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1 – 7 of 7Abdul Hadi Zulkafli and Fazilah Abdul Samad
Corporate governance is regarded as a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asia. These countries have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the…
Abstract
Corporate governance is regarded as a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asia. These countries have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the protection of shareholders and stakeholders interests. Such reforms have affected the conduct of business of all corporations in the region as it allows for greater monitoring especially by the shareholders. Unlike earlier studies which focused on non-financial firms, this study analyzes the corporate governance of listed banking firms in nine Asian emerging markets. Corporate governance mechanisms that serve to monitor the banking firms can be classified into Ownership Monitoring Mechanism, Internal Control Monitoring Mechanism, Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism, and Disclosure Monitoring Mechanism. This paper suggests that there are differences in the monitoring mechanisms of banking firms and non-bank firms.
Haslindar Ibrahim and Fazilah M. Abdul Samad
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a…
Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a longitudinal study of the 290 publicly listed companies in the Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia over the period 1999–2005.The study applies the governance mechanisms such as board size, independent director and duality as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. There is strong evidence that larger board size has a significant effect as a device in mitigating agency costs. The study supports that independent directors and duality are viewed differently by family and non-family ownership. The evidence shows that an independent director in family ownership does not influence agency costs. But non-family ownership needs more independent directors to counsel and monitor the company and thus reducing the agency conflict with shareholders. The study also finds that family ownership experiences less agency conflicts when duality role exists. Contrary, non family ownership experiences high agency costs when duality exists on board.
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This study outlines some major findings of the impact of ownership concentration on corporate performance, investment and financing decisions in the Malaysian corporate sector…
Abstract
This study outlines some major findings of the impact of ownership concentration on corporate performance, investment and financing decisions in the Malaysian corporate sector. Earlier studies on corporate governance linked very concentrated ownership structure to weak corporate governance, thus leading firms to make poor investment and financing decisions. However, a firm that strives towards maximising shareholder’s wealth would select its investment and financing strategy with care. Thus concentrated ownership has also been found to lead to better corporate performance, and that composition of ownership is an important element to spur better corporate performance.