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This study aims to analyze and explain the effect of financial architecture (with three dimensions: ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance) and intangible assets on performance financial and corporate value in the Indonesian capital market.

This research was conducted on nonfinancial sector companies that were registered in the Indonesian capital market, namely Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2015. This study used quantitative data and used secondary data sources, meaning that data were obtained, collected and processed from other parties. In this study, the hypothesis testing of the effect of financial architecture (included the dimensions of ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance) and intangible assets on financial performance and corporate value using path analysis was performed.

The results of this study have provided findings that follow the research model that has been built (1) This research has been able to provide a theoretical model of the influence of financial architecture (with dimensions of ownership structure, capital structure and corporate governance), intangible assets, board processes on financial performance and company value in the Indonesian capital market. (2) To develop a theoretical model about the effect of corporate governance on financial performance in accordance with the two-tier system adopted by Indonesia. (3) An empirical study of the concept of financial architecture put forward by Myers (1999).

This research update lies in the research variable, which determines one value of the financial architecture variable comprehensively, combines the financial architecture variable and intangible assets to then be tested for its effect on company value and the use of the financial process variable as a board process as an intervening variable.

The purpose of this paper is to observe and analyze the influence of good corporate governance (GCG) and financial architecture on stock returns and financial performance and its implication for corporate value.

The data were analyzed using generalized structured component analysis. The unit of analysis for this research was LQ45 listed companies at the Indonesian Stock Exchange, taking data from the Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD), and the annual reports and financial reports of these companies. The population researched was as many as 84 companies. For the sample, LQ45 companies with annual reports, financial reports and long-standing, continuous ICMD membership were examined using “purposive sampling.” The research sample was about 22 companies assessed over the course of five years (i.e. 110 samples).

First, GCG has a significant and negative relationship to stock returns; second, financial architecture has a significant and positive relationship to stock returns, financial performance and corporate value; third, stock returns have a significant and positive relationship to financial performance and corporate value; and fourth, financial performance has a significant and positive relationship to stock returns and corporate value.

The originality of this research is to be found in its examination and analysis of relationships between stock returns and financial performance, which was discovered to be reciprocal, namely, the relationship between the variables occurring affected each other (causality alternating with turning), whereas in previous studies the relationship between variables was unidirectional. Besides the research undertaken before, an analysis was made to understand the influence of GCG on stock returns, corporate value and financial performance. There are differences in the results between studies that support the conjecture that financial architecture has a significant positive effect on financial performance and corporate value, and also that financial architecture has a significant positive effect on financial performance and corporate value. Given those existing differences, this study reexamines the effect of financial architecture on financial performance and corporate value.

Existing financial market architectures combine astonishing complexity with tight coupling, making them prone to systemic crises or “normal accidents” and placing extraordinary demands on regulation. In light of this, we consider two routes for regulatory reform. A “high modernist” possibility attempts to regulate financial markets as currently designed. This path means not only increasing the capacities of regulators and rating agencies to estimate complex risks, but also designing systems that can manage more radical forms of uncertainty through learning and bargaining. We consider a series of proposals and challenges that lie down this path. An alternative possibility takes seriously the notion that regulation constitutes markets and uses the current crisis to rethink market architectures themselves, especially their complexity and tight coupling. Preventing failures from spiraling into systemic crises may involve using regulation first, to simplify financial products and their interconnectedness, and second, to create redundancies or hedge bets through specialized financial subsectors organized around alternative principles, including recapitalized community banks, credit unions, mutuals, and public financial institutions.

This study explores the interrelationship between regulatory risks and strategic controls within the financial supervision architecture of an emergent global financial centre of China that embraces innovation as part of its strategic objectives.

This paper employs a longitudinal case study approach to examine the institutional dynamics of the key financial regulators in connection with the regulated financial institutions in Hong Kong before and after the financial tsunami of 2008.

First, this study reveals an organic development of a specialised financial regulatory architecture that resists transforming itself structurally despite the significant impact of externalities. Second, in this post-financial crisis analysis, regulated financial institutions swiftly respond by strengthening their risk controls through compliance with the guidelines imposed by the regulator. Institutional dynamics in influencing the implementation of risk controls through a top-down interactive mechanism are observed. Such dynamic and pertinent rapid responses induce the pursuit of optimal risk management within a regulatory framework.

This paper provides a longitudinal case study to reveal regulatory risks and strategic controls of the global financial centre of China. It unveils mitigating risk control measures in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The study demonstrates how regulatory institutions strive to take precautionary, coercive measures such that the regulated institutions mimic and implement prudent mechanisms.

The purpose of this paper is to review current trends in reforms of the supervisory architecture in European Union (EU) countries.

Against the background of the debate on the advisability of further centralizing prudential supervision in the EU this paper develops a study of applied institutional economics, analyzing the financial supervisory architecture of each of the 27 EU countries and assesses their degree of institutional convergence. The paper investigate whether the recent wave of reforms are leading to a convergence of the national architectures.

While the degree of supervisory convergence is low, there is no single superior model of bank supervision.

The paper contributes to the debate on convergence of supervisory architectures in EU member countries.

This paper aims to examine the existence of multiple institutional logics among a number of organisations within the international Islamic financial architecture (IIFA) whose main purpose is to promote and support the development of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) across the globe and how IIFA relates to the role of Islamic financial reporting standards.

The authors review websites of 11 IIFA’s constituent organisations and undertake 7 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with senior members of a selection of these organisations to identify the dominant logics by which their role and (inter)action within the IIFA are shaped.

The study findings reveal evidence of competing (and shifting) logics and political interests that seem to have led to contradictions and inconsistencies among the constituent organisations. The authors explain this by proposing a framework consisting of religion logic, market logic and corporate logic that intertwines with the underlying economic system and acts as sources of identity–legitimacy–authority for the respective organisations.

The authors bring to light some key issues that may pose a threat to the sustained existence of IFIs. The authors adapt the institutional logic framework and incorporate it into religion logic within the context of Islam (i.e. hifdzul-din as the first Maqasid ul-Shari’ah), resulting in some fresh theoretical perspective that may inform future research.

Illicit financial flows are targeted by the United Nations’ (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGs). However, these illicit flows are not entirely understood. Furthermore, they can benefit from economic norms, laws and regulations that lack mechanisms to detect and penalize them. This paper aims to investigate whether a recent test, the embezzler test, can be used to identify regulatory architectures that facilitate illicit financial flows and related financial crimes.

This paper develops a more advanced version of the embezzler test in terms of definitions and practical implementation methodology.

In this test, the definition of embezzlement can be understood to be the occurrence of illicit financial flows crossing the boundaries of organizations and/or countries. This is a multistage test, which intentionally simulates illicit financial flows to observe how well equipped is the regulatory architecture to deal with other financial offences that are related with these flows, such as theft, money laundering, fraud, corruption, market manipulation and tax evasion.

Future research can use the version of this test to stress test a large range of economic norms, laws and regulations.

This test’s new version can assist achieve the UN SDGs’ illicit financial flow reduction target. Furthermore, it can be used to study both existing and proposed norms, laws and regulation.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first explicit test that has been presented to identify norms, laws and regulations that facilitate illicit financial flows and related financial crimes.

This paper aims to investigate the role of the quality of government on financial supervisory structures in different countries.

The objectives are pursued by means of econometric tools based on probit and multinomial logit techniques.

It is found that the quality of government plays a crucial role in determining supervision unification. “Good” policymakers (helping hand types) prefer a unified financial authority while “bad” ones (grabbing hand type) choose specialized or hybrid models depending on how powerful is the central bank.

Research limitations are represented by the endogenous nature of political variables with respect to the supervisory design. Suggestions for future research rely on finding adequate instrumental variables to be included in the empirical analysis in order to address causality issues.

The paper follows a positive approach, explaining why different supervisory structures are observed around the world. As a consequence, it does not provide any normative implication.

Its original contribution can be identified in the first attempt to include political preferences in determining the choice among different regimes of financial supervision.

This paper aims to analyse the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country‐specific factors, using a path‐dependence approach?

The paper performs an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks' prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities).

The paper concludes that supervisors in central banks are more likely to be publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely to be funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank‐oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime.

In general, the paper does not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition.

The paper analyses the financial governance of banking supervision in a sample of 90 countries world‐wide. The empirical analysis focuses on the financing rules and identifies factors that explain the differences between supervisory authorities.

The objective of this work is to analyse worldwide trends in financial supervision architectures. The focus is on the key issue in the debate – the single supervisor versus multiauthority model – in order to build up indexes of supervision unification, essential to perform studies on the causes and effects of various supervisory regimes. First, the paper introduces a Financial Authorities’ Concentration (FAC) Index. A comparative analysis of 69 countries confirmed that an increase in the degree of concentration of supervisory powers is evident in the developed countries, and particularly in the European Union. Secondly, the paper considers the nature of the institutions to which control responsibilities are entrusted. In particular, the role the central bank plays in the various national institutional settings is examined. An index of the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision is introduced, the Central Bank as Financial Authority (CBFA) Index. Each national institutional structure can be identified with the two above characteristics. Two models are the most frequent: (a) countries with a high level of unification of powers and weak central bank involvement (single financial authority regimes); and, (b) countries with a low level of unification of powers and strong central bank involvement (central bank dominated multiple supervisor regimes). A trade‐off therefore emerges between the degree of financial sector unification and the role of the central bank. Two possible explanations of this relationship emerged: the blurring hazard effect and the monopolistic bureau effect.