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This study aims to determine the optimum model of oil palm empty bunches (OPEB) management, to determine the optimal number of OPEB in waste management, which is then recommended to the company, and to know the achievement of various goals/targets with limited availability of resources.

This research uses quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative approach is done by processing the data for financing and profit analysis in OPEB waste management which is then used for resource approach. A qualitative approach is undertaken for weighing purposes in the analytic hierarchical program (AHP) analysis. The research location was determined purposively in the crude palm oil mill of PT. Pundi Lahan Khatulistiwa in Ambawang, Kubu Raya Regency.

In order that the optimal settlement can achieve the goal/target of minimal environmental pollution, low cost and profit gain, the amount of OPEB that must be managed by the company is 311 tons prioritized for productive plants compost of 66.67 tons, organic fertilizer of 11 tons and mushroom growing media of 233.33 tons. Consequently, the company's cost of IDR 4.000.000.000 still spares IDR 2.004.694.000. The OPEB management as oyster mushroom promises a relatively high profit compared to other OPEB managements even though the cost is not the least.

This research is one of the few studies that examines the waste management model of palm oil empty bunches, mainly located in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. Originality is seen from the use of optimization analysis tools with integration of AHP with goal programming.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

Planning for increased contractor profits should start at the time the contract is signed because low profits and lack of profitability are the primary causes of contractor failure. The purpose of this paper is to propose an integrated profit maximization model (IPMM) that aims for maximum expected profit by using time-cost tradeoff analysis, adjusted start times of activities, minimized financing cost and minimized extension of work schedule beyond the contract duration. This kind of integrated approach was never researched in the past.

IPMM is programmed into an automated system using MATLAB 2016a. It generates an optimal work schedule that leads to maximum profit by means of time-cost tradeoff analysis considering different activity acceleration/deceleration methods and adjusting the start/finish times of activities. While doing so, IPMM minimizes the contractor’s financing cost by considering combinations of different financing alternatives such as short-term loans, long-term loans and lines of credit. IPMM also considers the impact of extending the project duration on project profit.

IPMM is tested for different project durations, for the optimality of the solutions, differing activity start/finish times and project financing alternatives. In all cases, contractors can achieve maximum profit by using IPMM.

IPMM considers a deterministic project schedule, whereas stochastic time-cost tradeoff analysis can improve its performance. Resource allocation and resource leveling are not considered in IPMM, but can be incorporated into the model in future research. Finally, the long computational time is a challenge that needs to be overcome in future research.

IPMM is likely to increase profits and improve the chances of contractors to survive and grow compared to their competitors. The practical value of IPMM is that any contractor can and should use IPMM since all the data required to run IPMM is available to the contractor at the time the contract is signed. The contractor who provides information about network logic, schedule data, cost data, contractual terms, and available financing alternatives and their APRs can use an automated IPMM that adjusts activity start times and durations, minimizes financing cost, eliminates or minimizes time extensions, minimizes total cost and maximizes expected profit.

Unlike any prior study that looks into contractors’ profits by considering the impact of only one or two factors at a time, this study presents an IPMM that considers all major factors that affect profits, namely, time-cost tradeoff analysis, adjusted start times of activities, minimized financing cost and minimized extension of work schedule beyond the contract duration.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to introduce a financing scheme to tackle the manufacturer's capital constraint problem, discuss the effects of data-driven marketing (DDM) quality, cross-channel-return (CCR) rate and financing interest rate on the members' pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions and optimal performances, and analyzes `how to achieve the coordination within a dual-channel supply chain (DSC) by contract coordination.

This work establishes a DSC model with DDM, and the offline retailer can provide internal financing to the capital-constrained online manufacturer. The demand under the price is determined based on DDM quality, customer channel preference and delivery lead time. Then, combined with the Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions are discussed under the inconsistent and consistent pricing strategies with decentralized and centralized systems. Furthermore, it designs a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract to coordinate the members under the two pricing strategies.

(1) The increase of DDM quality will reduce the delivery-lead-time under the inconsistent or consistent pricing strategy and will push the selling prices; (2) The growth of the CCR rate will raise selling prices and extend the delivery-lead-time under the decentralized decision; (3) Under price competition, the offline selling price is higher than the online selling price when customers prefer the offline channel and vice versa; (4) The retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a win-win situation through a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract.

This paper contributes to the studies related to DSC by investigating pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions based on DDM, CCR, internal financing and supply chain contract and proposes some managerial implications.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal production and financing strategies for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a capital-constrained original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a risk-averse authorized remanufacturer (RM).

The authors formulate four models with different scenarios, namely, the OEM has sufficient capital; the OEM has limited capital without financing; the OEM adopts debt financing strategy; and the OEM adopts equity financing strategy. The equilibrium solutions of each scenario are obtained by backward induction method, the influences of risk aversion coefficient on the equilibrium solutions are examined and the OEM's optimal financing strategy is found by comparison analysis.

When the OEM's initial capital is limited and the equity dividend ratio is less than a certain threshold, the equity financing strategy is more advantageous for the OEM. However, if the OEM's initial capital is extremely scarce and the dividend proportion is large, the OEM prefers the debt financing strategy. When considering financing, consumer surplus always decreases as the risk aversion factor increases; the debt financing strategy is more environmentally friendly compared with the equity financing strategy. Only the debt financing strategy can make both members in the CLSC achieve a win-win situation in a certain region when the dividend ratio is sufficiently large.

It will be more fascinating if the model extends to such a case that the production operation situation in the CLSC composed of multiple OEMs in multiple periods. Furthermore, the remanufacturer's risk-averse information is asymmetry may be more realistic in our daily life.

There are three main differences from the existing research. One is that the remanufacturer's risk aversion originates from the uncertain remanufacturing cost instead of the uncertain market demand. Another is that the boundary conditions of the OEM prefer to adopt debt financing is obtained through the envelope theorem with Lagrange multiplier method. Last but not the least, this paper provides a good theoretical reference and practical guidance for the OEM to make the rational financing strategy selection in face of different degree of capital scarcity in the CLSC system. The value of the three aspects provides a theoretical basis for the optimal operation decisions of capital-constrained manufacturer considering the remanufacturer's risk aversion in the CLSC operation system.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal profit-and-loss sharing (PLS)-based contract when market frictions occur.

This paper opts for an adverse selection analysis and Monte Carlo simulation to assess the less risky contract for the principal and the agent when musharakah, mudarabah and venture capital financings are used in imperfect markets. Furthermore, this framework enables us to capture the level of market frictions that the principal can bear and the level of audit that he/she may undertake to mitigate bankruptcy.

The simulation results reveal that Musharakah is the less risky contract for the principal compared to Mudarabah and venture capital when the shock is low and high. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the increase of market frictions engender higher audit cost and profit-sharing ratios. The increase of the safety index in the case of high shock is most likely attributed to the increase of the audit parameter for all contracts to mitigate the selfish behavior of the agent. Accordingly, the principal tends to require a higher profit-sharing ratio to compensate for the severer information asymmetry.

This paper has two main limits. First, the results were not compared to real data because the latter are not available. Second, this paper is a general framework to determine the less risky contract for the principal and does not consider the firm and sectoral characteristics. However, it can be extended in various ways where stress can be put on conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent with the aim to determine the contract that aligns their interests. In addition, the examination of firm dynamics in the case of equity and debt financing can provide further arguments for economic agents regarding the value of the firm, the growth rate and the lifetime of the project when information is asymmetrically distributed.

The findings shed some light on the necessity of the Islamic finance experts to re-think of the promotion of Musharakah because it dominates the two other contracts when market frictions occur.

Although Maghrabi and Mirakhor (2015), Alanzi and Lone (2015) and Lone and Ahmad (2017) among others showed that profit and loss sharing can ensure economic growth, findings may motivate economic players to consider Musharakah financing with the aim to reach financial inclusion and social, which is in line with Shari’ah requirements and Islamic values.

Although several papers highlighted the financial contracting theory from Shari’ah perspective, they ignored the financial issues that are associated to adverse selection. This paper provides theoretical evidence regarding the selection of the less risky financing mode in case of equity financing using Monte Carlo simulation.

This paper aims to identify criteria for the better targeting of public funding for private social activities and organizations. As a starting point, it proposes that financing strategies can characterize organizations which are positioned on a for-profit/non-profit continuum. The paper then analyses how far the effectiveness of public support systems depends on recipients’ general financing strategies.

The study is based on data from a standardized small-scale survey. The analysis applies latent class analysis for the creation of a meaningful organizational dimension and applies them in an ordered logistic regression.

Despite their variety along a for-profit/non-profit continuum, organizations in the sample can be described by three meaningful dimensions, and the focal role of organizations’ financing strategies can be confirmed. Repeated project-based public support might create a harmful dependence on this kind of funds. To be effective, it needs to be targeted at nascent socially effective organizations with non-solvent clients.

Recognition of different financing strategies as meaningful characteristics of organizations with consequences for their long-term development is of direct practical relevance for a better design and targeting of financing systems in general and public support systems in particular.

Although the focal relevance of financing for the characterization of (social) organizations has been stressed before, the paper is able to operationalize the idea and to demonstrate its value in an application to the evaluation of project based support.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This study aims to focus on the optimal green R&D of a capital-constrained supply chain under different channel power structures as well as the impact of capital constraint, financing cost, channel power structure and cost-reducing efficiency on green R&D and supply chain profitability.

A two-echelon supply chain is considered. The upstream firm engages in green R&D but has capital constraints that can be overcome by external financing. Green R&D is beneficial to reduce production costs and increase consumer demand. Based on whether or not the upstream firm is capital constrained and dominates the supply chain, four models are developed.

Capital constraints significantly lower green R&D and supply chain profitability. Transferring leadership from the upstream to the downstream firms leads to higher green R&D levels and downstream firm profitability, whereas the upstream firm's profitability is increased (decreased) if green R&D investment efficiency is high (low) enough. Greater financing costs reduce green R&D and downstream firm profitability; however, the upstream firm's profitability under the model in which it functions as the follower increases if the initial capital is sufficient. More importantly, empirical analysis based on practice data is used to verify the theoretical results reported above.

This study reveals how upstream firms in supply chains decide green R&D decisions in situations with capital constraints, providing managers and governments with an understanding of the impact of capital constraint, channel power structure, financing cost and cost-reducing efficiency on supply chain green R&D and profitability.

The major contributions are the exploration of supply chain green R&D by taking into consideration channel power structures and cost-reducing efficiency and the validation of theoretical results using practice data.