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Research has focused primarily on the antecedents that influence the risk taking of CEOs themselves. This study examines how an important event experienced by a CEO at a direct rival firm influences a CEO's risk-taking. It also examines how prior firm performance relative to aspirations moderates the relationship.

In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an a difference-in-differences methodology.

Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that when a CEO wins a prestigious CEO award, competitor CEOs increase their firm risk-taking in the post-award period. The proclivity becomes stronger when their prior firm performance relative to aspirations is better. These findings suggest that a CEO winning a prominent CEO award influences competitor CEOs' risk-taking.

This study contributes to the literature on managerial risk-taking by highlighting that a star CEO winning a prominent award may serve as a striving aspiration and induce competitor CEOs to take risks, and that two different types of aspirations – striving and competitive aspirations – interact to influence the competitor CEOs' risk-taking.

The board structure (BS) is pivotal in modern corporate governance (CG). This study aims to investigate BS variables (BSIZE, BIND and chief executive officer [CEO] duality) and their correlation with risk-taking behavior indicators, enriching the understanding of how CG shapes financial institutions’ (FIs) decision-making in Pakistan.

By scrutinizing data from 67 financial entities listed on the Stock Exchange of Pakistan spanning from 2011 to 2022 through panel data regression techniques, the research emphasizes that BS holds a substantial influence over the risk tendencies exhibited by these firms.

Key findings suggest that board size has a positive influence, aligned with previous CG research. Smaller boards perform better and avoid excessive risk-taking, contrasting some negative relationship claims. More independent directors are recommended to curtail risk and financial disruption. Holding both CEO and chair roles reduces risk exposure, resonating with reputational and employment risk theory. It is essential to recognize that BS’s impact on risk-taking is nuanced and context-dependent.

Policymakers, scholars, practitioners and investors working in the market for financial companies might greatly benefit from the empirical findings of this study. Imposing mandates on FIs to uphold adequate capital reserves functions as a safeguard against unforeseen losses, thereby diminishing the probability of unwarranted risk-taking.

Prior studies in this domain predominantly focus on nonfinancial sectors. In addition, existing research often explores the relationship between BS and firm risk-taking solely within the banking sector, overlooking other FIs. This study contributes by using a comprehensive data set encompassing all types of FIs, thus extending the existing literature.

The paper aims to investigate corporate risk-taking following changes in firms' credit ratings (CR) and the mechanisms the firms use in implementing the risk-taking.

The paper employs fixed-effect regression models to examine risk-taking behaviour after firms experience changes in CR after their ratings are downgraded to the lower edge of the investment grade rating (i.e. BBB-) and after their CRs are downgraded below the investment rating.

The paper finds that, whilst in general, changes in CR are negatively associated with post-event risk-taking, firms downgraded to BBB- do not increase their risk-taking. Only when firms are rated below this grade, firms significantly increase their risk-taking, suggesting that the association between downgrades in CR and firm risk-taking following the event is not linear. Further analysis suggests that these downgraded firms do not increase research and development (R&D) expenses or capital expenditures but employ long-term debt as their risk-taking mechanism.

The findings of the paper have practical implications for investors considering investing in downgraded-rating firms to shareholders of such firms and especially to those overseeing the firms' risk-taking policies.

The study fills the gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence on corporate risk-taking after changes in CR and also contributes to the optimal debt-maturity choice literature.

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and corporate risk-taking in emerging markets where corruption is considered as “public enemy number one.”

The study measures corruption based on Corruption Control Index annually published by World Bank and examines how corruption affects corporate risk-taking in emerging markets covered in MSCI Emerging Market Index.

With a sample of 75,338 observations from 8,326 firms across 20 emerging stock markets during the period 2005–2016, the author finds that corruption negatively affects corporate risk-taking. Robustness checks with a reduced sample without China and India, alternatives of corruption measures, various measures of risk-taking and Generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator also show consistent results. Moreover, additional analysis shows that information disclosure mitigates the effect of corruption on risk-taking.

The extant literature implies that corruption may decrease corporate risk-taking behavior through two channels including operational cost and debt financing cost.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study aims to analyze whether the impact of stock options on firm strategic risk-taking changes across various quantiles and investigates the moderating role of firm performance.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-uniform association, the authors use a panel quantile method.

The results reveal that the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) stock options on firm strategic risk-taking varies across risk-taking quantiles. More specifically, the study’s results show a positive association at low quantile levels of strategic risk-taking, measured by research and development (R&D) and a negative linkage at high levels. The authors also find that firm performance moderates the impact of CEO stock options on strategic risk-taking.

The non-uniform relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking shows that the weight of CEO stock options in the total compensation can be a major determinant of the firm's strategic risk-taking attitude.

This study extends existing research on executive compensation and strategic risk-taking. Thus, this study has the potential to help stakeholders, board of directors and regulators, who are attempting to understand how the compensation contract – in particular, stock option pay – is related to the risk behavior of the agents and guide them to structure the executive compensation in an optimal way.

The authors empirically examine the impact of the stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking and firm value.

The authors argue that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the quality of corporate governance, which reduces corporate risk-taking and strengthens the firm value that might improve investor protection.

The authors find corporate risk-taking decline significantly for firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with firms that have a joint audit and risk committee. The authors also find that the presence of a stand-alone risk committee is positively associated with firm value.

The evidence is consistent with the proposition that firms with a stand-alone risk committee can effectively evaluate potential risks and implement a proper risk management system.

This is the first paper that investigates the association between the existence of a stand-alone risk committee and firm risk-taking in a multi-industry setting. Also, our research extends the association between a stand-alone risk committee and firm value.

This study explores the effects of the performance and corporate risk-taking behaviour of agricultural firms. Despite its importance in mitigating climate change, the agricultural sector also faces global competition, market liberalisation, rapid technological advances and the starter of stricter quality and safety procedures, all of which require firms to take greater risks.

This study explores this relationship by applying generalised least square (GLS), random effect methodologies (REM) and generalised method of moments (GMM).

The findings report a favourable relationship between firm performance and corporate risk-taking using a sample of firms from an emerging market.

The effects of these results for management practice and recommendations for further research were examined.

While this empirical study used a sample focused on a single industry, most previous studies focused on multiple industries. The originality of this study is its analysis of how firm performance affects corporate risk-taking in the Malaysian agriculture sector.

The main objective of the paper is to examine the relationship between managerial attributes (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) and firm risk-taking on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The study’s sample comprises 150 companies listed on the TSE from 2011 to 2017. Risk-taking is calculated as the standard deviation (SD) of stock return. Explanatory factor analysis was performed to calculate the weight of each of the five variables managerial ownership, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, board compensation and CEO duality as a proxy for managerial entrenchment. The study by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) was also used to calculate managerial myopia, and the study by Schrand and Zechman (2012) was used to calculate managerial overconfidence.

The results indicate that the effect of managerial entrenchment and managerial myopia on risk-taking of listed firms on the TSE is positive and significant, implying that an increase in CEO entrenchment is likely to give rise to risk-taking. The authors conjecture that this finding could be due to the investment projects impairing the firm performance in the long run. Furthermore, the effect of managerial overconfidence on listed firms' risk-taking on the TSE is significantly negative. Since overconfidence is one of the traits of narcissism and corporate managers tend to be encouraged and admired, it is implied that they tend to make efficient and low-risk investments that ultimately reduce the firm risk-taking.

Several theoretical studies show that managerial behavior is a determining factor in the economy. One of the reasons which justify the originality of this study is the context and institutional environment. Undoubtedly, managerial behavior (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) is expected to have some significant variations in developing countries compared to prevailing in developed countries, particularly in the Iranian stock market the economic sanctions. Furthermore, due to the direct impact of individuals' psychological and behavioral characteristics on their decisions and the effect of companies' risk-taking on increasing and decreasing shareholders and companies' wealth, this research is essential. Given the function of designed behavioral criteria for assessing risk-taking behaviors, the relationship between managerial attributes and firms' risk-taking is still unclear and investigated in this study.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of higher-quality auditors on corporate risk-taking.

Agency theory suggests that managers have incentives to avoid risk in the interests of perquisite consumption and self-preservation, while investors prefer that managers invest in all projects with a positive net present value, i.e. projects that generally increase corporate risk. Empirical literature finds that managerial risk-aversion is mitigated (and firm value enhanced) when investor protection is higher. The authors examine whether higher-quality auditing is one such mechanism to encourage shareholder-focused corporate risk-taking. They model measures of corporate risk as a function of whether a firm is audited by an industry specialist or not, controlling specifically for accounting quality. They then examine the incremental effect of higher-quality audits on other forms of external monitoring (analyst coverage and institutional holdings) for corporate risk.

Using a sample from 2003 to 2007, the authors document a positive relationship between local-level audit industry specialization and both the standard deviation of annual stock returns and research and development expenditures (their measures of corporate risk-taking). They then find the effect is mitigated when firms have alternative external monitoring, in the form of either higher analyst coverage or greater institutional holdings.

Given the nature of the question the authors ask, particularly in the context of the auditor–client relationship, a potential limitation is the difficulty in assigning causation. Nonetheless, this study underscores the importance of auditors as an effective mechanism for monitoring corporate managers.

This study provides novel evidence that auditors affect managerial decision making beyond a simple effect on financial statements, and should be of interest to boards of directors, regulators and investors.

This study aims to examine the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) personal characteristics on firms’ risk taking and the moderating role of family ownership on this relationship.

This study used 2,647 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period 2013–2021. To test the hypotheses, the authors used ordinary least squares regression and, to resolve the possible endogeneity problem, the authors used system generalized method of moments technique.

Drawing insights first from upper echelons theory, the authors report that CEOs with business, economics, finance and/or management educational background and female CEOs reduce firms’ risk-taking behaviour. Further, using insights from social and organizational identity theoretical perspectives, the results indicate that due to strong family affiliation and organizational identity, family owners exhibit risk aversion behaviour and moderate this relationship.

This study provides novel evidence of risk averse behaviour of CEOs with business, economics, finance and/or management educational background and female CEOs along with moderating impact of family ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy. Overall, the results extend empirical support for upper echelons and social identity theories in an emerging market context.