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As franchisees are perceived to be independent and self employed entrepreneurs, their ongoing development is frequently overlooked or poorly managed; particularly compared with the development opportunities for corporate staff in their support offices. The concern is that franchisees do not prioritise their own professional development due to their inability to diagnose and source appropriate training, their focus on immediate operational needs and a lack of free time to undergo development activities. As primary income generators of franchise businesses; organisational effectiveness and growth of the entire organisation rests on the abilities of the franchisees. This article examines one training program offered to franchisees at a major Australian franchise organisation. Through a survey of franchisees, some important lessons have been learned regarding the nature, scope and design of development initiatives for franchisees and some recommendations are provided to better manage franchisee development for the benefit of the entire organisation.

Examines the nature and success of corporate communication initiatives within a large retail franchise organization. Challenges faced by communication strategists in franchised organisations are discussed and initiatives for overcoming these barriers are outlined. Research conducted through Deakin University into franchisee awareness of, and support for, corporate instigated policy is outlined. The research, centred on corporate communication tools, found strong franchisee awareness of corporate policy with a few exceptions. Franchisee support for policies varied considerably. Recommendations for more effective communication between franchisors and franchisees include greater corporate initiated consultation and clearer promotion of core ideas that justify and explain rather than preach and demand.

Discusses a recent study into the level of satisfaction experienced by franchisees in the Australian restaurant sector. A model of consumer buying behaviour was used to identify the characteristics of both franchisers and franchisees which contribute to owner‐manager satisfaction with the purchase and operation of a franchised small business. The post‐purchase intentions of franchisees, were also investigated. Based on the survey findings from nine companies and 127 of their franchisee owner‐managers, provides prognostic and diagnostic frameworks to assist both franchisers and franchisees in their selection of a suitable business partner and in specifying appropriate remedial action in marginal franchised outlets.

Through an exploratory study, based on interviews with retail franchisees and franchisers belonging to the British Franchise Association, the operational nature of the relationship between franchisee and franchiser is explored. The views of franchisees and franchisers on the nature and level of their respective responsibilities throughout the relationship are sought, and differences in perceptions are pinpointed. The early findings suggest that, whilst apparently a franchise is an opportunity for a new entrant with no previous business experience, the whole process from vetting and training, through to trading, is in fact based on the assumption that the entrant is familiar with general business practice.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the conceptual relationship between the running royalty programs and the performance of a franchisee or franchisor. Thus, this paper will analyze the correlation of financial stability when the franchisor strengthens the running royalty policy at aspect of franchisor.

A model is presented and designed. The paper will analyze the causality which is affected by strengthening the profit structure with the running royalty program and also find out how the strengthened profit structure will affect and improve the franchisors' sustainable supports for the franchisees, service quality and service satisfactions.

Although the franchise industry is growing in Korea, the stability of business is still in doubt because the business cycle of the franchisor is shortened. This paper found the reasons why franchisors have unstable status in Korea. The main reason was the instability of profit structures for franchisors which are a burden to the franchisees which then worsen the franchisors' financial status. The biggest different from the US franchise industry was the running royalty program. So, this paper will apply the running royalty program politically to the franchise business in Korea and find out how it will affect the overall business cycle.

This study was limited to the Korean franchise industry and found out the factors which influence the franchisors' performance in various aspects. By analyzing with casual loop diagram, this paper found how each of the factors interact and bring out the positive feedback process. Also, it suggests a way of adopting the running royalty program into the Korean market.

This study aims to understand what primary relationship problem mechanisms can exist in the franchise channel and how exchange partners respond to them. This study demonstrates how the franchisor’s relationship problem mechanisms (threat, contract enforcement) affect the franchisee’s negative active responses (venting, threatened withdrawal).

This study tested hypotheses through multiple regression analysis using data from 200 franchisees in Korea-based food franchise systems.

The results indicated that threat increases venting and threatened withdrawal, while contract enforcement only increases venting. Venting increases threatened withdrawal. In addition, the results indicated that the franchisor’s behavior monitoring positively moderates the relationship between relationship problem mechanisms and negative active responses.

This study helps strategically manage responses to relationship problems by categorizing ‘relationship problem mechanisms’ into intentional relationship problem mechanisms based on communication (threat) and unintentional relationship problem mechanisms based on action (contract enforcement). This study finds that both relationship problem mechanisms, intentional or unintentional, eventually cause threatened withdrawal directly or indirectly. Even if the threat is merely communication, not action, it is more likely to cause relationship dissolution than contract enforcement by directly triggering any negative active response. This study also finds that behavior monitoring can affect exchange partners through interaction with other management mechanisms rather than directly affecting them.

This chapter is a descriptive and exploratory study of the challenges and opportunities faced by franchisors in adapting their franchise systems to accommodate cultural diversity among franchisees. It uses literature on migrant entrepreneurs and cultural diversity in small business settings in the United Kingdom, Europe, and the Americas as a basis for application to a franchising context. Triggered by events in the Australian franchising sector over the past two years, in which franchise systems have been embroiled in controversial and illegal activities undertaken by franchisees – many of whom were business migrants – the research begins to unravel the complexities of utilizing migrant franchisees as vehicles of system growth. Two sources of data provide indicative evidence about the issues associated with migrant franchisees. Firstly, two surveys of franchisors were conducted in 2014 and 2016 to obtain descriptive data about the incidence of migrants as franchisees. Secondly, a series of focus groups provided insights into the challenges and opportunities faced by franchisors in recruiting and managing migrant franchisees. Tentative findings of best practice in accommodating migrant franchisees are revealed. This research begins to fill an important gap in the literature about cultural diversity in franchising.

An agency relationship exists whenever one party (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent). Because agents are assumed to be self-interested and to possess goals that diverge from the principal's goals, the principal must expend resources (called agency costs) to insure that agents act in her interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In chains, the firm can choose as outlet managers either employees who are paid a salary (and perhaps a bonus) or franchisees who are granted the right to their outlet's profits after royalties and other expenses. In both cases, an agency problem is created because the firm delegates local decision-making to outlet managers whose interests are not perfectly aligned with that of the franchisor's (Rubin, 1978).