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This paper aims to discuss the topic of financial speculation with special reference to forex and offers an analysis from the Maqasid Al-Shari’ah perspective, whereby authors propose to limit the outreach of speculative instruments in the financial markets.

The authors will make use of a simple textual analysis of existing materials and documents. To come up with conclusions, relevant to this study and to make them credible enough, the authors will undertake to review the existing literature in the next part of the paper and will later present his analysis of findings in light of financial crises and the objectives of Shari’ah.

The Maqasid Al-Shari’ah approach used in the analysis suggests that speculative financial instruments do not constitute a necessity, and their harmful practice must be limited to protect the religion, life, lineage, intellect and property.

Financial speculation in general and foreign exchange in particular must be regulated. Their current practices of financial system pose significant challenges for entire economies as well as individuals. Muslims should also avoid speculative financial instruments, such as forex, because they are a clear threat to individual and state wealth and prosperity. In addition, they threaten traditional businesses and social norms in Muslim societies.

This study aims to analyze the competition of two financial chains (FCs) when the government intervenes in the financial market to prohibit the excessively high-interest rate by minimizing the arbitrages caused by speculative transactions. Each FC comprises an investor and one intermediary, attempts to finance the capital-constrained firms in financing needs.

Using a Stackelberg game theoretic framework and formulating two- and three-level optimization problems for six possible scenarios, the authors establish an integrative framework to evaluate the scenarios through the lens of the two main decision-making structures of the FCs (i.e. centralized and decentralized) and three policies of the government (i.e. speculation minimizing, revenue gaining and utility maximizing).

Solving the problem results in optimal values for tariffs, which guarantee a stable competitive market. Consequently, policymaking by the government influences the decision variables, which is shown in a numerical study. The authors find that the government can orchestrate the FCs in the competitive market by imposing tariffs and prohibiting high-interest rates via regulating the speculation impacts, which guarantees a stable market and facilitates the financing of capital-constrained firms.

This paper aids the financial markets and governments to control the interest rate by minimizing the speculation level.

This paper investigates the impact of government intervention policies – as a leading player – on the competition of FCs – as followers – in providing financial services and making profits. The government imposes tariffs on the interest rate to stabilize the market by limiting speculative transactions. The paper presents the mathematical models of the optimization problems through the game-theoretic framework and comparison of the scenarios through a numerical experiment.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how non‐finance departmental involvement in the management of exchange rate risks impacts the extent of foreign exchange speculation in non‐financial firms.

Non‐financial firms in a small open economy (Denmark) are surveyed to investigate the extent of foreign exchange speculation and how it is related to the degree of nonfinance departmental involvement in the management of exchange rate risks. The authors employ binary and ordered probit regression analysis.

A positive link is found between the extent to which departments other than the finance department are involved in the management of exchange rate risks; and second, the extent to which the firm is likely to speculate – whether in the form of selective hedging or active speculation – on the foreign exchange market.

The findings indicate that the trend towards a more integrated risk management approach in which the finance department is not the only department responsible for risk management may have the (unforeseen) consequence that foreign exchange speculation increases.

The paper's findings are important because the link between the extent of foreign exchange speculation and a more integrated risk management approach has not been addressed previously.

This paper aims to conceptually analyse the role of speculation in society to determine whether agricultural commodity index funds, a new form of speculation, contribute to sustainable development.

The theoretical arguments justifying the value of the market economic system for generating sustainable development and the positive contribution speculators make too in this context are elaborated. It is then considered whether the arguments justifying traditional speculation hold for agricultural commodity index funds.

Traditional forms of speculation contribute positively to sustainable development; primarily due to the information they uncover on demand and supply factors which affect prices. Agricultural index funds are a danger to sustainable development, as their transactions are not based on demand and supply factors but simply represent demand for the diversification effect which commodities generate when added to an investment portfolio.

The article offers a new approach to assessing whether agricultural index funds contribute to sustainable development. Empirical research has been conducted on whether speculation via index funds has unjustifiably affected commodity prices. However, results of these investigations have been inconclusive due to stark limitations in data availability. By approaching the issue from a conceptual point of view, the article delivers theoretically sound arguments as to why agricultural commodity index funds are likely to have an unjustifiable effect on prices and, hence, are a danger to sustainable development. This has strong implications for finance practice and regulation.

The study endeavors to explore whether the financialization of agricultural commodities, traditionally viewed as a catalyst for price volatility, has any repercussions on food security in BRICS economies.

The empirical analysis employs the examination of three agricultural commodities, namely wheat, maize and soybean. Utilizing data from the Chicago Board of Trade on futures trading for these commodities, we focus on parameters such as annual trading volume, annual open interest contracts and the ratio of annual trading volume to annual open interest contracts. The study spans the period 2000–2021, encompassing pre- and post-financial crisis analyses and specifically explores the BRICS countries namely the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. To scrutinize the connections between financialization indicators and food security measures, the analysis employs econometric techniques such as panel data regression analysis and a moderating effects model.

The results indicate that the financialization of agricultural products contributes to the heightened food price volatility and has adverse effects on food security in emerging economies. Furthermore, the study reveals that the impact of the financialization of agricultural commodities on food security was more pronounced in emerging nations after the global financial crisis of 2008 compared to the pre-crisis period.

This paper seeks to draw increased attention to the financialization of agricultural commodities by presenting empirical evidence of its potential impact on food security in BRICS economies. The findings serve as a valuable guide for policymakers, offering insights to help them safeguard the security and availability of the world’s food supply.

Very few studies have explored the effect of financialization of agricultural commodities on food security covering a sample of developing economies, with sample period from 2000 to 2021, especially at the individual agriculture commodity level. Understanding the evolving effects of financialization is further improved by comparing pre and post-financial crisis times.

In speeches and testimonies, Alan Greenspan claimed intellectual links between his financial policies and the ideas of Milton Friedman and Joseph A. Schumpeter on banks, central banks, and financial crises. As the financial crisis deepened in 2008, Greenspan admitted that his policies had been shockingly wrong. The purpose of this paper is to explain why his claims of intellectual links between those policies and the ideas of Friedman and Schumpeter were also wrong.

Beginning with representative examples of Greenspan's citations of Friedman and of Schumpeter as supporting his financial policies, the authors review the economic ideas of Friedman and Schumpeter on banks, central banks, and financial crises. In each case, we contrast Greenspan's financial policies with those ideas, demonstrating the spurious nature of his claims of intellectual links.

While expanding the role of the Federal Reserve in the financial markets, Greenspan's financial policies were based on the declaration that deregulation and financial innovations were providing flexibility and stability for the entire financial system. In his financial policies, Greenspan rejected Friedman's recommendations for changes in the powers and functioning of the Federal Reserve that featured a monetary policy rule and the 100 percent reserve requirement for deposits that would involve the separation of depository banking from loans and investments. From a Schumpeterian perspective, Greenspan's policies encouraged and facilitated the massive “reckless” finance that was responsible for the financial crisis of 2007‐2009.

Greenspan's legacy as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is one of policies that first contributed to recurring financial crises of increasing severity and were then followed by an extraordinary policy expansion of the Federal Reserve in attempts to cope with the crises. On that basis, it is important to have a clear understanding of the lack of intellectual support for those policies from the influential economists with whom he claimed intellectual links.

Financialisation being but the end product of a complex process, countering it is not a question of modifying individual behaviour but of changing the law. In sharecropping, the standard contract between landowner and labourer gets shared only based on what has actually been produced: risk is being shared along the terms of the contract guaranteeing to both parties a share of the produce, not a fixed quantity of it. Imbalance creeps in when rent is being paid without being a true share of wealth having been created, in what is nowadays called ‘consumer credit’: when interest is charged and paid from wealth that has not been generated through combining human labour with the resources lent as an investment but by the borrower mortgaging wages yet to come. Got historically added to the dysfunction of consumer lending, speculation with the meaning traditionally assigned to it in finance of ‘wagers on the rise or fall of the price of financial products’. Speculation doesn't add any economic value but shifts only amounts of money between bettors, generating a number of risks. Counterparty risk: the loser possibly defaulting, triggering then a damaging chain reaction of defaults. Moral hazard risk: bettors attempt to push the market in the direction favouring their bet. Systemic risk: bettors take advantage of the well-established fact that should they lose, the public sector will act as a saviour of last resort, bailing them out. This all can be redressed by law, and by law only.

This paper aims to survey the screening practices and regulatory arrangements that can be gleaned from the experience of Islamic financial indices on international stock markets. Such indices can be regarded as experiments in the demarcation of “pockets” of Sharī‘ah-compliant securities exchange, in the context of non-Sharī‘ah-compliant stock markets. They offer valuable regulatory precedent, with a view to the development of a transnational domain of Islamic financial transactions.

The paper leverages the experience of Islamic financial indices for charting the fault lines between the foundational principles of Islamic finance, and those of interest-based investment commonly accepted on international financial markets. It subsequently reviews the most salient regulatory arrangements in place for discriminating between permissible and forbidden securities and modes of trading, as implemented on Islamic financial indices. These include selection criteria for index inclusion, and Sharī‘ah committees with ex ante and ex post supervisory duties.

The paper makes a case for viewing Islamic finance indices on international capital markets as capacity-building experiments for the regulation of transnational Islamic financial flows.

The study rejuvenates the pragmatic approach towards the development of Islamic capital markets, by suggesting that incremental organisational innovations, as developed in connection with Islamic financial indices, can build institutional capacity towards an economy that abides by Islamic values.