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The objective of the study is to determine if an over-borrowing bias emerges when the state fiscal base is shared by multiple general-purpose and special-purpose jurisdictions serving different groups of citizens.

This study uses panel data from all 50 states in the US from 1997 to 2007 to estimate models of total debt levels of state governments and total debt levels of all local governments aggregated at the state level. For comparison, it also estimates total debt levels of state and local governments taken together for the same years.

This study finds that jurisdictional overlap will increase state government debt, local government debt, as well as combined state and local government debt.

The finding from the study suggests that the fiscal common-pool model provides a more accurate analysis and more appropriate understanding of the institutional composition at the state and local public sector, especially for the vertical dimension of the local public sector where there are more specialized and overlapping jurisdictions.

In its recommendation on the 2004 update of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), the European Commission (2004) issued country-specific recommendations for fiscal policy in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that have recently joined the European Union (EU) (henceforth the EU-10 countries). All countries except Estonia and Slovenia were urged to reduce their general government deficits, or to pursue low budget deficits in a credible and sustainable way within the multi-annual framework of EU budgetary surveillance. Some countries have received additional recommendations (the Czech Republic to reform its health care and pension systems, Estonia and Lithuania to avoid pro-cyclical policies, and Poland to reform its pension system). Most new Member States will consequently have to reduce their fiscal deficits and/or will have to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies to comply with the BEPGs, but also because of the required convergence within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Bearing in mind that the government balance for the new Member States was –5.7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003, the required reduction of fiscal deficits will not be easy. This has been acknowledged by the Commission, which has argued that the need to reach and maintain sound budgetary positions will require an appropriate time path between the necessary consolidation and the appropriate fiscal stance supporting the transition. Particular attention will also need to be given to country-specific circumstances, in particular to initial budgetary positions, to ongoing structural shifts in the new Member State economies, and to the possible risks resulting from current account imbalances and strong credit growth.

This paper reviews Korean intergovernmental relations in the 1990s with an emphasis on fiscal relations among the different levels of the government. In the 1990s, Korea reinvigorated its system of local autonomy first established in the sixties. A major issue in the implementation of this system is the presence of vertical and horizontal disparities in local fiscal capacity. Although some efforts have been made to transfer tax sources from central government to local governments or establish local transfer (block grants), fiscal autonomy still remains below expectation, jeopardizing the realization of full local autonomy. This paper is an effort to look into these issues and search for solutions.

The objective of this study is to understand the budgetary role of national legislatures in euro area (EA) countries and to analyse implications for fiscal discipline.

Building on the budget institutions literature, a legislative budgetary power index for all the 19 euro area (EA) countries is constructed using Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and European Commission data as well as data generated from questionnaires to national authorities. A two-way fixed effects panel data model is then used to assess the effect of legislative budgetary power on the budget balance in the EA during 2006–2015.

Overall, in the EA, formal legislative powers vis-à-vis the national budgetary process are weak, but there is more legislative involvement in Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) procedures, and legislative budgetary organisational capacity is generally quite good. In contrast to the traditional view in the budget institutions literature, this study’s empirical findings show that strong legislative budgetary power does not necessarily result in larger budget deficits.

Data on legislative budgeting were available from different sources, and time series data were very limited.

There is scope to improve democratic legitimacy of the national budgetary process in the EA, without necessarily jeopardising fiscal discipline.

The constructed legislative budgetary power index covers all the 19 EA countries and has a broad scope covering various novel institutional characteristics. The empirical analysis contributes to the scarce literature on the impact of legislative budgeting on fiscal discipline.

Recently many European countries have incurred crises in public finance despite the fact that EU institutions have pushed the national governments toward the sustainability of public finance with compulsory and voluntary rules regarding fiscal governance. This paper investigates the relations between the quality of fiscal governance and the financial virtuosity of national fiscal policy. We proposed a general framework for analyzing the fiscal governance issue and we empirically tested the correlation between the dimensions of fiscal governance and the budgetary performance of EU countries. The results showed a positive correlation between the quality of fiscal governance in the EU countries and financial surplus in the period concerned. However further investigations are needed and an effort should be made to collect uniform data on fiscal governance in the European Union.

Making citizens able to monitor and evaluate public spending activities is a fundamental issue in public financial management literature. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether fiscal transparency, measured by the Open Budget Index, has an effect on public spending performance, measured by the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report data.

Research methods rely on random-effects panel regression models on a country-level panel data set of 82 world countries observed in the 2008–2015 time interval.

Results show that the potential positive effects of fiscal transparency are mediated by the level of democracy of the country. In detail, in democratic countries, a higher degree of disclosure of fiscal information is correlated with a higher efficiency of government spending while, in non-democratic countries, fiscal transparency does not seem to provide any effect.

The results suggest that fiscal transparency can be a powerful device where politicians can be held accountable for their actions, while it could fail to provide positive results where a strong and effective vertical accountability is missing.

The novelty of the paper is twofold. First, it provides new additional evidence about the positive effect that fiscal transparency has on public spending efficiency by advancing previous research on this topic (Porumbescu, 2017; Montes et al., 2019). Second, the paper investigates conceptually and empirically how the positive effect on public spending efficiency determined by fiscal transparency depends on the degree of democracy present in the institutional environment in which fiscal information disclosure is implemented.

This article examines the effect of party composition of government on the centralization of budgeting institutions in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 1989-1999, and assesses the impact of the centralization of budgeting institutions on the capacity of these countries to meet the fiscal deficit requirement for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership. The article finds that centralization of budgeting institutions through delegation to a strong finance minister and/or prime minister is likely to occur in one-party governments or coalition governments composed of parties which expect to fight repeated elections together, with effective punishment mechanisms. The article finds that countries with centralized budgeting institutions are likely to be more capable of meeting the EMU deficit requirement than countries with decentralized institutions.

The purpose of this study is to examine the cyclical pattern of social expenditure during 1980-2012 for a set of Asian countries. The extant literature available so far has captured the cyclicality of fiscal policy only for member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and for Latin American countries. Moreover, previous studies have largely ignored Asian countries.

The analysis used panel data from global macro-databases of the International Monetary Fund, Statistics of public expenditure for economic development and Asian Development Bank. The cyclical components of social spending (health, education, and social protection) and GDP were determined by using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. In line with the existing literature on fiscal cyclicality (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Lane, 2003; Frankel et al., 2013) that has examined the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle, regression analysis is used to examine the impact of political and institutional factors on the behavior of social spending.

It was found that government social expenditure is procyclical across Asian countries during 1980-2012. However, during the past decade, emerging Asian countries have been able to shift from procyclical to countercyclical social spending. This shows that they had taken several initiatives to boost expenditure in the social sector – be it in social protection, health, or education services. The significant determinant of social cyclicality is the quality of institutions, which could help the government to increase fiscal deficit during recessions and repay the debt during economic booms. However, to some extent, their countercyclical action is restrained by the high accumulated level of public debt.

In the context of the Asian region, it is important to understand the cyclical pattern of social policy for several reasons. It has been said that crises offer an opportunity for countries to rethink their social policy to achieve more sustained and equitable development. By studying the social spending behavior, the authors can see whether Asian countries were able to grab the opportunity for reshaping their social and economic agenda after the Asian financial crisis.