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This paper aims to examine the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) attributes on foreign shareholdings from the perspective of an emerging economy.

This study examined Bombay Stock Exchange listed firms from the Indian stock market and applied a balanced panel data approach with fixed effect estimation technique during the period 2010–2019.

The study shows that CEOs’ financial education and a higher level of education positively affect foreign shareholdings. The age and experience of CEO have a positive and significant impact on foreign shareholdings. Firms with male CEOs are preferred more by foreign investors. The effect of CEO busyness and CEO duality is negative on foreign shareholdings. Foreign investors prefer to invest in firms with foreign nationality CEOs. Furthermore, the robustness test reveals that the influence of CEO attributes on foreign shareholdings is stronger for new, small and stand-alone firms than for old, large and group-affiliated firms.

The study will be beneficial for a diverse audience ranging from firms’ board of directors, regulators and policymakers who are entrusted with the CEO recruitment process. Additionally, firms seeking external financing should disclose CEO information adequately and improve the reporting quality to attract foreign investors, as they consider CEO characteristics as a valuable signal before making investment decisions.

In light of the current legislative reforms, this study can be recognized as one of the early studies that explore the relationship between CEO attributes and foreign shareholdings in the context of an emerging economy.

Documents evidence on the interdependence between the mechanisms used to control the agency costs in Turkish manufacturing firms where the external control devices are restricted and most of the firms have concentrated ownership. The ownership concentration, board size and composition, managerial shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, and family shareholdings are the selected devices. Evidence reveals that the proportion of insiders on the board is positively related to the percentage of family shareholdings and negatively related to the percentage of foreign institutional shareholdings and ownership concentration. Board size shows a significant negative relation with all the control mechanisms except the debt ratio. The finding that the managerially controlled firms have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms and the family controlled firms supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The capital market seems to complement the institutional shareholdings, family shareholdings, and ownership concentration in monitoring the CEOs.

The purpose of this paper is to test the relative strengths of efficiency and opportunistic considerations in making client auditor choice decisions in an emerging audit services market. The authors examine whether the degrees of foreign and institutional shareholdings, audit complexity, industry orientation (i.e. whether the firm belongs to the banking sector), ownership concentration in the hands of domestic sponsor shareholders, state ownership, power concentration in the hands of a CEO who is also the chairperson of the board, and audit risk affect the demand for superior monitoring by Big‐4 auditors.

The authors carry out a multivariate analysis using binary logit regression technique. They test whether efficiency or opportunism rules auditor choice of firms in their sample. Efficiency‐based variables used in the authors' models include foreign shareholding by a multinational parent, institutional shareholding, audit complexity and whether the firm belongs to the banking sector. Opportunism‐based variables include ownership concentration in the hands of domestic sponsor shareholders other than government, government shareholding, power concentration in the hands of a CEO who holds the position of chair as well, and audit risk.

The authors find that opportunistic considerations outweigh efficiency considerations in shaping auditor choice decisions in their sample. Two out of four efficiency arguments (foreign shareholdings in the hands of a multinational parent and institutional shareholding) support efficiency as the main driver of auditor choice while one (client belonging to the banking sector) indicates otherwise. On the other hand, three out of four opportunism arguments (government shareholding, CEO‐chair duality and audit risk) document opportunistic considerations to be the main forces behind auditor choice. The influence of foreign shareholding becomes apparent only when the foreign shareholder is the controlling shareholder.

This paper is the first of its kind to address auditor choice in an emerging market context. No other paper looked at auditor choice using efficiency‐opportunism incentives. The paper contributes to our understanding of auditor choice dynamics in emerging markets. The finding that institutional shareholding is associated with choice of high quality auditors is encouraging. Individual small investors can use institutional investors as a shield to protect their investment through the higher quality auditing linked to the presence of institutional investors.

This research seeks to understand how shareholder constituencies including controlling family, nonfamily insiders, as well as domestic and foreign institutions in the corporate governance system of emerging economy firms perceive institutional risks in terms of regulative, normative, and cognitive institutions and influence strategic choices in the internationalization of their invested firms.

The sample data are Taiwanese publicly listed companies in the electronics and computer industry. Panel data of the parent firms and their overseas affiliates are available from the annual report and Taiwan Economic Journal database. Country-level data are available from the World Investment Report and the IMD World Competitiveness Report. Statistical regression models including tobit and logistic regression are used to analyze the data.

Controlling family and nonfamily insider shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a shared ownership. Domestic institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to adopt a shared ownership and enter in host countries with larger and smaller institutional distances in terms of regulative and normative institution, respectively. Foreign institutional shareholders tend to influence their invested firms to enter in institutionally smaller host countries through a whole ownership.

The strategic choices of foreign market entry made by emerging economy firms are significantly shaped by the different risk perceptions of shareholder constituencies in their corporate governance system toward the institutional distances between the home and the host country.

This study examines the impact of ownership structure on firm financial performance, for 146 manufacturing firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for the period 2003–2012.

The theoretical background of the present study is based on the agency theory. Ownership structure is measured by institutional shareholdings, insider shareholdings, foreign shareholders and government shareholdings, while return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), market-to-book ratio (MBR) and Tobin's Q (TQ) are used as proxies of corporate financial performance. The dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) method is employed to cater for the issue of endogeneity.

We find that institutional ownership exerts a significant positive impact on ROE and MBR, which suggests that institutional investors play a significant role in improving the financial performance of the sample Pakistani. Furthermore, the results reveal a significant positive relationship of insider ownership with ROA, ROE, MBR and TQ, which is consistent with the prediction of agency theory that concentration of insider ownership aligns the interest of shareholders with those of the managers and hence improves performance. A significant positive association of government shareholdings with ROA and ROE was also found. Therefore, policymakers may encourage government ownership in firms, which can help to improve corporate financial performance.

The present study contributes to the existing literature on ownership structure and corporate financial performance in an emerging market like Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that the institutional setup and corporate governance structure in Pakistan is yet at an evolving stage. Findings of this study may provide useful insights to corporate managers and investors about the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance of firms from the manufacturing sector in Pakistan.

The paper examines the differential impact of various firm characteristics on firm value across various threshold levels of foreign ownership.

Using a panel of 408 Indian publicly listed companies for the period during 2010–2018, a fixed-effect panel threshold regression model is adapted to study the threshold effects between foreign ownership and firm value. Tobin's Q is used as a proxy for firm value.

The study identifies three threshold levels, that is, four threshold regions in which foreign ownership changes its slope considerably. Various firm characteristics impact firm value differently in these four regions.

The study employs observations of the past nine years on variables identified as firm characteristics impacting firm value. Some variables are dropped due to the problem of multicollinearity. The employed variables may not be exhaustive in nature.

The present study implies that there exists no impact of foreign ownership on the value of the firm. Foreign investors invest for financial considerations and not with the objective of governing the firms. The governance effect of foreign investments is negligible, so their activism in the firms needs to be encouraged.

The study employs a novel approach to study the impact of foreign ownership on firm value applying fixed effect panel data threshold regression, considering foreign ownership as a proxy of corporate governance.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether financial institutions, which are highly regulated entities, experience fewer sanctions and have lower penalties (mandatory and regulatory) if they have better corporate governance performance (voluntary).

This study uses unique corporate governance data endorsed by the authorities and sanction information for financial institutions in Taiwan from 2014 to 2020 to examine whether regulatory compliance is associated with corporate governance for financial institutions. This study also examines the moderating effects of shareholding concentration, governmental shareholding and foreign institution shareholding on this relationship.

The positive association between compliance and governance is found. In addition, partial results show that the positive relationship is less profound when the shareholder concentration is higher and more profound when government shareholdings are higher.

The findings of this study support the premise that a well-structured, non-mandatory corporate governance evaluation mechanism, that is actively established and monitored by the appropriate authorities, may influence the compliance performance of financial institutions which is mandatory and minimum social requirements.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of board financial expertise on the shareholding of foreign institutional investors in an emerging equity market of China and to explore whether ownership concentration moderates the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment.

To test the hypothesized relationships, this study uses panel data regression models, i.e. static (fixed effect and random effect) and dynamic (two-step generalized methods of moments) models. Further, to control the possible endogeniety issue, this study uses two instrumental variables, namely, board size and industry average financial expertise of board to proxy board financial expertise. This study covers a period from 2006 to 2015 for 169 listed Chinese firms.

The results revealed that foreign institutional investors positively perceived board financial expertise and holds more shareholdings with the increasing level of financial experts at boards of directors. Moreover, ownership concentration positively moderated this relationship. It means that in highly concentrated firms, the board financial expertise conveys a stronger signal to foreign institutional investors that firms can manage financial resources rationally by controlling negative effects of ownership concentration. Further, the robustness model also confirmed the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional shareholdings.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board-level financial expertise as a determinant of foreign institutional ownership. Further, no previous study has used ownership concentration as a contextual variable on the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment.

This study focuses on listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. It found that an increase in the ownership proportion of institutional investors (INs), including foreign investors, investment trusts, and dealers can enhance the informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between these factors follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, indicating that excessively high ownership ratios can actually lead to a decrease in the informativeness of stock prices. Additionally, increasing the ownership proportions of foreign investors and investment trusts can reduce the risk of stock price collapse, while dealers show no significant relationship in this regard. This study also reveals that the technical variable of the price deviation rate is an important explanatory factor for post-collapse returns. It is positively correlated with the magnitude of the price decline after a collapse, meaning that stocks with weaker pre-collapse performance experience larger post-collapse declines. When the data during the 2020 pandemic period are excluded, changes in foreign ownership ratios show a significant positive correlation with postcrash returns in both the long and short term. The significant correlation in the short term may be due to a high proportion of foreign ownership. Any reduction in this could put pressure on stock prices, and retail investors may follow suit and sell-off, using foreign investors as a reference. The significant correlation in the long term might be due to foreign investors themselves possibly also trying to avoid the pressure that their own short-term sell-offs could exert on stock prices. The changes in the ownership ratios of investment trusts and dealers indicate that medium and long-term changes have a significant impact on postcrash returns, while the changes in the major players' ownership show no significant correlation. When data from 2020 are included in the analysis, the significance of all INs decreases.

The authors examine the industrywise investment preferences of foreign portfolio investors (FPIs), domestic institutional investors (DIIs) and retail investors in the Indian context. They also investigate the factors influencing their preferences.

Using the quarterly shareholdings and returns data of the Indian market from March 31, 2009 to March 31, 2018, the authors employ analysis of variance to study investors' preferences and a random effect panel data model to examine the factors that influence these preferences.

FPIs hold proportionally more stocks in service-oriented industries and large-cap firms, DIIs hold proportionally large numbers of shares in paper industries and retail investors hold proportionally more shares in chemicals and textiles. FPIs prefer stocks with a high export-to-sales ratio and firms registered on a foreign stock market. Domestic investors, especially retail investors, prefer small-cap stocks and firms whose operations require local knowledge. In addition, industry heterogeneity determines investment decisions. Firm-specific and macroeconomic factors that influence investment decisions differ across industries. Finally, government policies and reforms also play a key role in attracting investors.

Policymakers can identify the key variables that influence investment, which can help direct and regulate investment in India and similar emerging markets.

This study fills a research gap by addressing how industry-level heterogeneity affects investors' preferences in terms of the industrywise preferences of different types of investors and the factors that influence their preferences.