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There are striking similarities between publicly-held government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and investor-owned public utilities. Each firm enjoys large scale economies that give a significant competitive advantage over other companies, possesses a dominant market position that it may be able to exploit to earn profits above competitive levels, and has a strong incentive to enter new markets when the life cycle of its core markets constrain its ability to increase profits. The recent behavior of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indicates that the government must impose more stringent economic regulation on those GSEs in order to be sure that they achieve their public purposes.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief introduction to the role of the Fannie Mae/ Freddie Mac duopoly in the American housing market.

First, the paper defines the “government sponsored enterprise,” which is the type of hybrid public/private entity that Fannie and Freddie are and provides an introduction to the other significant government sponsored enterprises. It then explains what Fannie and Freddie do in the American mortgage market and provides a brief history of how the two companies developed. Finally, it evaluates the two companies as duopolists in the conforming mortgage market.

The paper concludes by suggesting that the current financial crisis presents an opportunity to rethink whether the Fannie/Freddie duopoly continues to serve the public interest.

Because of its length, the paper does not review alternative approaches to the status quo that the US Government can take to ensure that it has a stable federal housing finance policy.

The paper argues that the current financial crisis provides an opportunity to revisit the design of the structure of the US housing finance market.

The paper sets forth the rationale and legal basis for characterizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as duopolists.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which the USA has sought to hold the leading banks to account for the financial crisis and to asses the validity of the methods used. This is the first of two articles which looks at the basis of the Complaints against the banks and the settlements which led to the imposition of large fines on the banks.

The paper first provides an account of the government housing policy from 1995 to 2008 and argues that the cases brought against the banks and then at the legal basis of the charges. The methodology consists of a careful examination of the documentary evidence and an analysis of the changes in the relevant laws used by the Department of Justice when bringing charges against the banks.

The paper concludes that both the basis of the cases against the banks and the purpose of large fines are open to question.

Much of the information is available. However, as the major cases against the large banks did not go the court, and the basis of the fines is a settlement between the bank and the Department of Justice, each fine is supported by a relatively brief “Statement of the Facts”. The evidence amassed by subpoenas issued by the Department of Justice is not tested in court.

Much greater consideration must be given to more effective ways of holding banks and especially senior executives to account.

The imposition of large fines does not satisfy the public desire to see that justice is done. Such fines imposed on the ban are not likely to change bank behaviour.

Its originality lies in setting out an account of government housing policy and its role in the run-up to the financial crisis. No one has carried out a careful analysis of the cases against the large banks brought by the Department of Justice and, in the second article, by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

Develops an original 12‐step management of technology protocol and applies it to 51 applications which range from Du Pont’s failure in Nylon to the Single Online Trade Exchange for Auto Parts procurement by GM, Ford, Daimler‐Chrysler and Renault‐Nissan. Provides many case studies with regards to the adoption of technology and describes seven chief technology officer characteristics. Discusses common errors when companies invest in technology and considers the probabilities of success. Provides 175 questions and answers to reinforce the concepts introduced. States that this substantial journal is aimed primarily at the present and potential chief technology officer to assist their survival and success in national and international markets.

In 1997, Congress enacted legislation to transition the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) from status as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) to a fully-private, non-federally chartered organization. The process through which this legislation was enacted will have precedential value for future legislation affecting other GSEs.

This article reviews the unique context in which the Sallie Mae Privatization Act was considered and enacted. Sallie Mae was an active participant in the development of the privatization legislation, and Congress had little precedent in considering the diverse interests of stakeholders such as other entities involved in student loans, taxpayers, and Sallie Mae shareholders. Full assessment of the 1997 legislation requires a review of how the “privatizing” of Sallie Mae changes the student loan marketplace.

The past century and a quarter can be divided into three successive eras for homeownership policy characterization. For the first four decades, the federal government pursued a laissez-faire policy that left housing issues to the individual states and private markets. For the next six decades, the federal government implemented a policy created as part of the Roosevelt New Deal program. Finally, the Clinton administration discarded the New Deal policy in favor of a more aggressive policy that has continued to the present day. The purpose of this study is to compare the performance of the respective policies.

The study introduces two metrics. The first metric, based on government homeownership rate data, enables comparison of the laissez-faire and New Deal policies. The second metric, based on financial frictions in the mortgage market, enables comparison of the New Deal and Clinton policies.

Analysis based on the first metric suggests the New Deal policy was successful in meeting its macroeconomic objectives and was more effective overall than the laissez-faire policy. Analysis based on the second metric suggests the New Deal policy was also more successful in both respects than the Clinton policy.

The findings suggest that the Clinton homeownership policy was the primary driver behind the recent US housing crisis and that vulnerability in the secondary mortgage market created by the Clinton policy represents systemic housing market risk.

The study introduces simple analytical tools to address problems related to systemic risk in the US housing and housing finance markets due to homeownership policy.

The neighborhoods north and northwest of downtown St Louis are blighted by their abundance of substandard, abandoned, and demolished housing. Crime, poverty, and unemployment are high while family stability, educational achievement, and health outcomes are low. These conditions are not unique to St Louis, but can be found in neighborhoods in every city in America. How did this happen? What factors led to the demise of these neighborhoods? This chapter examines the history of St Louis along with theories of neighborhood succession to identify possible explanations for the city's collapse.

The desirability of financial reform to avoid another financial melt‐down is widely accepted, but the likelihood of reform is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to present a case study of evolution and reform attempts at US mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and provides an instructive model of the likely long‐term success of attempts to reform the financial system.

A model of the legislative and regulatory change process is first developed, considering the range of influences that arise. The history of reform attempts for US government sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are examined in the context of this model.

The model predicts that reform will often be thwarted. US government sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac helped fuel the housing bubble and required a government bail‐out. Sentiment for reform was high, but what happened next was – nothing. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have a long history of successful lobbying, and they succeeded again. They did not need to stop legislation. They needed only to see it delayed long enough for attention to turn elsewhere. Five years after the bubble broke, their market dominance and the implied guarantees continue. Reform is not on the legislative agenda. This outcome does not bode well for financial market reform or stability.

An understanding of the process, influences, and likelihood of reform is important for governments, businesses, and individuals. While the picture this paper paints is not optimistic, it is important.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receive explicit and implicit off-budget subsidies from the federal government. This paper reviews the methods to estimate the dollar amount of the subsidies. None of the three techniques to estimate the indirect subsidy yield accurate point estimates. They do suggest that Fannie and Freddie could receive billions of dollars in subsidies in some years and much smaller amounts in other years. However, assessing the size of the implied subsidies is most valuable in demonstrating that Fannie and Freddie, not the federal government, control their size. Efforts to improve federal control face significant difficulties including informational asymmetries and the political incentives that have led to the status quo. These drawbacks bolster the rationale for eliminating federal support for Fannie and Freddie.

This paper investigates the link between equity and credit markets for the government‐sponsored mortgage institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, during the period from January 2007 until December 2008. Before the financial crisis, investors perceived these real estate finance institutions as quasi state guaranteed.

By examining Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during 2007 and 2008, this study extends existing research on the link between equity and credit markets. The authors employ univariate time series regression and vector autoregressive models to analyze the comovements over time and the lead‐lag relationship for equity returns, CDS spread changes, and bond spread changes.

The results provide evidence for equity returns and credit spreads of CDS and bonds being inversely related and adjusting simultaneously. The relationship between equity and credit markets intensifies during periods of heightened risks. The link between equity returns and bond spread changes is more robust in an environment of slightly elevated risk, while the relationship between equity and CDS markets intensifies during times of extreme stress. It was also found that the link between equity and credit markets completely breaks down as government intervention in the form of regulatory changes and ultimately, conservatorship, materializes.

Investors active in equity and credit markets need to be aware of the relevance of the prevailing capital market regime and the role of external effects such as government support and bailout.

There is a growing body of empirical research employing event studies and regression analyses on the firm level to examine the link between equity and credit default swaps. Yet, to the authors' knowledge this relationship has not been explored specifically for quasi guaranteed institutions. However, given the growing number of at least partly state owned real estate finance institutions, this specific focus is important to understand future expected risk compensation of equity and credit investors. The paper ask what lessons are to be learnt from the current financial crisis about investor protection in quasi guaranteed financial institutions.