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This study takes the position that the concept of fraud is socially constructed. Moreover, it asks why and how different understandings of fraud have emerged. Insights from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 2003; Lakoff, 2002, 2004, 2009) are used to analyze language revealing dominant worldviews and metaphors regarding fraud. The research method is a case study (Yin, 2014), and the analytical approach used parallels the one described in O’Dwyer (2004). The research setting is a report issued by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which provides a context to study different understandings of fraud due to the report’s divided nature. The analysis reveals three alternative worldviews, representing different assumptions about reality, that are at the root of the different understandings of fraud. These worldviews also lead to the usage of different conceptual metaphors which allow the commissioners to interpret facts in a manner that supports each worldview’s assumptions. The paper also concludes by providing a nuanced and critical examination of the results of the commission concerning its understanding of fraud.

Big Data draws both praise and criticism, seen as both villain and hero. The release of megabytes of data by Wikileaks is accorded praise as information transparency by some, whilst others find the massive collection of information by Amazon or Google, often freely given, immoral and to be feared. The paper examines three cases embracing the velocity, volume and variety aspects of Big Data – digital platforms, driverless cars and the Banking Royal Commission – and uses René Girard’s theories of mimesis and scapegoating to show that the identification of a scapegoat, or villain, is a common feature in them and that concerns over Big Data are linked to fear of ‘the other’, thus helping to show how Big Data can be both loved and hated and how both practitioners and theorists might comprehend public reaction to big data and its ethical dimensions.

Mandatory auditor firm rotation (mandatory rotation) has been a controversial issue in the United States for many decades. Mandatory rotation has been considered at various times as a means of improving auditor independence. For example, in the United States, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has considered mandatory rotation as a solution to the independence problem (PCAOB, 2011) and the European Parliament approved legislation that will require mandatory rotation in the near future (Council of European Union, 2014). The concept of implementing a mandatory rotation policy has been encouraged by some constituents of audited financial statements and rejected by other constituents of audited financial statements. Although there are apparent pros and cons of such a policy, the developmental process of such a policy in this country has not necessarily been an open-democratic, objective process. Universal mandatory rotation may or may not be the ideal solution; however, an open-democratic, objective process is needed to facilitate the development of a solution that considers the needs of all major stakeholders of audited financial statements – not simply accounting firms and public companies, but also investors. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine key issues relating to mandatory rotation and to encourage and stimulate future research and ongoing dialogue regarding this issue, in spite of efforts by certain constituents to silence the issue. This paper provides an overview of the various reasons, including practical, theoretical, political, and self-motivated reasons, why a mandatory rotation policy has not been implemented in the United States in order to address the potential conflict of interest between the auditor and client. This paper will also discuss how some deliberations of mandatory rotation have been flawed. The paper concludes with a summary of key issues along with two approaches for regulators, policy makers, and academics to consider as ways to improve the process and address auditor independence. The authors are not advocating for any specific solution; however, we are advocating for a more objective, unified approach and for the dialogue regarding auditor rotation to continue.

Cryptocurrency arose, and grew in popularity, following the financial crisis of 2008 built upon a promise of decentralizing money and payments. An examination of the history of money and banking in the United States demonstrates that stable money benefits from strict controls and commitments by a centralized government through chartering restrictions and a broad safety net, rather than decentralization. In addition, financial crises happen when the government allows money creation to occur outside of official channels. The US central bank is then forced into a policy of supporting a range of money-like assets in order to maintain a grip on monetary policy and some semblance of financial stability.

In addition, this chapter argues that cryptocurrency as a form of shadow money shares many of the problematic attributes of both the privately issued bank notes that created instability during the “free banking” era and the “shadow banking” activities that contributed to the 2008 crisis. In this sense, rather than being a novel and disruptive idea, cryptocurrency replicates many of the systemically destabilizing aspects of privately issued money and money-like instruments.

This chapter proposes that, rather than allowing a new, digital “free banking” era to emerge, there are better alternatives. Specifically, it argues that the Federal Reserve (Fed) should use its tools to improve public payment systems, enact robust utility-like regulations for private digital currencies and limit the likelihood of bubbles using prudential measures.

The 2000–2006 housing market bubble conformed to a classic boom–bust scenario that triggered the most serious and costly financial crisis since the Great Depression. The 2008 subprime mortgage collapse leveraged a financial system that privatizes profits and socializes risks. Several factors converge to set up the subprime mortgage market as an easy target for industry insiders to exploit. Enabling legislation expanded the potential pool of borrowers eligible for subprime mortgages and structured incentives to lenders willing to assume the risks. The securitization of subprime mortgages transformed bundles of high-risk loans into mortgage-backed securities that were in demand by domestic and foreign investors. Pressure to edge out competition produced high-risk loans marketed to unqualified borrowers. The final piece in the setup of the subprime lending crisis was a move from an origination model to a distributive model by many financial institutions in the business of lending. We find that the diffusion and totality of these business practices produced a criminogenic opportunity structure for industry insiders to profit at the expense of homebuyers and later investors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate textual issues and communication patterns of CEOs/chairmen/presidents’ letters to shareholders in the post-2008 financial crisis period. By taking a global perspective, the work specifically explores how 307 banks from 15 countries communicated the issues of financial crisis with shareholders, customers and other stakeholders in their letters to shareholders published in the banks’ annual reports.

By using content analysis and qualitative research, the work specifically analyzes 307 letters to shareholders that constitute 1,028 pages.

Results of the work suggest that textual features and communication patterns of letters to shareholders remain distinct regarding corporate messages that banks delivered to their shareholders. There was little resemblance between financial institutions regarding their communicative patterns. This could be the result of cultural issues, diverse business environments, regulatory standards, discursive information and hidden business practices.

Within our limited data (307 banks), the significance of this paper lies in its timeliness and relevance to the post-2008 financial crisis period and its worldwide business disruptions.

Practitioners need to use the results of this research and should be familiar with the main causes of the crisis that remain controversial and complex.

Global markets and society as a whole were impacted by the severity and longevity of this crisis because of losses, socioeconomic disruptions and business bankruptcies.

Original value of this work falls within the domains of global financial markets and multinational banks.

The finance literature has not documented the feeling, the shock and the pain that ordinary people had to go through during the 2008 global financial crisis especially in the United States where it all began. In an effort to shed new light on the global financial crisis, it has become important to present a view of the financial crisis from the lens of those who were affected by the crisis, those who were responsible for the crisis, those who could have prevented the crisis, as well as the views of other observers. The views or quotes in this chapter are concise, useful and thought provoking. They create an opportunity to help reconsider the events of 2008 from a fresh perspective, so that a lot more can be done by everyone, including banks, governments and citizens, to prevent a repeat of those events in the future of finance. Finally, most of the views or quotes reported in this chapter have within them some important lessons and wisdom to guide us on what to do before another future crisis comes.

This paper aims to provide a brief overview of the global financial crisis (GFC), highlighting its most frightening dimensions, the policy responses and issues around the management of labour during and post‐GFC. Further, this paper introduces the five research papers that encompass this special issue.

The papers presented here are early contributions on how the GFC has impacted the management of people. The key areas focused upon include the human resource management responses of multinational enterprises, the response of trade unions, the roles of employee representative bodies and the rationalisation of post‐crisis managerial strategies.

The major conclusions of this special issue are that the impact of the GFC was variable across countries and sectors in addition to the process of decision making, the types of decisions made, and the determinants and consequences of those decisions.

The papers of the special issue provide some of the first empirical findings on how the GFC has impacted on people management, trade unions and the HR function in different contexts.