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USDA direct and guaranteed farm loan programs exhibit significant geographical variation in lending activity. County‐level estimations made using Tobit procedures indicate that use of Farm Service Agency (FSA) farm loan programs is greater in counties with lower per capita income and regions experiencing greater farm financial stress. Use of direct FSA loan programs was lower in counties with fewer private‐sector lenders. Guarantee loan program usage was found to decline when commercial agricultural lenders are absent from the county. FSA loan programs were more highly utilized in counties with an FSA loan service center and in states receiving greater FSA farm loan funding in past years.

The purpose of this paper is to examine changes in the structures of US farms and lenders and identify prospective implications for federal credit.

Data from US farm operations for 1996-2014 were adjusted to 2014 values using commodity price indices. Farm size groups were constructed by value of farm production to analyze changes in farm numbers, production, assets, debt, leverage, liquidity, profitability, land tenure, commodity type, contract production, organization type, and use of Farm Service Agency (FSA) direct and guaranteed loans by farm size. Bank, Farm Credit System (FCS), and FSA data from 1996 to 2015 were adjusted to 2014 values. Lender size groups were constructed to analyze changes in bank and association numbers, farm loans, and use of FSA guaranteed loans by lender size.

The greatest consolidation has been by farms with over $2 million in production. More farm debt is held by large, complex organizations, frequently with multiple operators, more variable income, and greater reliance on production contracts and operating and nonreal estate credit. Large farms have greater leverage, are more profitable, and have a larger share of household income from the farm. Banks and FCS institutions are fewer and larger, yet smaller institutions use FSA guarantees to a greater extent. Larger farms tend to be more reliant on both direct and guaranteed FSA loans and are likely to become more dependent on FSA credit.

Changing farm and lender structure together with softening farm income may require FSA farm loan program changes to meet any increase in loan demand. Policy alternatives are provided to meet changing demand for farm credit.

Federal farm credit programs currently administered by the USDA were initiated in the early 1900s to help the farm sector cope with natural disasters, and these programs have continued to evolve. There has been a rich history of research analyzing USDA farm credit programs and the effects they have had on farmers, ranchers, and credit markets. This paper highlights past research and offers a view of the future direction of research on federal farm credit programs.

An established paradigm in small business lending is segmented by bank size with large banks more likely to lend to large informationally transparent firms while small banks are more likely to lend to small informationally opaque firms. In light of banking consolidation, this market segmentation can have implications for credit availability. Federal loan guarantees, such as those provided by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) may reduce the risks of lending to informationally opaque firms thereby mitigating the impacts of the bank size lending paradigm. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

This analysis utilized a binomial logit procedure to determine if there was any empirical evidence that smaller community banks served a unique clientele of farmers when making FSA-guaranteed loans. The analysis relied on a unique data set which incorporated detailed data on farm businesses receiving FSA-guaranteed loans, loan characteristics, as well as information about the originating bank and characteristics of the local credit markets.

Results were consistent with the bank size lending paradigm with smaller banks being less likely to engage in fixed-asset lending, and more likely to serve a riskier and less established clientele when making guaranteed loans.

Data limitations did not permit detailed analysis of banks larger than $250 million in total assets nor for consideration of non-bank lenders. An expansion by these lender groups into serving more informationally opaque borrowers could mitigate any adverse impacts arising from fewer small community banks.

The results suggested that Federal guarantees do not completely eliminate the relative informational advantages of large and small size banks. And, continued bank consolidation, such that there are fewer small community banks, could result in less credit availability among smaller, less creditworthy farm businesses.

While FSA guarantees may not enhance a large banks propensity to serve informationally opaque farm borrowers, they may enhance the ability of smaller community banks to serve groups specifically targeted through FSA lending programs; the provision of credit to family farmers who, despite being creditworthy, are unable to obtain credit at reasonable rates and terms.

The analysis examines relationship between bank size and the use of FSA guarantees using a unique data set which incorporated information on FSA-guaranteed loans, farm financial characteristics, along with characteristics of commercial banks which participated in the FSA-guarantee program.

The purpose of this paper is to examine credit usage by beginning farmers and ranchers (BFR). BFR credit usage is stratified by location (state) and by socially disadvantaged farmer and rancher (SDFR, also known as historically underserved) status. SDFR groups are defined to include women; individuals with Hispanic, Latino or Spanish Origin; individuals who identify as American Indian or Alaskan Native, Black or African American, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Non-SDFR is defined as individuals who identify as non-Hispanic, White men.

The US Department of Agriculture’s Census of Agriculture, Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) is linked with Farm Service Agency (FSA) loan program administrative data to estimate shares of BFR operations using FSA credit. Census data provided information on population changes in total farms and BFR operations from 2012 to 2017 which are compared by SDFR status.

Results reveal differences among BFR operations active in agricultural credit markets by SDFR status and state. BFR were more common among SDFR groups as well as in regions where farms tend to be smaller, such as the Northeast, compared to a more highly agricultural upper Midwest. Among BFR, non-SDFR are more likely to utilize credit than SDFR, however, FSA appeared to be crucial in enabling BFR and especially beginning SDFR groups to access loans.

The results are timely and of keen interest to researchers, industry and policymakers and are expected to assist in developing and adjusting policies to effectively promote and improve BFR success in general and for beginning SDFR groups.

During the 1930s Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal created a wide range of spending and loan programs. Brief descriptions are provided for the programs created by the New Deal and loan and spending programs that were in place before the New Deal. I worked with others to create a panel data set with estimates of the spending and lending by the programs each year from 1930 through 1940. The data aggregated to broad categories are reported here and the methods and sources used to construct the estimates of the spending and lending for the categories are discussed.

Studies of Depression-era financial remediation have generally focused on federal deposit insurance and the provision of equity to banks by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). This paper broadens the concept of financial remediation to include other programs – RFC lending, federal guarantees of farm and home mortgages, and the elimination of interest on demand deposits – and other intermediaries – savings and loans, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies. The benefits of remediation or the amounts potentially at risk to the government in these programs are calculated annually and allocated to the various intermediaries. The slow remediation of real estate loans (two-thirds of these intermediaries' loans) needs further study with respect to the slow economic recovery. The paper compares Depression-era remediation with efforts during the 2008–2009 crisis. Today's remediation contrasts with the 1930s in its speed, magnitude relative to GDP or private sector nonfinancial debt, the share of remediation going to nonbanks, and emphasis on securities markets.

Beginning farmers have unique challenges securing credit because they are less likely to have established sales and collateral for secured loans. This article explores US beginning farmers’ financing strategies relative to those of established operations, with a focus on the source of financing and debt structure (short- vs long-term usage). Agricultural operations commonly use nontraditional financing tools and strategies to start, build and/or sustain their businesses. This article provides a comparative overview of financing strategies comparing established operators to operations with only beginning operators, as well as those multigenerational operations with at least one beginning operator.

The study uses 2013–2016 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey data to explore how various financing patterns vary across US beginning farmers and ranchers with a particular focus on understanding differences where (1) all operators are beginning, (2) there is a mix of beginning and established operators and (3) all operators are established.

This article explores how the nature of beginning farmer status, human capital resources and alternative marketing strategies may influence financial management strategies and lead to differential use of nontraditional financing sources for beginning farmers and ranchers.

Though exploratory, the authors hope that attention to patterns among US beginning farmers and ranchers of reliance on human capital resources including off-farm income and type of beginning farm operation, nontraditional government support programs and alternative marketing strategies can provide important information as to the role of nontraditional credit in the US farm economy.

The purpose of this paper is to determine if there are positive microeconomic effects from a state‐funded loan participation program on farm productivity and investment behavior.

The authors take the approach that access to credit solves a liquidity problem. If a credit constraint exists it results in a suboptimal allocation of resources and a reduction in farm output and profitability. A two‐stage regression model approach is used to analyze farmer survey and loan application data. In the first stage, a probit regression model is used to identify the farmers who are likely to be credit rationed. In the second stage, switching regression models are used to observe the effect of credit rationing on farm productivity and on farm investment behavior.

It is found that there are liquidity effects of credit constraints for a significant share of the beginning and low‐resource farmers who participated in the state‐funded farm loan program. After controlling for various farm and farmer characteristics, the estimated productivity and investment demand equations imply that a 1 percent increase in credit received by credit constrained farmers under the state program increased their gross income by about 0.49 percent, and their investments in depreciable assets by about 0.33 percent.

This paper is the first to apply the switching regression model to a state‐funded farm loan program for the purpose of evaluating the financial impacts on farmer participants.

Agricultural credit markets are dominated by two institutional retail lender groups, the cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS) and commercial banks. Analysis of farm loans made over the 1991S1993 and 2001S2002 periods indicates that FCS lenders were more likely to serve full‐time commercial farmers and farmers located in regions with less competitive credit markets. In contrast, commercial banks were more likely to serve small, part‐time, and hobby farmers. This segmentation of farm credit markets is consistent with federal regulations requiring the FCS to provide credit to “bona fide” farmers with a basis for credit.