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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of founding-family firms on managerial ability.

Founding-family firms are determined by founder and/or family involvement as block holder and as in the firm board. Managerial ability is estimated by data envelopment analysis. Research samples consist of 412 manufacturing firm-years listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Analysis data use random-effect regression as the main analysis and Huber-White regression as an alternative analysis.

This research finds that founding-family firms have a negative effect on managerial ability. Further, the result shows that lower managerial ability occurred when founding-family firms led by founder and professional CEOs, when other family members involved in the ownership and the board have higher family ownership. It indicates that founding-family firms concern more about family interest, such as family reputation, rather than business needs and best management practice.

Limitation of this research does not occur if the founding-family firms are managed by first, second, third, etc., family generation. Future research expected to consider family generation in founding-family firms management.

This research can be used by founding-family firms in Indonesia as consideration of management policy formulation that can improve managerial ability.

This research provides new evidence if founding-family firms promote lower managerial ability in emerging market such Indonesian market where family businesses are the root of private businesses which have a major contribution to economics.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which founding‐family firms create value. In particular, the paper investigates how agency costs and monitoring capabilities influence the value creation process.

The empirical analysis relies on unique hand‐collected ownership data that has been collected for all Swedish publicly listed firms in the years 2001 to 2010 (2,128 observations). The research design employs level regression specifications and they are tested using pooled cross‐sectional regressions with controls for year and industry fixed effects.

The paper confirms previous studies that firms with founding family ownership have a higher value (Tobin's Q) and higher performance (RNOA). In contrast to prior studies, the paper finds that firm value and performance is significantly higher when ownership is concentrated the most. The paper also shows that firm value and performance is significantly lower for long‐term non‐founding‐family ownership.

This is one of the largest single‐country analyses of founding family owner effects on value and performance in publicly listed firms. The paper confirms known associations between ownership and performance in a unique institutional setting. The paper extends previous research findings by identifying differences in value and performance between founding family owners and long‐term non‐founding‐family owners.

The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that the quality of earnings of family run firms is superior to that of the other firms and that firms run by founding family members exhibit this trait even more prominently. Using insights from the fundamental accounting valuation model, this study also hypothesizes that financial markets place a higher weightage on earnings than book value for founding family-run firms in Thailand as these firms report a more reliable earnings number.

This is an empirical archival research.

The authors report evidence that financial markets place a higher weightage on earnings than book value for founding family-run firms. The evidence is consistent with the insight that current earnings of the founding family-run firms offer more information about future earnings and cash flow compared to book value than those for family (FAM) and non-family (NonCS) firms. The authors also provide evidence that earnings persistence and the accrual quality of the founding family firms are higher compared to the other firms. This evidence is contrary to the notion that family firms have more opaque disclosures, lower earnings quality and higher implied cost of equity capital.

The authors find support for the alignment hypothesis of the long-term family ownership of Thai firms. The authors consider these evidences consistent with the shareholder interest alignment hypothesis of the controlling shareholders as opposed to the entrenchment hypothesis.

The study implies that earnings of the Thai firms run by founding family members are more reliable and can be relied on more for firm valuation. Additionally, the authors also offer a different methodology by appealing to the valuation properties of the reported accounting numbers besides looking at the quality of accruals and earnings persistence tests offered in the existing literature.

The society is better off if there are more opportunities to invest in Thai firms run by founding family members. The finding of the quality difference in governance by firms with founding family members is new. Therefore, the study points to the need of finer partition of the family firms while looking at their corporate governance practices. The fact that the FF firms offer a higher quality of earnings implies that they are less engaged in opportunistic manipulation of earnings and cash flow and, thus, are self-motivated to protect the longer term interest of the firms.

This if the first time the accounting fundamental valuation theory has been used to provide evidence of higher earnings quality.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether family firms (FFs) differ from non-family firms (NFFs) in their propensity and likelihood of repurchasing shares. It focuses on the effects of voting control and managerial control of family members and economic conditions on repurchasing activity.

This paper employs pooled Tobit and probit models for a sample of 982 US firms for the period 2006 through 2015 and separates the roles of voting control and managerial control on influencing share repurchase decisions.

This paper provides evidence that FFs have a decreased propensity to repurchase shares relative to NFFs over the sample period. In general, the decreased propensity to repurchase shares is driven by the decision whether to repurchase shares and not the percentage of outstanding market value of equity repurchased.

For critics of share repurchases, this paper provides support for existing literature that FFs provide good long-term stewardship to their firms. In general, it demonstrates that FFs are less likely to repurchase shares than NFFs. Investors that have a preference for or against repurchases can use this information to improve their security selection process.

To date, the effects of family voting and managerial control on share repurchases in the USA has not been considered in the finance literature. This paper adds to the literature by providing evidence that family influence generally results in a lower propensity to repurchase shares.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the moderating role of family involvement on the corporate social responsibility (CSR)-firm performance (FP) relationship in the US hospitality industry. Building on agency theory, this study examines how family ownership, management and board control influence the relationship between CSR and FP.

To examine the moderating effect of family ownership, family management and family board control, this study adopts the two-way fixed-effects model and performs a panel regression analysis with robust standard errors. The sample period spans 1994–2018 and 565 firm-year observations are included.

This study finds that the impact of CSR on FP is positively moderated by the extent of a firm’s family member involvement. In specific, all three aspects of corporate governance (i.e. ownership, management and board control) positively moderate the relationship between CSR and FP.

Findings of this study yield several recommendations for hospitality managers, including shaping strategic decisions for implementing CSR, by providing a unique perspective that the involvement of founding family members can be helpful in enhancing firm value through CSR activities.

This study sheds light on the further understanding of the CSR-FP link in the hospitality literature. In addition, this study provides practical guidelines for hospitality firms in the context of CSR by revealing possible advantages of strengthened founding family involvement.

The purpose of this paper is to explore corporate social performance attained by listed family and non-family firms in Japan. They are measured by the composite CSP index and five attributes composed of employ relations, social contributions (SCs), firm security and product safety, internal governance and risk control, and environment concern.

The authors employ univariate and regression analyses on the quantitatively aggregated CSP score data of Japanese firms from 2007 to 2009.

Japan non-family firms tend to perform better than family firms in terms of attaining corporate social performance overall. Family CEOs positively affect CSP in the foods, textiles and apparels, and pharmaceutical industries as well as in retail trade, wholesale, and services industries, but negatively affect CSP in the heavy manufacturing industry. In these industries the joint effect of the percentage of family shareholdings and the fraction of family members on the board also augments the positive role played by family CEO. The findings are robust when the sample is ranked by Tobin’s q.

The observation period is short due to the data availability of CSP by Toyo Keizai Inc. This data covers all the listed firms which answered the questionnaire, which may also contain sample selection problems.

Positive role of CEO and negative effects of shareholdings among listed family firms in Japan call for attention and corrective measures for top management and family shareholders.

While family firms in Japan may accumulate socioemotional wealth, they should exert more efforts to advance CSP and create social capital.

This is the first comprehensive quantitative study in the field, which explored CSP of all the listed family firms vs non-family firms in Japan with large sample.

The purpose of this paper is to provide some illustrative evidence to understand the distinctive forms of governance implemented by a well-established family business group (FBG) and to highlight the relative importance given to the different dimensions of socio-emotional wealth (SEW) during the internationalization process.

Drawing on multi-level and longitudinal data, the research provides in-depth insights into how the affiliated firms are linked to the focal firm, how the founding family in a large FBG organizes the top leadership roles spanning multiple countries and whether the inter-organizational and inter-personal networks changes over time and which are the most important items representing the SEW dimensions.

From the findings, it emerges that family ownership, family leadership and the presence of trusted people as pivotal actors in the FBG’s internationalization process.

The originality of the research stems from its contribution because despite providing illustrative evidence based on a single case-study, the findings offer additional insights over the importance of and the instrumental role played by SEW preservation as a perspective to explain FBGs’ internationalization.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how family ownership enhances or damages firm value.

The paper studies a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) between 1999 and 2007 and apply multivariate regression with firm value as a dependent variable. The paper measures firm value as Tobin ' s Q and ROA based either on net income or EBITDA. The independent variables include family firm dummy and ownership percentage.

It is found that control-enhancing mechanisms which are often employed by family companies add value to companies. Furthermore, it is found that agency conflicts between ownership and management are less costly than those between majority and minority shareholders, suggesting that family ownership helps resolve the agency conflicts between ownership and management and in turn enhances firm value. Finally, it is found that family companies with founders as CEOs outperform those with descendants as CEOs.

The paper studies Canadian family firms; as such, the sample size is not relatively large. Nonetheless, the results should be generalized as Canada is one of the largest markets in the world and have high integration with the rest of the world.

The results suggest investors should invest in family ownership firms.

The paper shows whether firm ownership increases firm value and the determinant of family firm value.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of independent directors in reducing firms’ information asymmetry. Moreover, the authors enrich this investigation by differentiating the effectiveness of independent directors in an intriguing comparative setting of family vs non-family firms. Family firms are used to represent an interesting environment where controlling insiders (i.e. firms’ founding families) have dominant control over corporate decisions. This study addresses the question of whether controlling-insiders dominate independent directors.

The authors manually collect firms’ founder information to identify family firm status in a sample of S&P 500 firms. Following a large literature in capital market research, the authors proxy information asymmetry by trading volume, bid-ask spread and price volatility. The authors employ multivariate regression with two-stage least square analysis, instrumental variable method, Heckman selection model and Hausman–Taylor model to address the issue of endogenous selection of board of director and family firm status.

The authors find a negative relation between the board independence and information asymmetry, suggesting independent directors are effective in reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, the authors find this negative relation is stronger in family firms. These results are robust after controlling for the endogenous issues using various models.

Our results suggest that independent directors in family-controlled firms are more successful in reducing information asymmetry than their counterparts in non-family firms. The authors provide direct evidence to support the existing theoretical arguments from Rediker and Seth (1995) and Anderson and Reeb (2004) that founding families and independent boards might be a powerful combination for aligning the interest of insider and diffused shareholders. The findings ease a prevalent concern that the role of independent directors might be compromised in an environment with controlling shareholders, and advocate regulations promoting board independence for various business practices.

A number of studies concentrate on the practice of corporate disclosure of firm’s performance and governance and how corporate disclosure mitigates information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of independent directors in reducing information asymmetry. The research adds to understanding the incentives of board members and supports recent findings that different types of investors have heterogeneous incentives for corporate disclosure (Srinidhi et al., 2014).

Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of founding families and the degree to which they monitor operations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of family ownership, control, and CEO dividends on CEO incentive compensation.

The sample consisted of 194 firms, covering about 40 percent of the relevant S&P SmallCap 600 firms. Employed were a logistic regression of the presence of incentive compensation plan and a panel regression of incentive compensation ratio against the family ownership, family CEO, CEO ownership, and dividend income variables as well as firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables.

For 1,532 firm-year observations among S&P SmallCap600 index firms during 1999-2007, the authors found that family ownership and CEO dividend income ratio negatively related to the likelihood of an incentive compensation plan and to the ratio of equity-based compensation to total CEO pay. Additionally, the effect of CEO dividend income was limited to firms with outside CEOs.

Boards of small capitalization firms should consider the incentive effects of CEO dividend income and CEO family membership when setting their compensation policies.

S&P SmallCap600 index firms are unique because they are much smaller than those listed in the S&P 500 or the Fortune 500, and are subject to more family influence. SmallCap firms are comparable in size to the foreign firms previously researched but are still well covered by analysts, and benefit from audited financial statement variables, which include dividends and stock market returns.