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Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

In a country where judicial institutions are known to be inefficient and where activists have traditionally not engaged in legal mobilization, what explains the emergence of NGO strategic litigation? The author argues that a change in the legal opportunity structure impacts how activists interact with the legal system. Comparing two states in Mexico, the author demonstrates that the introduction of private prosecution rights opened the door for activists to litigate femicide cases. The emergence of strategic litigation has helped improve compliance with international human rights law and has had a demonstration effect on how to use the law to press for accountability.

In this chapter, we provide a brief historical framework of the events and policy changes that impacted the prosecution of terrorism over the past 50 years with emphasis placed on the changes that resulted from the 9/11 attacks.

We provide a review of relevant literature and complete the chapter by providing new data (2015) on case outcomes derived from the American Terrorism Study, a database housed in the Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, at the University of Arkansas.

Investigative and prosecutorial authority in U.S. terrorism cases has experienced ebbs and flows that correspond with terrorism attacks as well as missteps by the FBI, and each has impacted the success of prosecution efforts. Despite dramatic changes, the number of cases prosecuted after 9/11 is unprecedented, and conviction rates continue to climb.

This chapter provides the reader with a synopsis of the policy changes that have occurred in federal terrorism investigations and trials from the late 1960s upto the present. Based on that context, we provide an explanation of how those policy changes have impacted terrorism prosecutions.

Immigration enforcement along the Southwest border between United States and Mexico has long channeled migrants into perilous desert corridors, where many thousands have died, out of general public view. In response to this humanitarian crisis, activists from organizations such as No More Deaths (NMD) trek deep into the treacherous desert, hoping to save lives, honor the remains of those who did not survive, and influence public opinion about border enforcement policies. NMD’s activism is not merely utilitarian but also deeply expressive; ultimately, they hope to convey the message that all lives – including those of unauthorized migrants – are worth saving. The Trump Administration has escalated repressive tactics intended to silence these forms of border-policy dissent. Some federal land managers now blacklist NMD, preemptively denying requests for access permits. Meanwhile, the US Attorney’s office has aggressively prosecuted members for humanitarian activities. This chapter explains the expressive components of humanitarian activism in this context and of the government’s attempt to suppress it, suggesting the need for constitutional scrutiny and legal change.

This chapter explores the laws and unique challenges associated with the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. Crimes that involve the misuse of computers (e.g., hacking, denial of service, and ransomware attacks) and criminal activity that uses computers to commit the act are both covered (e.g., fraud, theft, and money laundering). This chapter also describes the roles of the various federal agencies involved in investigating cybercrime, common cybercrime terms and trends, the statutes frequently used to prosecute cybercrimes, and the challenges and complexity of investigating cybercrime.

Prosecutors are politically elected officials entrusted with the sensitive responsibilities of prosecuting law violators. The strength and admissibility of evidence is tantamount to a successful prosecution, not politics, personal views, or other outside influences. And, the Supreme Court has ruled that prosecutors must ensure justice is achieved for crime victims and criminal defendants alike. However, outside influences, personal views, and other factors may influence a prosecutor’s leadership and decision making in some criminal cases. Since the office of prosecution is an elected position, their success is based on convictions whether achieved through plea bargaining or a guilty verdict at trial. This chapter examines criminal cases in which prosecutorial leadership strategies and decisions have circumvented justice in the name of politics or political correctness. The lack of evidence or withholding of evidence in these cases suggests that some prosecutors are more interested in personal or political interests rather than justice.

Trials provide social movements with a public arena that can advance social movement goals. The adversarial structure of a trial gives social movements an opportunity to articulate their grievances and to subject their opponents to cross-examination. The drama associated with trials often attracts media attention, thus creating a broad audience for the movement's message. Moreover, trials can sometimes provide opportunities for collective experiences, bringing together activists, lawyers, experts, and other actors whose combined efforts can both strengthen the movement and promote its goals.

It is commonly claimed that the entrapment defense has never succeeded in a terrorism case. Yet that is not precisely true. In several post-9/11 cases, entrapment claims have contributed to full or partial acquittals, hung juries, and unexpectedly lenient sentences. Prosecutors have also dropped charges, setting convicted defendants free, to prevent successful entrapment defenses upon retrial. This chapter concludes that, despite the fragility and ambiguity of the right not to be entrapped, entrapment claims can achieve partial victories even in terrorism cases, due to the multiple discretion points at which entrapment can inform strategic or normative judgments.

For more than a decade, public opinion polls have shown that nearly 80% of Americans support hate crime legislation as a response to violence committed because of the victim's race, color, religion, and sexual orientation. Americans' widespread support for legislation aimed at bias-motivated crimes is not matched by the federal and state efforts devoted to responding to such crimes. This chapter describes the myriad factors contributing to America's limited police and prosecutorial response to hate crimes. After a discussion of the patchwork of state and federal legislation aimed at hate crimes, the chapter analyzes the substantial legislative and administrative structures that hamper the enforcement of hate crime law in the United States.