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This chapter analyses the recovery of the Danish economy from the crisis of the 1980s, its elevation to a bit of an ‘economic miracle’ or at least an ‘employment miracle’ from 1995 to 2005 and its subsequent decline during the financial crisis, which revealed more long-standing problems that precluded a quick recovery. The solution of Denmark's structural balance of payment problems in the early 1990s paved the way for long-term prosperity, and Denmark managed the challenges of globalisation and deindustrialisation almost without social costs. However, an accumulation of short-term policy failures and credit liberalisation facilitated a credit and housing bubble, a consumption-driven boom and declining competitiveness. In broad terms, the explanation is political; this includes not only vote- and office-seeking strategies of the incumbent government but also ideational factors such as agenda setting of economic policy. Somewhat unnoticed – partly because of preoccupation with long-term challenges of ageing and shortage of labour – productivity and economic growth rates had slowed down over several years. The Danish decline in GDP 2008–2009 was larger than in the 1930s, and after the bubble burst, there were few drivers of economic growth. Households consolidated and were reluctant to consume; public consumption had to be cut as well; exports increased rather slowly; and in this climate, there was little room for private investments. Financially, the Danish economy remained healthy, though. Current accounts revealed record-high surpluses after the financial crisis; state debt remained moderate, and if one were to include the enormous retained taxes in private pension funds, net state debt would de facto be positive. Still, around 2010–2011 there were few short-term drivers of economic growth, and rather unexpectedly, it turned out that unemployment problems were likely to prevail for several years.

Microfinance which refers to the issuance of microloans and the delivery of other related financial services to mostly necessity entrepreneurs has remained a major developmental tool across the developing world. With its inception from Bangladesh’s village of Jobra in 1976, microfinance has provided financial capital to many poor households to engage in income-generating activities in order to increase their assets and reduce vulnerability. Most often than not, necessity entrepreneurs who endeavor to start their own businesses depend on microfinance as a source of financial resource into their Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs). Using Ghana as the study country, this study investigated the impact of microfinance on the necessity entrepreneurs in the areas of poverty reduction, employment generation as well as the various difficulties associated with Microfinance delivery in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. We conducted a paper-based survey with 378 MSE owners from this region. The results indicate that microfinance has contributed to employment generation and poverty reduction in the Greater Accra region of Ghana through the provision of microloans to necessity entrepreneurs to engage in various types of income-generating activities. However, necessity entrepreneurs are faced with loan inadequacy issues coupled with under-financing difficulties. More so, they are also faced with non-flexible loan terms and cumbersome loan application procedures which do not support business expansion and employment generation. This study contributes to the debate on the social logic concept of microfinance delivery and poverty reduction. Microfinance therefore remains an indispensable tool in supporting necessity entrepreneurs in promoting self-employment.

This paper explores the emerging articulations between microfinance and livestock production cycles among Mongolian pastoralists in contexts plagued by disaster and commodity market fluctuations. Ethnographic investigations of household production and vulnerability in two rural districts of eastern and western Mongolia demonstrates that both poor and wealthy households have become ensnared in a cashmere-debt cycle but that the bifurcation of livestock asset trajectories between large and small herds has also fostered diverse financial and herd management strategies that further exacerbate existing inequalities.

We extend Diamond's (1989, 1991) life-cycle hypothesis to posit that, once they reach the stage of bank borrowing, firms begin with prime loans and evolve toward borrowing more cheaply at LIBOR as they grow larger, less risky and less characterized by asymmetric information. We conduct multinomial logit regressions to explain firms’ membership in one of three groups: prime only, prime and LIBOR, and LIBOR. We also examine spreads over prime and LIBOR and find that loans set up to allow borrowing at prime carry higher spreads than those allowing borrowing at LIBOR. Both sets of tests support the life-cycle hypothesis.

This chapter studies banks’ loan pricing behavior in mainland China during 2003–2013 by applying panel regressions to firm-level loan data and the estimated default likelihood for listed companies. The authors find that with the progress of market-oriented financial reforms, banks generally require compensation for their exposure to borrowers’ default risks. It is even more so if the borrower is a non-state-owned enterprise (non-SOE), mainly due to the pricing behavior of the Big Four banks. Bank lending rates are shown to be less sensitive to the default risks of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our results also reveal that banks priced in firm default risks before 2008 financial crisis, but not necessarily so after the crisis. As for industries, we find that after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the real estate sector and other government-supported industries tended to enjoy better terms on loan pricing in terms of default risks. We believe the main reason is that the government stimulus policies tilted toward those industries that have played crucial roles in China’s economic growth.

This paper is concerned to show how the Danish political elite interpreted and responded to the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis for the Danish economy. In particular, the paper describes how this interpretive construction focused primarily on three features of the Danish context to the exclusion of other perspectives; the first was an emphasis on the problems of the financial sector, of interest rates and state finances; the second was that Danish productivity increases were falling behind other comparable countries and part of the solution required new strategies towards labour and unemployment benefits; thirdly, the adverse effects of the crisis were causing an increase in government expenditure and a decline in government revenues which was rapidly becoming unsustainable. As a consequence, the Danish elite fell into the broader interpretation of the crisis embedded in the dominant view within the EU institutions as well as among the international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, that a period of austerity and fiscal consolidation was the required remedy, even though this was likely to be pro-cyclical in its effects. However, the paper shows that alternative data which is more reflective of Denmark’s position in the global economy and the trajectory and form of its growth over the last decade reveals that the interpretation of the Danish elite has been too narrow and neglects the distinctive roots of Denmark’s competitive strengths. Indeed, by responding in the way which they have, the Danish elite is in danger of undermining the very conditions of Denmark’s competitiveness.

Macao survived the COVID-19 pandemic with only 46 confirmed cases and zero death (Macao Government Information Bureau, 2020). As one of the densest tourism cities in the world, Macao was as vulnerable as any other cities under severe outbreak. The success was the result of instant responses from government, support from large enterprises and cooperation of the community. The pandemic fighting process was examined in five phases, in which a few key criteria were demonstrated in managing the crisis. Despite the positive result, the Macao government also learnt a lesson in future planning when the pandemic once again revealed the weakness of sole dependence on the tourism industry.

Ọsẹ dúdú production and sale constitute a major indigenous business among the Yoruba people. Scholars have noted that the business is capable of boosting the socio-economic status of black soap entrepreneurs and of countries. However, ọsẹ dúdú enterprise has some significant threats and problems that are yet to be researched. This chapter examined the challenges of osẹ dúdú entrepreneurs in Southwest Nigeria. Twenty-six interviews were conducted among indigenous black soap producers and sellers in Ogun, Oyo and Lagos States. Data were analysed in themes. Weather, financial, spiritual, copyright and succession challenges, as well as issues such as a large number of sellers, debt, lack of support, pricing and brand competition, were found to be problems faced by black soap entrepreneurs. This chapter concluded that certain controllable and uncontrollable factors were not only capable of limiting the development of osẹ dúdú business but also have adverse implications for the achievement of the sustainable development goals through the indigenous resource. This chapter suggests that osẹ dúdú business actors such as mechanical engineers, local fabricators, financial institutions, and governmental and non-governmental agencies collaborate with black soap entrepreneurs to ameliorate the challenges of the latter. It is only through this alliance that black soap entrepreneurs can contribute to indigenous business development and the achievement of sustainable development goals in Africa.

The final chapter of this volume brings together the key debates from this book and situates them within an ever-developing policy landscape. It argues that the themes this volume raises around the two competing uses of ‘business’, both figurative and literal, continue to drive developments in widening participation (WP). It draws together threads around the figurative usage of business to consider the ways in which the ideology of marketisation has impacted the sector to date and continues to shape policies in this area. Considering the more literal ways in which WP has become the ‘business’ of the sector, this chapter draws together threads from across the second part of this book, which examined how higher education providers (HEPs), further education colleges, new providers and third sector WP organisations all enact WP as part of their ‘business as usual’. This chapter concludes with a summary of changes to the market structure introduced since the Higher Education Research Act (HERA, 2017), such as the levelling up White Paper (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 2022), the Department for Education (DfE, 2022a) higher education policy statement and Office for Students (OfS) regulatory consultations (OfS, 2022b), and questions whether these represent minor tweaks to a recently embedded policy environment or indeed render much of the 2017 settlement redundant. Whether these are considered as continuity or change, in the final analysis, they suggest that there remain tensions among those responsible for the executive/ideological policy direction, with corresponding knock-on effects elsewhere on the enactment staircase. What remains clear, however, is that the contradictions inherent in the dual imperative – the human capital needs of the country juxtaposed against a desire for a more socially just society – remain unresolved while a ‘level playing field’ market order is layered over such a steep institutional hierarchy.

All over the world, the role of central banks is being redefined following the outbreak of the global financial crisis and subsequent breakdown of the “great moderation” consensus. Consequently, most advanced economies adopted non-conventional approaches of monetary policy which resulted in spill-overs to emerging markets and developing countries with implications on their financial system and monetary policy transmission. This, coupled with, internal developments in the financial systems of developing countries necessitated modifications of not only monetary policy frameworks but also responsibilities of most central banks. This chapter acknowledges possible evolutions of the financial structure variables in developing countries and uses data from Kenya to analyze the dynamic linkages between financial sector variables and monetary policy transmission in the light of the financial crisis. The study used structural vector autoregression to examine the relationship between financial structure variables and monetary policy as well as assess the relative importance of various monetary transmission channels in Kenya. The results show that the changing financial structure represented by credit to the private sector and stock market indicators in Kenya only slightly altered relative importance of monetary policy transmission. The insignificance of credit to the private sector suggests that the importance attached to the bank lending channel in previous studies is waning while the marginal significance of the stock market indicator signals the potential for asset price channel. The results also indicate that the interest rate and exchange rate channels are relatively more important in Kenya while the asset prices is only marginally significant and bank lending channel is the weakest in the intermediate stage of monetary policy transmission. However, transmission of monetary policy to the ultimate objectives is somewhat slow and weak to inflation and almost absent to output. The result implies a limited role of monetary policy on growth and questions the wisdom of pursuing multiple objectives.