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The fatal conceit is the assumption that the world can be shaped according to human desires. This chapter argues that the logic of the fatal conceit can be applied to foreign interventions which go beyond the limits of what can be rationally constructed by reason alone. In suffering from the fatal conceit, these interventions are characterized by: (1) the realization that intentions do not equal results, (2) a reliance on top-down planning, (3) the view of development as a technological issue, (4) a reliance on bureaucracy over markets, and (5) the primacy of collectivism over individualism. These characteristics explain why interventions extending beyond the limits of what can be rationally constructed tend to fail.

This paper analyzes how the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” in foreign interventions abroad have changed the dynamics of government activities domestically. Facing limited or absent constraints abroad, foreign interventions served as a testing ground for the domestically constrained U.S. government to experiment with drone technologies and other methods of social control over foreign populations. Utilizing the “boomerang effect” framework developed by Coyne and Hall (2014), this paper examines the use of drones abroad and the mechanisms through which the technology has been imported back to the United States. The use of these technologies domestically has substantial implications for the freedom and liberties of U.S. citizens as it lowers the cost of government expanding the scope of its activities.

The aim of this chapter is to describe the purpose of the introduction of the exchange rate commitment by the Czech National Bank (CNB) in the period from November 2013 to April 2017 and its effects on the real economy. The main reason for introducing the exchange rate commitment was concern about the possibility of a prolonged deflationary period in Czechia. Given that the standard monetary policy instruments had already been exhausted on easing the monetary policy conditions, the CNB Bank Board opted for an exchange rate commitment. The secondary objective of the exchange rate commitment was to boost the economy through the positive effect of a weaker koruna on exports. Next, we focus in more detail on the effect of the exchange rate commitment in the economy and the course of the foreign exchange interventions. Overall, we can summarize that the CNB's foreign exchange interventions were an extraordinary monetary policy instrument – in a market economy with inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate – used in extraordinary times.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

This chapter addresses the relationship between foreign interventions and the democracy of the intervened country. In other words, I discuss how foreign interventions have affected the quality of the democratic institutions of the country that is being intervened. Latin America has been chosen for this endeavour, and more specifically, three countries have been chosen as case studies: Nicaragua, Cuba and Brazil. Furthermore, I analyze two types of foreign interventions: military and economic interventions. Nicaragua, Cuba and Brazil have experienced both types of interventions. In order to do this comparison, I look at the predominant interventionists in Latin America: the United States and China.

The paper aims to investigate the determinants of China’s daily intervention in the foreign exchange market since the 2005 reform aimed at moving the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate regime towards greater flexibility.

The paper uses bivariate probit models to test whether China’s intervention decision is driven by three sets of factors, comprising Model I (basic model), Model II and Model III.

Evidence from the models suggests that medium-term Chinese interventions tend to be leaning-against-the-wind, whereas long-term interventions are leaning-with-the-wind. Furthermore, by analyzing exchange rate volatility, this paper finds that intervention is used by the Chinese central bank to ensure that there are no big swings in the RMB exchange rate.

The paper will be of value to other researchers attempting to understand the policy of the central bank and, in particular, the factors that can lead to interventions during periods of financial crisis.

This chapter reviews the literature to contextualize the intervention in the post–cold war era characterized by the momentum of globalization dominated by informal actors beside the legal authority of the state. It indicates how these actors deviate the primary purpose of the humanitarian intervention and create an ungovernable environment of the state particularly when interventions are operated in countries endowed with natural resources. The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) serves as a model to ascertain such phenomenon in which actors such as states involved in intervention come in collusion with shadow elites, lobbyists and multinational companies to establish clandestine networks of illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. The chapter winds up by suggesting the redefinition of policies of interventions to keep humanitarian intervention in its primary mission while holding actors involved in illegal and smuggling of natural resources accountable.