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This study investigates the relation of executive cash compensation and gender characteristics of senior executives of Thai listed companies using 1,660 firm-years observations from 2009 to 2013. The findings show that male executives earn more cash compensation than do their female counterparts and that compensation is higher for male CEOs whose educational qualifications were Master’s degree or above. Companies with a higher proportion of male executives and with better firm performance (measured by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s q) pay higher cash compensation. The results conform with the Expectancy theory that male executives receive more compensation than do female executives because of their (expected) abilities to make higher returns to the firm’s assets. Other significant determinants are that older and larger firms pay more cash compensation to the executives (Life cycle theory) and that companies with a higher proportion of independent directors (Agency Theory) and higher ownership concentrations (Stewardship theory) offer less compensation.

The literature considers three main models of nonprofit sector structure and development: liberal, welfare partnership, and social democratic. This study analyzes the cases of Italian and Canadian nonprofit organizations (NPOs) that operate in two third-sector contexts, widely known as “hybrids.” In particular, we aim to verify whether some features of governance, leadership, and volunteer participation have impacts on the financial performances of selected Italian and Canadian NPOs.

Differences between the two studied nonprofit contexts influenced the sampling, the data collection, and the methods of analysis. Data on Italian and Canadian NPOs are analyzed both together and separately, using multiple regression models. Revenues, fund-raising and other grants from the general public, and program expenses are used as measurements of financial performance.

Our analysis demonstrates that some board characteristics, as well as volunteer participation and representation on the board, have impacts on the nonprofit financial performance. The characteristics of the CEO studied in this work are not significantly associated with the level of financial performance.

This study has several important implications for research on board characteristics, CEO characteristics and volunteer management and governance, as well as implications for practitioners. The limitations of this study are related mostly to the different methods used for sampling NPOs and collecting data in the two different country contexts due to the different level of availability of data.

The past literature has not adequately examined the relationships among the board and CEO characteristics, the role of volunteers in governance and financial performance.

In this paper we use a large linked employer-employee data set on German establishments between 1993 and 2012 to investigate how the gender composition of the top layer of management affects a variety of establishment and worker outcomes. We use two different measures to identify the gender composition of the top layer based on direct survey data: the fraction of women among top managers, and the fraction of women among working proprietors. We document the following facts: (a) There is a strong negative association between the fraction of women in the top layer of management and several establishment outcomes, among them business volume, investment, total wage bill per worker, total employment, and turnover; (b) Establishments with a high fraction of women in the top layer of management are more likely to implement female-friendly policies, such as providing childcare facilities or promoting and mentoring female junior staff; (c) The fraction of women in the top layer of management is also negatively associated with employment and wages, both male and female, full-time and part-time. However, all of these associations vanish when we include establishment fixed effects and establishment-specific time trends. This reveals a substantial sorting of female managers across establishments: small and less productive establishments that invest less, pay their employees lower wages, but are more female-friendly are more likely to be led by women.

This chapter offers an inquiry into the emerging phenomenon of corporate social advocacy, also known as CEO activism, in a non-Western sociocultural context. It addresses gaps in CEO activism research, including a dearth of non-Western contexts, dominance of modernist perspectives, and omission of female activist CEO voices. I apply alternative theoretical lenses of Caritas, Ubuntu, Africapitalism, and postmodernism to examine facets of CEO activism in Ghana. Data were collected through long interviews with 24 activist CEO men and women and data underwent hermeneutic phenomenological theme analysis. Findings suggest that CEO activism in Ghana is motivated by a range of factors previously not articulated in the literature on CEO activism. Brand activism typologies adequately describe the causes/issues advocated by activist CEOs in Ghana – as findings advance perspectives of non-Western society CEO activists. Hence, this chapter internationalizes the CEO activism phenomenon for the public relations literature while extending diversity, equality, and inclusion, sustainability, postmodern values, and insider activist perspectives to also include Caritas, Ubuntu philosophy, and Africapitalism.

Purpose: This chapter explores some of the difficult issues in financial regulation for financial stability. Noting the lack of prior academic work in the topic, this chapter presents a discussion of some difficult issues in financial regulation for financial stability.

Methodology: The chapter draws from real-world experiences in financial regulation and draws support from existing literature.

Findings and conclusions: Some of the difficult issues include: the difficulty in breaking too-big-to-fail financial institutions into small insignificant parts; the difficulty in regulating executive compensation in the financial sector without limiting the ability of financial institutions to offer competitive pay for executive talent; difficulty in instilling strict financial regulation and supervision without limiting the ability of financial institutions to exploit emerging profitable opportunities; difficulty in ensuring that financial institutions increase lending in bad times and during recessions; the rarity of having both a female CEO and Chair in a major financial institution; difficulty in making Central Banks independent from the Federal Government; difficulty in making financial institutions relevant in the midst of hostile technological innovation and disruption.

Practical implications: The implication of the findings is that financial regulation for financial stability is not an easy task. There will be issues that financial regulation can address, and there will be issues that financial regulation cannot address. Acknowledging that such difficulties exist on the path to financial stability is the first step to addressing these issues.

Family is a variable rarely included in organizational research (Dyer, 2003). Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999) argued that one way researchers could bring clarity to the concept of family business would be to distinguish between operational and theoretical definitions. In this paper, we provide a theoretical definition for family business that is based on social capital theory (Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Lesser, 2000; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993). A family business is one in which the social structure of the family overlaps with the social structure of the business. The result is that the social structure in the business takes on some of the characteristics of the family, especially in small businesses. In addition, and importantly, the social structure of the family takes on some characteristics of the business. In this paper, we focus on how the social structure that exists between marriage partners may influence the social structure in family firms.

This chapter examines regulatory experimentation in relation to gender equality and the gender pay and representation gaps. The corporate sector has long promoted a voluntarist ‘business case’ for equality as part of their wider agenda to promote CSR, an approach that fits within the second web of rules. However, slow progress prompted governments to introduce proactive legislative measures such as gender pay gap reporting and gender quotas. At the same time, the traditional web of joint regulation continues to be relevant with trade unions using equal pay litigation to challenge the historical undervaluation of work by low-paid women and negotiate new collective pay structures to deliver tangible benefits to low-paid women. Union litigation in the UK local authority sector and the New Zealand care sector are compared. The chapter argues that the three webs are more usefully understood as complements rather than substitutes.