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This article starts with a short introduction to the department of the Dutch Fiscal Investigation and Information Service (FIOD). There will be an introduction on financial investigations in general, a definition and goals. Attention will also be given to the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. There are two examples of financial investigations, one in the area of so‐called ‘organised crime’ and one in the area of ‘organisational crime’. These examples make clear that financial investigations can be a successful investigation method. Through the use of this method both tactical information and evidence are given. The examples will also show that financial investigations may have to be connected to other forms of investigation: the use of informers, surveillance, wire tapping and crown witnesses. They will also make clear that, from the point of view of a financial investigator, there is no big or relevant distinction in the way of tackling these sorts of crime.

This paper aims to examine 12 cases in which financial investigation was used in the UK to secure a conviction of an organised crime group. Importantly, no conviction would have been achieved in these cases without the use of financial investigation.

Qualitative interviews were undertaken with investigating officers/financial investigators/prosecutors associated with 60 cases in which a conviction and subsequent confiscation order were achieved. Of these 60 cases, a conviction would not have been achieved without the use of financial investigation in 12 cases. In other cases (not examined here), financial investigation played a supporting role for other methods of investigation to achieve a conviction. This paper provides a reanalysis of the 12 cases concerned.

The study shows that financial investigation was often introduced at the pre‐arrest stage in an investigation, although there were still opportunities to introduce financial investigation earlier in the case in some instances. While a range of different types of criminality were investigated, all 12 were eventually convicted of financial crime.

The research was limited by the small number of cases examined and by the fact that it relied on the recollections of those involved in the cases, rather than analysis of case files. Further research should examine a wider range of cases in which a conviction was secured solely through financial investigation.

This paper is the first to analyse cases in which convictions for organised crime would not have been achieved without financial investigation.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the problems that arise when undertaking a financial investigation that involves tracing assets in foreign jurisdictions.

The paper is based on a secondary analysis of data collected as part of a qualitative study of the role of financial investigation in tackling organised crime. This was based on interviews with investigating officers, financial investigators and Crown Prosecution Service representatives associated with 60 cases. Of the 60 cases, 36 were found to have an international dimension.

The study found a number of problems with undertaking overseas financial investigations. These included problems with the letter of request process, difficulties tracking assets in some countries and problems with tracing funds transferred through money service bureaux. Informal contact on a police-to-police basis was generally considered an effective means of improving the quality of information received.

This study is based on just 60 cases of organised crime in which financial investigation was used. The extent to which these findings can be generalised to other cases is unclear.

The study highlights the most common obstacles to overseas financial investigation that should be addressed. In addition, the importance of informal contact with overseas police jurisdictions may highlight a means of improving requests for assistance.

This paper provides an important insight into the views of operational staff undertaking overseas financial investigations and as such highlights the particular difficulties in this work.

Financial crime continues to represent a crime type that costs billions of dollars per year. It is likely more widespread than any other criminal offence. Despite this, it remains an area that is often ignored, or at best neglected by police. Police agencies typically fail to invest resources and training in upskilling police in financial crime investigation. The current study evaluates an agency-wide training initiative undertaken by the Queensland Police Service (QPS), Australia.

The QPS mandated completion of an in-house online financial crime training program for all officers, up to and including the rank of senior sergeant. Matched pre- and post-training data of 1,403 officers were obtained.

The research found that police are under-trained in financial crime. The findings suggest that short online training programs can produce important improvements in knowledge and confidence in financial crime investigation. Critically, attitudes about this crime type which may be deterring officers from engaging in financial crime investigation can be improved.

The current research finds that police agencies need to more heavily invest in training officers to investigate financial crime and such investment will have positive outcomes. The first step involves improving knowledge, skills and attitudes towards this crime type. Further research is needed to understand why training, particularly related to attitudinal change, is more effective for different cohorts of police and how future training programs should be adapted to maximise success.

Malaysia has implemented a comprehensive AML/CFT framework, yet its effectiveness remains questionable due to low number of prosecutions on money laundering cases. Therefore, this study aims to understand the reasons for low number of prosecutions, by addressing the challenges faced by the law enforcement agencies in conducting money laundering investigation. This study then identifies future improvement actions to enhance their effectiveness in combating money laundering in future.

This study distributed surveys to the law enforcement agencies that are responsible for conducting money laundering investigation in Malaysia. In total, 65 surveys were distributed; however, only 61 were returned to the researchers. Out of the 61 surveys returned, only 39 can be analysed due to incomplete answers given by respective respondents.

The results show that the investigating officers are facing difficulties in gathering sufficient information to support their charges. Besides information gathering, they are also facing difficulties due to short investigation timeframe regulated in the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act (AMLATFPUAA) 2001. This study concludes that, although the law enforcement agencies have the power to investigate money laundering and terrorism financing under the act, Malaysia is lacking in having a good investigative support system to assist the law enforcement agencies during the investigation process.

The results of this study are helpful to the regulators and law enforcement agencies in determining the flaws of the current money laundering investigation practices. This study also provides suggestions for future improvement action.

Lack of study focuses on money laundering investigation conducted by the law enforcement agencies, especially in the Malaysian setting, makes the study valuable to the money laundering research.

Recognising that financially related, personal information is the raw material of successful asset recovery investigations, the paper aims to examine the mechanisms which investigators may use to gather such information and the legal barriers to information gathering.

The paper draws on the author's own practical experience of involvement in criminal asset recovery proceedings in the UK.

It is the State's obligation to deliver criminal asset recovery in the most efficient and cost‐effective way, consistent with privacy rights and obligations, providing value for money in what is delivered by law enforcement. Doing so will require making better use of financial information held by public sector agencies. There must be no form of financial information which is beyond the reach of an investigator in an appropriate case. If there is, criminals will utilize that weakness to place criminal assets where information in respect of those assets cannot be obtained. If asset recovery is to be successful, it is essential that – to use the metaphor of financial information as “dots” – investigators are able to collect the dots, connect the dots and share the dots.

The paper identifies: the need to keep the legal tools used to obtain information under regular review; eight core information skills which investigators must develop for effective asset recovery; and the importance of a multi‐disciplinary approach in analysing financial information.

The paper explores UK criminal asset recovery from an informational perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the limitations of training provided to accredited financial investigators, police officers generally, the Crown Prosecution Service and the judiciary in relation to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, money laundering, the investigation of financial crime and the options to recover the assets of criminals.

A literature review of the legislation and statutory instruments; training material; evidence provided to government committees; academic papers and journal articles was undertaken to identify the intention of the legislation and how this is manifested in the training of those responsible for dealing with money laundering; cash detention and forfeiture; restraint and confiscation.

The training provided to accredited financial investigators has failed to progress since the implementation of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 that legislated for its provision. It is limited to the use of the powers granted to financial investigators within the Act, ignoring the variety of roles in which an accredited financial investigator can be used, as well as the changing face of criminality generally and specifically in terms of fraud and money laundering and the predicate criminality behind it. Additionally, the training for the Crown Prosecution Service and judiciary is inadequate with insufficient lawyers and judges with expertise in Proceeds of Crime work. Suggestions for the improvement in training are made with a recommendation that the training be reviewed regularly to ensure currency and relevance.

This paper serves as a useful review of the existing training picture in financial investigation and identifies its limitations and areas for improvement. It is essential that financial investigation is not viewed as an inconvenience or a niche role and that it is considered essential to the investigation of organised crime, money laundering, acquisitive and economic crime.

The purpose of this paper is to present results from an exploratory study of private investigations by fraud examiners in Norway. The activity of private investigations by fraud examiners is a business of lawyers, auditors and other professionals who investigate suspicions of financial crime by white-collar criminals.

This article presents results from an empirical study of investigation reports.

The available sample consists of 21 reports produced mostly by auditing firms such as PwC. Suspicion of financial crime led to police investigation, public prosecution and jail sentence in two cases.

Empirical studies of private investigations are rare.

This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the financial investigation function of an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) may be considered in policing terms, with a view to categorising it in relation to existing paradigms, while acknowledging the IGO’s unique context, in which it enjoys autonomy through various privileges and immunities.

This paper describes and analyses the internal investigation function of IGOs, drawing on practitioner experience as well as mandates, resolutions and reviews from the intergovernmental sector, before making comparisons with policing typologies.

Notwithstanding their expansion into inquiries of non-financial misconduct, IGO investigation offices are the primary means of addressing financial wrongdoing affecting their organisations. Comparisons are drawn with both the corporate policing role inherent in other employment-based organisations and with public policing as a function of the state. It is found that these two paradigms are insufficient to categorise policing within the unique context of the IGO, which has hybrid features of both.

In comparing IGO investigation alongside existing policing paradigms, this paper lays a foundation for further research into the accountability models applicable to this policing function.

This paper discusses the emergence of a form of policing with hybrid features of both internal corporate policing and state law enforcement and contributes to a field that is largely unaddressed in existing research.

This paper aims to examine the history of data leaks and investigative journalism, the techniques and technology that enable them and their influence in Australia and abroad. It explores the ethical and professional considerations of investigative journalists, how they approach privacy and information-sharing and how this differs from intelligence practice in government and industry. The paper assesses the strengths and limitations of Collaborative Investigative Reporting based on Information Leaks (CIRIL) as a kind of public-facing intelligence practice.

This study draws on academic literature, source material from investigations by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, and a survey of financial crime compliance professionals conducted in 2022.

The paper identifies three key causal factors that have enabled the rise of CIRIL even as traditional journalism has declined: the digital storage of information; increasing public interest in offshore finance and tax evasion; and “virtual newsrooms” enabled by internet communications. It concludes that the primary strength of CIRIL is its creation of complex global narratives to inform the public about corruption and tax evasion, while its key weakness is that the scale and breadth of the data released makes it difficult to focus on likely criminal activity. Results of a survey of industry and government professionals indicate that CIRIL is generally more effective as public information than as an investigative resource, owing to the volume, age and quality of information released. However, the trends enabling CIRIL are likely to continue, and this means that governments and financial institutions need to become more effective at using leaked information.

Over the past decade, large-scale, data-driven investigative journalism projects such as the Pandora Papers and the Russian Laundromat have had a significant public impact by exposing money laundering, financial crime and corruption. These projects share certain hallmarks: the use of human intelligence, often sourced from anonymous leaks; inventive fusion of this intelligence with data from open sources; and collaboration among a global collective of investigative journalists to build a narrative. These projects prioritise informing the public. They are also an important information source for government and private sector organisations working to investigate and disrupt financial crime.