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In 1998 and 1999, the Office of Student Financial Assistance of the Department of Education and the Patent and Trademark Office of the Department of Commerce, were designated as Performance-Based Organizations (PBOs), respectively. This paper examines the transformation progress of the agencies, as they attempt to convert to high-performing organizations by utilizing and establishing new and more flexible systems of performance-oriented business practices and processes.

The paper compares and contrasts the different approaches and tools used to improve management and organizational performance, as well as concentrate on human resources, procurement, budget, customer service, and internal controls. The document explores whether or not these agencies have improved their performance as a result of these flexibilities and examines the organizational and cultural challenges encountered as the agencies move from a restrictive and bureaucratic system, to a more liberal system of management and internal controls.

The Performance-Based Organizations (PBOs) concept is to have federal agencies focus on the customer, deliver high quality products, and devise more efficient operations. Therefore, the paper further examines whether or not the PBO legislation has been effective in changing the performance of federal organizations by granting administrative and managerial flexibilities aligned with corporate (agency) strategies, performance, and pay.

In 2017, US federal agencies awarded over $86 billion in contracts to small businesses owned by members of under-represented groups (minorities, women, service-disabled veterans, and certified businesses located in economically distressed areas). The vast scale and scope of public procurement coupled with policies for supporting small disadvantaged businesses may drive federal agencies toward greater inclusiveness in awarding contracts, which may shape broader societal patterns of economic participation and social equity. However, the level of inclusiveness varies considerably across different federal agencies. The authors posit that differences in three key organizational mechanisms associated with federal agencies’ decision-making processes – administrative discretion, workplace discrimination, and legislative oversight – influence an agency’s level of inclusiveness in awarding contracts. They test these ideas using the annual small business procurement activities of 41 federal agencies, large and small, from 2002 to 2011. The authors find empirical evidence for economically significant effects of discretion, discrimination, and oversight on an agency’s inclusiveness in awarding contracts and discuss the scholarly, managerial, and policy implications.

The US federal procurement market is the largest procurement market in the world. Therefore, it is an attractive market for foreign companies to enter. Existing literature indicates the success factors and barriers for public procurement market entry in general, however not for the US procurement market. To get an in-depth understanding of the US federal procurement market entry process for foreign companies, an expert study was conducted, involving successful foreign companies, procurement market entry consultants, and US government officials. The findings indicate that company-specific factors and product-specific factors can be labeled as “qualifiers,” while relational factors can be labeled “winners.”

At the beginning of the 20th century, three intertwined ambitions drove federal legislation over wildlife and biodiversity: establishment of multiple-use federal lands, the economic development of natural resources, and the maintenance of option values. We examine this federal intervention in natural resource use by analyzing roll call votes over the past century with a Random Utility Model (Manski, 1977) and conclude that economics mattered. So did ideology, but not uniformly. After World War II, the pro-environment vote which had been conservative shifted to being liberal. All these votes involved decisions regarding public land that reallocated the returns to users by changing the asset’s physical character or its usage rights. We suggest that long-term consequences affecting current resource allocations arose from disparities between broadly dispersed benefits and locally concentrated socioeconomic and geophysical (spatial) costs. We show that a primary intent of public land management has become to preserve multiple-use option values and identify important factors in computing those option values. We do this by demonstrating how the willingness to forego current benefits for future ones depends on the community’s resource endowments. These endowments are defined not only in terms of users’ current wealth accumulation but also from their expected ability to extract utility from natural resources over time.

To explore whether supposedly non-modern patrimonial arrangements ever advance the “modern” economy, this essay examines emergent state institutional practices in North America in relation to the domain of public lands from colonial times to the late nineteenth-century U.S. I deconstruct the Weberian model of patrimonialism into four elements – logic, setting, obligations, and resources – in order to show how state grants of land to individuals and corporations (notably railroad companies) constituted patrimonial practices embedded within modern structures. “Modern state patrimonialism” had its origins in royal patrimonialism. Monopolization of resources – by a state rather than an absolutist ruler – continued to offer the basis for patrimonial practice, but state patrimonial resource distribution became less personalistic and more connected to public goals (financing the state, rewarding state service, settlement of territory, development of a national economy, and construction of a transportation system). Recipients of patrimonial distributions often gained considerable control over disposition of resources that they received. In these patrimonialist practices, economic action was constructed in logics of action that occurred outside of “market” transactions. Future research should analyze patrimonial dynamics during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, by identifying state monopolizations of scarce and desirable resources (mineral rights; city water systems; electrical systems; telephone systems; radio, television, and other airwave bandwidth; the internet), and analyzing how the distribution of those resources are entailed, controlled, licensed, or otherwise managed. A research program in the study of modern patrimonialism helps build out an institutionalist sociology of the economy.