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This chapter is concerned with access to bank finance by ethnic minority businesses (EMBs) in the U.K., focusing particularly on the process of decision-making by bank managers with respect to credit applications by entrepreneurs from ethnic minority groups. The results reported in this chapter are taken from a major U.K. study that included two large scale surveys of EMB owners and a white control group, case studies with ethnic minority entrepreneurs and a programme of interviews with business support agencies. Whilst referring to other evidence, this chapter focuses on the findings from a series of interviews with bank representatives. The U.K. study was funded by the British Bankers’ Association (BBA), the Bank of England and the Small Business Service and supported by the Commission for Racial Equality.

Informal associations are typical features of farm and non-farm ventures especially within rural communities. Owing to the informality of these associations, members of the groups usually evolve strategies to cope with different kinds of economic and social shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic or unexpected economic recessions. Accordingly, entrepreneurship and non-farm business development in rural areas require massive finance input, which this group largely lacks owing to agrarian activities which is the main source of revenue. Therefore, to inform rural development policies, this chapter draws on the interrelationships that exist between finance options (including formal, informal and social networks) and small business development. Using the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), the analytics identifies informal financing and social networks as leading alternatives to formal financing option in rural businesses. Therefore, we suggest that the government institutions recognise and formalise informal finance systems. This will not only aid access to government interventions and programmes, but foster collaborations with existing formal institutions and investors for sustainable rural business financing.

To provide a selective review of most recent developments in experimental economics of banking and lending and to summarize and synthesize the experiment designs and results in banking under asymmetric information.

The review includes recently published or working papers (2006–2013) that exclusively employ experimental economics methodology, especially for studying the impact of formal or informal institutions on lending in credit markets.

The results of the reviewed experimental studies provide support for the important role of both informal (e.g., relationship banking and reputation) and formal (e.g., third-party enforcement; collateral) institutions and their impact on credit market performance, as well as the importance of studying the interaction of the two types of institutions.

The number of studies reviewed is fairly small but growing, indicating that this is the area of growing significance.

Controlled economic experiments are better able to address the questions regarding the direction of causality in empirical relationships. Economic experiments are particularly useful in studying complex markets like credit and capital and in eliciting specific effects of institutions on credit market performance. Such well-established empirical relationships will be able to provide guidance for policy making for financial market reform.

This is the first review of laboratory research in banking and lending under asymmetric information that aims to call attention to this area of research and serves as a starting point for an interested researcher and provide future direction.

The development of banking in Africa followed the demand of exchange networks from traditional indigenous economies to colonial exchange with the European world. The establishment of European banking institutions reflected the needs of the capitalist economy introduced by colonialism. The banking management of late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European banks adhered to the interests of shareholders. This chapter shows the emergence of well-managed banks in Africa, but after decolonization the political economy of African independence resulted in state capturing of financial institutions in most African countries. The South African banking system developed in close adherence to the British model. State-owned post-independence banks in Africa failed to deliver the development envisaged. The chapter shows the adverse impact of global economic developments on Africa, resulting in high debt levels. Structural adjustment of African economies and new market-oriented policies allowed the development of locally owned private banking institutions. The high-cost structure of the formal banking system from the dominant South African banks incentivised the mobile money innovation, an arena where African entrepreneurs lead global markets. Financial inclusion remains low in Africa.

Both consumer and corporate credit ratings agencies played a major role in the US subprime mortgage crisis. Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion deployed a formalized scoring system to assess individuals in mortgage origination, mortgage pools then were assessed for securitization by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch relying on expert judgment aided by formal models. What can we learn about the limits of formalization from the crisis? We discuss five problems responsible for the rating failures – reactivity, endogeneity, learning, correlated outcomes, and conflict of interest – and compare the way consumer and corporate rating agencies tackled these difficulties. We conclude with some policy lessons.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.