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This paper gives a selective review on some recent developments of nonparametric methods in both continuous and discrete time finance, particularly in the areas of nonparametric estimation and testing of diffusion processes, nonparametric testing of parametric diffusion models, nonparametric pricing of derivatives, nonparametric estimation and hypothesis testing for nonlinear pricing kernel, and nonparametric predictability of asset returns. For each financial context, the paper discusses the suitable statistical concepts, models, and modeling procedures, as well as some of their applications to financial data. Their relative strengths and weaknesses are discussed. Much theoretical and empirical research is needed in this area, and more importantly, the paper points to several aspects that deserve further investigation.

This chapter examines China’s corporate governance and accounting environment that shapes the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards. Specifically, it examines international influences, including supranational organizations; foreign investors and international accounting firms; domestic institutional influences, including the political system, economic system, legal system, and cultural system; and accounting infrastructure. China’s convergence is driven by desired efficiency of the corporate sector and legitimacy of participating in the global market. Influenced heavily by international forces in the context of globalization, corporate governance and accounting practices are increasingly becoming in line with internationally acceptable standards and codes. While convergence assists China in obtaining legitimacy, improving efficiency is likely to be adversely affected given that corporate governance and accounting in China operate in an environment that differs considerably from those of Anglo-American countries. An examination of the corporate governance and accounting environment in China suggests heavy government involvement within underdeveloped institutions. While the Chinese government has made impressive progress in developing the corporate governance and accounting environment for the market economy, China’s unique institutional setting is likely to affect how the imported concepts are interpreted and implemented.

As its market and society open up, China has transformed itself from a closed agrarian socialist economy to an urban state and an economic force. This has released accumulated tourism demand, led to the development of a diversified industry, and the spread of university and vocational courses in this field. However, the industry faces challenges to recruit and retain staff, with tourism education in higher education blamed for the shortfall in numbers and quality of candidates with suitable purpose, knowledge, and passion to serve. This chapter provides a background to the development of and problems facing tourism education in China, and suggests how to support student engagement and hence the future workforce.

The interbank market in China experienced remarkable squeezes in liquidity in 2013. In particular, the overnight Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate reached a historical high in June. Banks were unprepared, facing the occurrence of various liquidity demands simultaneously. Effects of the liquidity squeeze spread across markets, and concerns were expressed about the health of the banking sector in the world’s second largest economy. Yet the central bank of China maintained an unswerving view that the tightness of liquidity was only structural, and could be overcome by the commercial banks themselves. While it may be too early to judge whether the central bank was correct, or whether there is systematic liquidity risk in the banking sector, markets received a clear signal from the People’s Bank of China. The central bank stopped acting as a ‘perpetual put option’ for commercial banks and refused to take responsibility to satisfy liquidity needs in the interbank market. Its intention is clear; that is, to adjust monetary policy and support economic reform in China. The new Chinese government seems determined to steer a new course away from the previous growth episode. Its resolution has been published and actions have been taken. Among them, the central bank’s changes to monetary policy have received responses from the markets, and the People’s Bank of China is now in the vanguard of a battle to squeeze liquidity. It is difficult to predict what further actions the government will take. However, it should be aware that the driving force of economic reform in China comes from structural change and productivity improvement. Without follow-up policies, complication in the financial system could undermine the central bank’s effort and international capital flows may quickly substitute the opening position of the central bank in the interbank market. More wisdom is required if China is to win the battle for deleveraging and structural reform.

This paper investigates CEO turnover and the usefulness of relative performance evaluation (RPE) as a management incentive in an emerging economy lacking market-based competition.

In a sample of China’s listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the period 2001 to 2005, we manually collect the data where a CEO has gone after being removed by reading the annual reports of the firms and searching the major news and business publications, and run OLS regressions to examine how various incentives provided by different CEO turnovers such as promotion, demotion, and rotation affect the firm performance.

We find that 41% of departing CEOs in SOEs is being promoted. The promotion is positively associated with preceding firm performance relative to peers in the same region and this association is more significant than that between the promotion and firm’s specific performance. Furthermore, the promotion outperforms other incentive schemes such as CEO demotions by 5–8% in terms of subsequent Tobin’s q in three years. These consequences persist in undeveloped regions where there are fewer firms listed on the stock market, a lower stock market capitalization, or a higher regional Herfindahl–Hirschman Index ( HHI ).

The findings imply that promotion based on RPE provides an important incentive by creating competitions.

This chapter aims to answer whether foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) operating within the Chinese context differ from indigenous firms on several essential labor standards indicators: white- and blue-collar salaries, pension insurance, and working hours. In drawing upon neo-institutional and organizational imprinting theories and applying these to the Chinese context, the study addresses competing arguments regarding the expected effects of ownership type on these indicators. We employ seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) to empirically examine a novel national survey of 1,268 firms in 12 Chinese cities. The regression results show that foreign MNCs do not provide uniquely beneficial labor practice packages to workers when compared with various indigenous firm types, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), affiliate businesses of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and domestic private enterprises (DPEs). Specifically, although MNCs provide relatively higher wage rates, they underperform relative to SOEs concerning social insurance. However, DPEs consistently underperform relative to MNCs across most indicators. The mixture of the results contributes important nuances to the application of neo-institutional and organizational imprinting theories to the Chinese context.

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government control and firm value in China.

Government might extract social or political benefits from a state-controlled firm, thus decreases firm value. However, government’s monitoring on firm management reduces managers’ agency problem, which increases firm value. We first build a game-theoretic model to prove the existence of optimal government control given these two roles of government, and we then employ the OLS regression method to test the theory predictions using the length of intermediate ownership chains connecting the listed state-owned enterprises to their ultimate controllers as the measure of government control.

We find that firm values first increase then decrease as government control weakens. Moreover, we find that government usually retains a stronger control over state-owned enterprises than the optimal level. In addition, we show that government control can be further weakened in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, which serve as a substitution of government monitoring.

Our results demonstrate that government control in China is still a necessary but costly mechanism to mitigate agency costs, especially when corporate governance system is underdeveloped.

We identify the substitution effect between government control and corporate governance using a unique measure of government control.