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The research is aimed at investigating how relational mechanisms and formal contracts affect alliance success under constructive and destructive conflict.

While relational mechanisms and formal contracts are widely used in strategic alliances to manage a variety of issues among partners, recent research has indicated that effects of these governance mechanisms may change in distinct contexts. Adopting the lens of new institutional economics, this study provides insights on the comparative and interactive effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success, and the differential contingency effects of two types of inter-partner conflict, i.e. constructive and destructive conflict, on the above relationships. The authors use hierarchical multivariate regression analyses through a survey dataset of 392 alliance firms in China with the approach of two key informants.

The empirical results confirm that relational mechanisms have a stronger positive effect on alliance success than formal contracts and these two governance mechanisms complement each other in driving alliance success. When facing a high level of constructive conflict, partner firms rely to a greater extent on relational mechanisms than on formal contracts to achieve alliance success. When a high level of destructive conflict exists, partner firms depend more heavily on formal contracts than on relational mechanisms to achieve alliance success. Moreover, the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms is much stronger when partner firms face high constructive conflict than when they face high destructive conflict.

This study discloses the comparative and interactive effects of relational mechanisms and formal contracts on alliance success in distinct contexts by identifying the moderating roles of constructive and destructive conflict.

Prior research has confirmed the usefulness of both formal and informal protection mechanisms for governing knowledge flows. However, there is lack of research on the motivation and needs driving firms in their choice of mechanisms for each situation. The aim of this paper is to examine the reasons for choosing formal or informal mechanisms.

The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 209 companies engaged in R&D. A Partial Least Squares was used for the analyses.

This study identifies statistically significant relationships between the protection need and the firm's strategy. The results indicate that there is variance in the use of mechanisms when there is a specific motivation for seeking protection, and when the firm faces difficulties related to protection issues.

The data were gathered in a single country. The results may be different if practices in a culture based more on informal relations, with less efficient patent system, were investigated.

The study provides managers with useful information on the informal protection of knowledge and innovations when resources are limited. In particular, it helps them to identify situations in which informal mechanisms are potentially more useful.

This study adds to the literature by studying quantitatively the relationship between the recognised need for protection and the choice of formal and/or informal protection as a strategy. It combines both formal and informal mechanisms. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is one of the few studies examining HRM-related protection mechanisms.

This paper aims to analyze the influence of governance mechanisms in the generation of relational rents for supplier in short food supply chains (SFSCs).

This study used data from a survey of 181 organic producers in SFSCs, using partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) with the aid of the SmartPLS® 3 software for the analysis.

The results show the relationship between formal and informal governance mechanisms and relational rents. The predominance of informal mechanisms enabled a higher explanatory power than that provided by formal governance mechanisms. Further, the authors found that the complementary use of governance mechanisms has a stronger impact on generating relational rents. However, contextual factors such as relationship time, power asymmetry and uncertainty in demand have not shown any influence on governance mechanisms for generating relational rents.

The result sheds new light on the relevance of governance mechanisms to foster relational rents to suppliers in SFSCs. It also shows that contextual factors that affect relationships in traditional supply chains do not play a relevant role in SFSCs due to their specific characteristics.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the relationship between knowledge transfer characteristics in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, the influence of alliance governance mechanisms on knowledge transfer consequences and investigate the role of environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer of alliance.

Survey data were collected mainly in high-tech industries of China, the firms in which often establish alliance for the purpose of learning and knowledge transfer often takes place in that alliance. Finally, 293 usable samples were included in subsequent analysis. Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the hypotheses.

The extent of relational (/formal) governance mechanism used in alliance has a stronger positive relationship with the extent of tacit (/explicit) knowledge transfer in alliance than with the extent of explicit (/tacit) knowledge transfer in alliance between them; environmental uncertainty impairs relational governance mechanisms and enhances formal governance mechanisms used in alliance; both relational and formal governance mechanisms could facilitate knowledge transfer in alliance; environmental uncertainty hinders knowledge transfer and negatively moderates the relationship between alliance governance mechanisms and knowledge transfer.

This paper finds the relationship between knowledge transfer in alliance and alliance governance mechanisms, and the role of environmental uncertainty, providing managers with direct implications about how to manage alliance with different knowledge transfer characteristics for the purpose of facilitating knowledge transfer in alliance; provides managers more details about the dark side of the environmental uncertainty in knowledge transfer, also reminds public policy-makers paying enough attention for the improvement of institutional environment to deal with uncertainty.

In this chapter, the authors argue that organizational controls are best depicted and studied as sets of control configurations. Concepts from extant control research streams describing basic control elements as well as ideal types of control systems are used to identify and classify control configurations. The authors present compositional distinctions among four control configurations using a decade-long case study of a start-up company. By displaying how specific control elements are simultaneously distinct and intertwined in this company, the authors reveal significant theoretical insights that can assist scholars in distinguishing between different configurational patterns and in comprehending dynamics present in holistic perspectives of control. The authors conclude by discussing how conceptualizing controls as configurations most accurately reflects both organizational and managerial practice in ways that can motivate the development of new theories and approaches to studying this key aspect of organizational design. Because control configurations inherently reflect interdisciplinary concerns, and because such configurations affect the attainment of strategic goals, this work provides findings and ideas that fit the interests of a broad audience.

The purpose of this paper is to explore intra-firm coordination in temporary organizations (TOs). Specifically, it identifies and explains how operational coordination evolves over time in a particular TO: the 2016 Olympic Games Organizing Committee.

This is an immersive case study based on qualitative analysis and longitudinal fieldwork, which allowed the observation of operational coordination in real time. The main sources of data are participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and internal documents of the TO.

The findings suggest that operational coordination in TOs dealing with multiple and decentralized operations takes place through the combination of both formal and informal coordination mechanisms. Further analysis indicates a contingency logic in using these mechanisms, shaped by the presence of specific coordination challenges in different phases of work. Three main aspects influencing coordination are explored. First, it is suggested that TOs are inherently “hybrid.” That is, they comprise enduring as well as temporary and centralized as well as decentralized elements. These elements change over time. Second, a formal transition phase is explored: “venueization” – a phase between planning and operation in which centralized structural elements and processes are translated to operational units. Third, since TOs present emergence and dynamism, and related challenges across various phases of work, coordination is arguably contingent on the phase of the project.

Although the findings are limited to a particular empirical context, this paper offers theoretically new insights concerning the hybrid nature of processes in TOs, the contingent use of complementary coordination mechanisms, and the importance of the venueization phase, and provides a basis for future research into operational coordination in TOs.

The findings can help practitioners understand and identify the challenges embedded in temporary contexts and develop coordination strategies accordingly.

This study explains how operational coordination takes place in TOs enabled by formal and informal mechanisms, which are contingently combined over time through particular coordination strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse how the use of governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships in the supply chain (SC) are related to the maturity of relationships and the generation of relational rents.

Several studies have analysed interorganisational governance in SCs. However, to the best of the knowledge, no study has focussed on the use of different types of governance mechanisms through maturity stages in buyer-supplier relationships and as a consequence, its relational rents. The aim of this paper is to analyse how the use of governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships in the SC are related to the maturity of relationships and the generation of relational rents. To achieve this goal, this paper carried out multiple case studies.

The results show that changes in the use of formal and informal governance mechanisms contribute to the generation of relational rents and relationship continuity. This paper identified that a reduction in power asymmetry by the buyer may allow for the greater use of informal governance mechanisms and greater relational rents. Moreover, the paper highlights that a relationship might advance or regress throughout the maturity stages, according to the commitment of the buyer to maintain the relationship with the supplier.

The study has the limitation of having chosen polar case studies in the organic sector in Brazil to illustrate the theoretical discussion and propose a model to be tested via further research. This study considered institutional factors in the analysis that might not affect dyadic relationships in other sectors and countries.

As a managerial contribution, the results indicate that when the buyer uses both kinds of mechanisms complementarily and encourages the utilisation of informal mechanisms, relationships become more resilient to adverse events.

The study also contributes towards valuing the role of organic farmers and encourages the government and business community to reflect on the challenges and opportunities in the sector.

Based on four propositions created by evaluating both the empirical data and previous literature, this paper proposes a buyer-supplier relationship maturity model rather than an overall SC maturity model. This paper also elaborated on the arguments of Dyer et al. (2018), proposing a causal explanation of how a relationship might advance or regress throughout the maturity stages, according to the commitment of the buyer to maintain the relationship with the supplier using governance mechanisms. This change in maturity stages, in turn, affects relational rents for the dyad.

This paper illuminates the distinction between individual and organizational actors in business-to-business markets as well as the coexistence of formal and informal mechanisms of coordination in multinational corporations. The main questions addressed include the following. (1) What factors influence the occurrence of personal contacts of foreign subsidiary managers in industrial multinational corporations? (2) How such personal contacts enable coordination in industrial markets and within multinational firms? The theoretical context of the paper is based on: (1) the interaction approach to industrial markets, (2) the network approach to industrial markets, and (3) the process approach to multinational management. The unit of analysis is the foreign subsidiary manager as the focal actor of a contact network. The paper is empirically focused on Portuguese sales subsidiaries of Finnish multinational corporations, which are managed by either a parent country national (Finnish), a host country national (Portuguese) or a third country national. The paper suggests eight scenarios of individual dependence and uncertainty, which are determined by individual, organizational, and/or market factors. Such scenarios are, in turn, thought to require personal contacts with specific functions. The paper suggests eight interpersonal roles of foreign subsidiary managers, by which the functions of their personal contacts enable inter-firm coordination in industrial markets. In addition, the paper suggests eight propositions on how the functions of their personal contacts enable centralization, formalization, socialization and horizontal communication in multinational corporations.

Previous research shows that implementing lean construction is not a straightforward task. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of formal and informal mechanisms in implementing lean principles in construction projects.

The paper draws on a single case study of the implementation of innovative lean principles in a public construction project in Norway. The study is based on qualitative data, including 17 semi-structured interviews with 21 individuals, document analysis, and observations in meetings and seminars, in addition to informal conversations.

Formal mechanisms, including contractual arrangements, have the potential to both facilitate and hamper the implementation of innovative lean principles in a construction project. They might create coherence, but at the same time they might limit the scope of the concept in such a way that others do not accept it. Informal mechanisms, including social and lateral relationships and trust aid implementation, both directly by creating commitment and by modifying the challenges that the formal mechanisms potentially incur. Formal mechanisms may, in turn, nurture the informal ones.

The research is based on a single case study within the Norwegian public sector, which is dependent on specific public procurement regulations and subject to strong contractual traditions.

The research extends the existing knowledge of implementation of lean construction in the construction industry. It helps refining the understanding of the role played by formal and informal mechanisms, and the interplay between them in the implementation process. This knowledge is also relevant for process innovations in construction in general.