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The past two decades have witnessed a transformation in the corporate human resource (HR) function – moving away from a role of balancing multiple interests toward a narrower focus on business objectives – yet we know little about how this change occurred. This study finds that the functional backgrounds of senior HR managers played an important role in determining the changing health benefits of large corporations. Managers with finance backgrounds controlled costs more than those with traditional HR backgrounds and contracted with fewer health plans – yet surprisingly without measured differences in health care quality management. These results suggest that more attention should be paid to the backgrounds of managers in the wider evolution of HR.

Informed by upper echelons theory, the purpose of this paper is to synthesize the current knowledge on finance managers in family firms and to suggest valuable future research avenues.

The paper is organized as a theory-informed literature review. Based on a keyword search in electronic databases, 17 journal articles that deal with finance managers in family firms were identified. In light of upper echelons theory, the results of these articles were analyzed and future research needs were identified.

Overall, the current knowledge on finance managers in family firms is scant and fragmented. At the same time, this paper’s review findings indicate that finance managers can play decisive roles in family firms, which is why we need further research on their roles. Upper echelons theory is suggested in this paper as a theoretical framework that is well suited to guide such further research.

This is the first review of the academic literature on finance managers in family firms. Its main value lies in providing a theory-informed synthesis of current research on this topic and highlighting fruitful future research avenues.

The purpose of this research is to outline the preliminary results of an empirical investigation into access to finance and related issues, as experienced by SME owner/managers in the UK and in China.

The authors employed a telephone survey involving a sample of SME owner/managers operating in the UK and in China. A detailed, semi‐structured questionnaire was administered to a selected sample of 32 matched SMEs. The survey requested quantitative and qualitative information on sources of finance, both preferred and actually used by owner/managers, during three stages in their firm's business cycle: at start up, after two years and over the next five years.

Evidence suggests that there are similarities as well as differences between SME financing in the UK and in China. In terms of initial (start‐up) funding, a large proportion of respondents relied exclusively on financial support from their immediate family. After two years in business, respondents exhibited a higher reliance on own savings and the financial support of bank and other financial institutions. At the end of five years of uninterrupted economic activity, most of the owner/managers in the UK sample relied for their borrowing needs primarily on financial institutions and to a lesser extent upon their own savings. In contrast, owner/managers in China depended mainly upon financial support from their immediate family and to a lesser extent on financial institutions.

The sample for this research study is both small and selective. It is not meant to represent a random or statistically significant selection of either the UK or Chinese SME sectors.

The financing preferences of owner/managers in the sample have been influenced by their perception of the relative strength and weaknesses of domestic finance infrastructures. The results of this research study is indicative of SME owner/managers' financing needs, attitudes and perception. Future developments and the strengthening of the legal and financial infrastructure in China could significantly reduce the comparative gap between owner/manager preferences in these two countries.

This paper presents a model of government saving in order to examine several questions regarding the personal and professional saving preferences or inclinations of a national sample of local government finance managers. First, is personal propensity to save related to a preference for local government saving? Second, is personal propensity to spend related to the finance managers' opinions about their local government's spending? Third, what are the determinants of finance managers' propensity to save or spend, both personally and for their local government? Results confirm that finance managers have a personal propensity to save and a positive view toward local government saving. The opposite, propensity to spend, is also influenced by personal preference. Determinants of these behaviors are explored.

The purpose of this study is to understand the impact of the overconfidence of finance managers on the capital structure decisions of family-run businesses in the Indian scenario. Furthermore, this study aims to demonstrate that measurable managerial characteristics explain the capital structure decisions of managers.

The qualitative approach to research, which aims at understanding a given phenomenon among the experts, is followed. Semi-structured interviews are conducted with 21 overconfident finance managers of family-owned businesses. Content analysis is used to analyse the collected data regarding capital structure decisions into several themes to fully explore the issue in the Indian scenario.

In terms of preference for cash or debt, most of the responding overconfident finance managers of family-run businesses agreed that cash is the preferred source of financing over debt financing. This is due to the biased behaviour of overconfident managers, who consider lower availability of debt as a reason to prefer cash over debt financing. The present study reports that overconfident finance managers prefer short- to long-term debt financing. These managers raise certain practical issues, such as stringent debt terms and inflexible repayment schedules, that arise in relation to the long-term debt market. The study also finds that overconfident finance managers do not fully use tax savings. Respondents reported a lack of access to the debt market and a lack of expertise in capital structure decisions as factors in these capital structure decisions. In addition, the study explores various factors, such as the role of government, the Central Bank of India and industry practices, in relation to capital structure decisions. The study finds that the capital structure decisions of these overconfident finance managers are suboptimal because of the presence of overconfidence bias.

This study gathers information from respondents who are finance managers, not top-level managers, of family businesses; the decision not to interview the higher-ranking managers is a potential limitation of the present study. Another limitation is the small number of respondents in a specific firm size. Because of these factors, the generalisability of the findings of this study will obviously be restricted.

The present study has several practical implications. The first is the recognition of overconfidence bias as it affects the decision-making of finance managers. Executives, especially finance executives, will benefit from the recognition of overconfidence bias and will understand how the presence of such bias impacts corporate decision-making. Managers will understand that bias leads to faulty decision-making. The study will provide indirect feedback to policymakers and regulators in terms of understanding the role of macroeconomic variables in economic decisions. The qualitative approach followed in the present study may enhance the understanding of capital structure decisions from a psychological perspective. The majority of studies in the review of literature adopt quantitative approaches; so the qualitative approach adopted here represents a methodological innovation, and it may provide a deeper understanding of the matter.

The existing literature includes quantitative research aimed at understanding the impact of CEO overconfidence on various corporate policies such as capital budgeting, mergers and acquisitions, dividend policy and capital structure decisions. Quantitative research into the presence of overconfidence bias among executives and its impact on corporate policies returns mixed results. To fulfil the need for studies of overconfidence bias among executives with practical implications, this study explores the presence of overconfidence bias among finance managers in family-run businesses and investigates the impact of overconfidence on capital structure decisions.

Executive decisions regarding capital financing are an important management aspect, especially during financing constraints and growth opportunities. The current study examines the impact of managerial skills of a company on capital financing decisions. Furthermore, it analyzed this nexus in financing constraints and growth opportunity situations.

The authors use the GMM (generalized method of moments) estimation approach on a dataset of 20,651 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share companies from 2010 to 2019.

The authors’ findings are compatible with management signaling and reputation enhancement theories, since they show that managerial skill is connected with more substantial debt financing. Managers with high management skills are likely to have more debt financing as they can foresee the economic future of their companies and tactfully convey private information, lowering information inequality and enhancing their reputation. Furthermore, the authors also show that firms with restricted financial resources and growth opportunities make this relationship stronger. Capital structure and managerial skill findings are unaffected by alternative specifications, omitted factors, industry group bias and endogeneity.

This study sheds fresh light on the essential manager personality trait of managing ability and how it influences complicated corporate decision-making, particularly in the tough environment due to financing constraints and competitive growth. The authors argue that high-ability managers are compelled to use debt financing not only to lessen information asymmetry but also to guarantee that the market finds their superior ability. This work contributes significantly to the managerial ability literature and the capital structure literature supporting signaling theory.

This study examines the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decisions by constructing proxies for managerial overconfidence based on the track records of earnings forecasts in Japanese listed firms. We find that managers have the stable tendency to forecast overly upward earnings compared to actual ones and that their upward bias decreases the probability of issuing equity in the public market by about 4.7 percent per one standard error, which economically has the strongest impact on financing decisions. This tendency is observed when we employ alternative measures for managerial overconfidence and other model specifications. However, in private placements, the choice to offer equity is not always avoided by managers. This implies that managers place private equity with the expectation of the certification effect

This paper draws on the case of a multinational energy company to explore the role played by management control systems (MCSs) in enacting governance policies at the local (subsidiary) level.

This research mobilizes the literature on governmentality to interpret MCSs as technologies of government that can be drawn upon to translate governance policies into practice. In particular, the authors discuss this process by interpreting “governance” as an epistemic object, that is an object that generates knowledge because of its inherent incompleteness and abstract nature.

The paper shows how MCSs act as technical objects insofar they attract, bind and engage local subsidiary managers in the generation of knowledge about governance policies (i.e. the epistemic object) set at the global level, thereby enacting these policies locally.

The findings have practical implications by showing how subsidiary managers engage with MCSs to translate and implement broader governance policies in their daily activities.

This research contributes to the accounting literature on governmentality by showing the role of MCSs as technologies that enact governance at the local level through the process of knowledge generation that these technologies enable. Such knowledge is triggered by the engagement between different participating subjects, attracted by MCSs in the attempt to define governance in practice.

This study examines the financing methods used by corporations to acquire real estate for their operations. It also examines the opinion of managers about the factors that they consider in choosing financing methods. The data were provided by a survey questionnaire that was sent to members of the International Association of Corporate Real Estate Executives. It was found that companies rely on internal financing (operating cash flows) and external financing such as long‐term leasing, joint ventures, property mortgages and sale/leaseback arrangements. The top‐ranked methods of finance include operating cash flows, property mortgages, leasing and sales/leasebacks. Use of real estate investment trusts, collateralised mortgage obligations and mortgage‐backed securities were the lowest‐ranked forms of financing. Managers tend to look at tax advantages of debt and availability of cash flows in deciding which financing methods to use, rather than theoretical corporate finance factors such as bankruptcy cost. There were significant differences in opinion by industry and by company size regarding the use of cash flows and the impact of debt financing on common stock prices.

We examine whether discretionary accruals of firms obtaining substantial external financing can be explained by managerial manipulation or managerial overoptimism. Insider trading patterns and press releases around equity and debt financing suggest that managers are more optimistic about their firms around debt financing. Consistent with earlier studies, we find that discretionary current accruals peak when firms obtain equity financing. However, we also find that discretionary accruals peak when firms obtain debt financing. Moreover, discretionary accruals are higher for firms that rely on debt rather than on equity financing. The results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics, excluding small and distressed firms, and using alternative measures of discretionary accruals. These findings support the hypothesis that managerial overoptimism distorts financial statements of firms obtaining external financing.