of the articles in this volume.

FEW visitors to the Business Efficiency Exhibition held in London a few weeks ago can be in any doubt that electronic “brains” and other electro‐mechanical developments will be used more widely in business in future for preparing up‐to‐date records of production and sales and for doing such laborious, time‐consuming tasks as the bookkeeping necessary in the banks.