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This paper examines the role that effective governance plays in driving the strategies of grant-giving foundations as it relates to supporting various types of charitable and philanthropy activities of public interest. Today, foundations are more than ever active as pivotal element of the so called ‘private welfare state’ all around Europe and the United States. While other forms of organizations involved in philanthropy and public welfare face competition (i.e. corporations), budget constrain (i.e. governments) or fundraising imperatives (i.e. NGOs), private foundations do not feel such a pressure and can, therefore, tackle social issues that other organizations may not. Despite this privileged position, the role of governance in such non-profit organizations is far from certain. Prior literature review shows the lack of empirical analysis related to the role of governance in foundations as they attempt to shape various projects of strong public interest.

Given foundations’ unique societal role and obligations and the fiscal advantages enjoyed by them, the objective of this study is to explore the factors that drive their decision-making and resource allocation process and to examine the efficacy of their financial and non-financial resource allocation decisions. Using the data collected from 112 large Italian foundations, this paper studies the relationship between the governance mechanism and philanthropic strategies of private foundations.

The significance of the study is based on the fact that in the non-profit sector, more than in the for-profit one, board members are called to play a strong advisory role at the top of their traditional monitoring role. In other words, active boards are expected to screen relevant public needs and to properly invest foundations’ resources in meritorious projects; while inert boards risks to pursuit private goals, camouflaged as public interest, and to dissipate resources by unconditionally financing unrelated grant requests.

This paper aims to empirically examine if and how different governance attributes associate with different philanthropic strategies. The choice of Italian foundations represents an ideal research environment considering the strong reduction of governmental social spending due to the financial crisis and the simultaneous increase in the social relevance of private foundations to support social causes of significance.

Recent literature has investigated the composition, responsibilities and characteristics of non-profits’ boards, but there is a lack of research on the link between governance practices and preferences related to philanthropic strategy. This study integrates the strategic philanthropy literature with recent works in the area of governance to understand how organisations’ approach to governance can lead to different strategic approaches. The empirical section presents the results of a survey conducted among 144 decision makers (presidents, board members, managers) that belong to the largest Italian foundations. Using perceptual data, the exploratory results show significant associations between selected governance items (satisfaction of decision makers, usefulness of managerial reports, activism of board members) and the four pillars of strategic philanthropy.

The results of the study reveal where and when foundations’ decision makers believe that well-governed private foundations can act more effectively and efficiently than individual donors and poorly governed foundations can. Conclusions facilitate the formulation of guidelines and recommendations to professional players and regulators who are interested in enhancing the social value foundations can create.

Purpose – Grant-giving foundation leaders are increasingly concerned with understanding the primary role their institutions are pressured to play in financing the growing nonprofit sectors. The main objective of the chapter is to determine whether effective governance plays a major role in driving foundations’ innovation and value-creation processes.Methodology – Building on the idea that foundations should act as financial partners, managerial experts, and innovator facilitators who deal with the projects proposed by nonprofit organizations, this chapter uses a survey and the annual reports of Italian grant-giving foundations to isolate their records in term of governance, innovation attitude, and performance.Findings – The results of this chapter contribute to improving understanding of the drivers that help foundations to improve the sophistication level of the grant-giving process. In particular, the analysis of governance provides relevant insights about the path foundations follow to incorporate selected tailored methods and practices from the “for profit” competitive arena to improve foundations’ output and nonprofit grantees’ outcomes.Social implication – Many academics, political leaders, and practitioners expect foundations to play the unique dual role of merchant bank and venture capitalist to foster the positive impact of nonprofit organizations on societies and people. The findings of this chapter facilitate this process.Originality/value of the chapter – The main contribution of this study lies in proposing and testing a theoretical framework that foundations can implement to disseminate liquidity and managerial expertise efficiently among selected grantees and to improve grantees’ social outcome.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the governance structures of corporate foundations in the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.

After discussing the heretofore-underutilized research advantages of corporate foundations, the authors survey theoretical perspectives to explain the corporate foundation phenomenon. The authors build on this theory to construct a typology of corporate foundation structures based on their interactions with internal and external stakeholders.

The findings suggest that many of the largest corporations do not embed their corporate foundation into their strategic plan as they define it (i.e. specific alignment with corporate competency).

Research limitations include an examination solely of the 50 largest corporate foundations among a field of nearly 3,000 corporate foundations. The authors advance a research agenda that addresses the potential role of corporate foundations in fulfilling CSR.

The foundation field may see a movement toward corporate foundations being strategically aligned with the parent company’s core competence as external stakeholders continue to pressure companies.

Studying corporate foundations is important as they serve as intermediaries between corporations and civil society. Thus, they will continue to play an important role in the CSR agenda.

This paper is one of the first to examine the corporate foundation phenomenon, with a specific focus on their governance. Thus, the authors go beyond the motivations that lead corporations to be involved in “socially responsible activities,” the types of activities that corporations select, and how these choices produce benefits for a diverse set of stakeholders.

As founders of First Interstate BancSystem, which held $8.6 billion in assets and had recently become a public company, and Padlock Ranch, which had over 11,000 head of cattle, the Scott family had to think carefully about business and family governance. Now entering its fifth generation, the family had over 80 shareholders across the US. In early 2016, the nine-member Scott Family Council (FC) and other family and business leaders considered the effectiveness of the Family Governance Leadership Development Initiative launched two years earlier. The initiative's aim was to ensure a pipeline of capable family leaders for the business boards, two foundation boards, and FC.

Seven family members had self-nominated for governance roles in mid-2015. As part of the development initiative, each was undergoing a leadership development process that included rigorous assessment and creation of a comprehensive development plan. As the nominees made their way through the process and other family members considered nominating themselves for future development, questions remained around several interrelated areas, including how to foster family engagement with governance roles while guarding against damaging competition among members; how to manage possible conflicts of interest around dual employee and governance roles; and how to extend the development process to governance for the foundations and FC. The FC considered how best to answer these and other questions, and whether the answers indicated the need to modify the fledgling initiative.

This case illustrates the challenges multigenerational family-owned enterprises face in developing governance leaders within the family. It serves as a good example of governance for a large group of cousins within a multienterprise portfolio. Students can learn and apply insights from this valuable illustration of family values, vision, and mission statement.

We survey private foundations for governance factors and internal processes that help explain why they barely miss (or not) the benchmark for qualifying distributions that would save them taxes on net investment income. Private foundations are subject to a 2% tax rate on their net investment income. If qualifying distributions are above a benchmark, the foundation qualifies for a 50% reduction in the tax rate to a 1% tax rate. This tax rate structure provides a “cliff effect” where the additional distributions required to qualify for the lower tax rate may actually be less than the potential tax savings (Sansing & Yetman, 2006). For example, one foundation in our sample could have saved $15,613 in tax by paying an additional $318 in distributions. We view this situation as a clear governance failure. Our first contribution to the literature is that board interest and information system strength affect the likelihood of avoiding such a governance failure, even after controlling for the general quality of management with management compensation and professional fees. Our second contribution is that foundations without sufficient financial savvy and sophistication appear to pay higher taxes. Given the large number of small, relatively unsophisticated foundations in America, differential tax rates based on sophistication is an interesting policy debate.

The emergence of Governance practices in the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector has become associated with increasingly high levels of organisational complexity. In the light of an expanding civil society sector in Chile and the emergence of formalised governance practices, this paper explores the construction of the Executive Director role in Chilean NGOs with reference to organisational functions, organisational dynamics, and external influences.

Grounded theory is used to explore qualitative data derived from a set of N = 39 interviews conducted in Chile These interviews involve NGO founders, funders, Executive Directors, scholars, consultants, and team members.

The findings reveal the pivotal role played by Executive Directors in conducting organisational activities which, in other types of organisations, are often distributed across various organisational functions. The data also highlight complex dynamics involving overt compliance with external regulatory requirements, uncertainties about financial sustainability, the recruitment of Executive Board members, the exercise of power by Executive Directors, and the influence of founders in leadership configurations.

The implications of the study are discussed in relation to the governance and accountability of NGOs, the nature of the Executive Director role, the purpose of Executive Boards in the NGO sector, and the recruitment and training of Board members. It is noted that the study was conducted in the NGO sector in Chile; further research is necessary to establish the generalisability of the findings to other contexts.

This paper addresses the shortage of organisational research on NGOs. It contributes by offering analytical perspectives on organisational processes of Leadership and Governance. This paper highlights the relationship between, and interdependency of, those processes.

The chapter elaborates how organizational governance can optimally address workplace bullying, a synergy possible because organizational governance seeks to promote ethical functioning while workplace bullying is considered an unethical behavior. Through its suggestions, the chapter aims at furthering employee dignity and well-being, cohering with international calls for human rights at work.

A review of two literatures was conducted: (a) workplace bullying differentiated on the basis of its situatedness and level into internal bullying – of an interpersonal and depersonalized nature – and external bullying; and (b) organizational governance including its theoretical perspectives, especially the societal lens, and international, national, and firm codes.

Several organizational governance measures at institutional level – both international and national in scope – and at firm level are proposed to deal with varieties of workplace bullying encompassing primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Accordingly, a shift in organizational effectiveness from goal-based models to process-oriented frameworks so that economic and non-economic objectives are balanced, following the stakeholder approach, is advocated. The political dynamics involved in such an initiative are alluded to.

Application, drawing on secondary rather than primary data, is the essential thrust of the chapter, with recommendations anchored in organizational governance, particularly its societal perspective, conceptualized to address workplace bullying in a holistic manner.

First, despite the clear relevance of organizational governance to workplace bullying, the prospect of interventions from this standpoint has never been previously explored. Second, the term “varieties of workplace bullying” is propounded to capture the different types of emotional abuse at work known so far.

Corporate governance has experienced numerous changes in chime with the exigencies of the time during which it has been introduced or the context in which it has been practiced. Its gestation can be divided into three stages of development namely the traditional governance, the current transitional governance, and the upcoming sustainable governance. Traditional governance refers to the period hitherto the industrial revolution when corporations have not yet been formed, in today’s sense, but the governance structures were already in place in the existing entities at the time. Transitional governance refers to a period between the industrial revolution and the information age when corporations started to rise as a new economic entity. Reviewing the dominant corporate governance models are integral to understanding the transitional era. At the end of the transitional governance era, a transmogrification in corporate governance is underway to prepare itself for the coming age of sustainability. Sustainable governance integrates the principles of systems thinking and appreciates the complexity of decision-making environment, contrary to its former iterations that welcomed oversimplification of interactive messes (systems of problems). The objective of this chapter is to review corporate governance developmental transition toward sustainable governance and its role in the age of sustainability.