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This paper attempts to understand how the interaction of natural disasters and human behaviour during wartime led to famines in three regions under imperial control around the Indian Ocean. The socio-economic structure of these regions had been increasingly differentiated over the period of imperial rule, with large proportions of their populations relying on agricultural labour for their subsistence.

Before the war, food crises in each of the regions had been met by the private importation of grain from national or overseas surplus regions: the grain had been made available through a range of systems, the most complex of which was the Bengal Famine Code in which the able-bodied had to work before receiving money to buy food in the market.

During the Second World War, the loss of control of normal sources of imported grain, the destruction of shipping in the Indian Ocean (by both sides) and the military demands on internal transport systems prevented the use of traditional famine responses when natural events affected grain supply in each of the regions. These circumstances drew the governments into attempts to control their own grain markets.

The food crises raised complex ethical and practical issues for the governments charged with their solution. The most significant of these was that the British Government could have attempted to ship wheat to Bengal but, having lost naval control of the Indian Ocean in 1942 and needing warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1943 chose to ignore the needs of the people of Bengal, focussing instead on winning the war.

In each of the regions governments allowed/encouraged the balkanisation of the grain supply – at times down to the sub-district level – which at times served to produce waste and corruption, and opened the way for black markets as various groups (inside and outside government ranks) manipulated the local supply.

People were affected in different ways by the changes brought about by the war: some benefitted if their role was important to the war-effort; others suffered. The effect of this was multiplied by the way each government ‘solved’ its financial problems by – in essence – printing money.

Because of the natural events of the period, there would have been food crises in these regions without World War II, but decisions made in the light of wartime exigencies and opportunities turned crises into famines, causing the loss of millions of lives.

To make the issue stark, let us begin with a few assumptions. I believe that these assumptions are probably roughly accurate, but none is certain, and I will not try to justify them here. Instead, I will simply take them for granted for the sake of argument.¹

This article considers what has happened in the 20 years since REIO was founded. The article argues that in sub-Saharan Africa many of those self-same issues currently continue to plague Africans, and that these issues urgently need to be addressed if we are going to improve morality in Africa. In exploring these issues, we considered the circumstances which the Victorian novelist, Anthony Trollope (1815–1882), experienced when he lived in Ireland during the Irish famine. Our article argues as to the very similar circumstances which led to the Irish famine and, currently, lead to the recurrent famines in sub-Saharan Africa. Trollope explored both the causes and the ramifications of the Irish famine in his novel Castle Richmond. According to Trollope, many of the effects of the Irish famine could have been averted if those in the community able to help had had the necessary moral willpower to do so. Trollope was an extremely keen fox-hunter and argued as to the communal benefits of fox-hunting. The article also considers a current devotee of fox-hunting, the Oxford philosopher Roger Scruton, and we explore Scruton’s arguments as to the benefits of local communities. We argue that Scruton’s conservative arguments have much in common with that of the renowned communitarian, Michael Sandel. And that if their arguments were seriously considered much of what the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo fears for her fellow sub-Saharan Africans might be avoided.

Mediated trauma pumped through information and communication technologies (ICTs), in highlighting the shared vulnerabilities and precarity of human lives, is also invested in the re-distribution and re-articulation of wounding and violence. This chapter examines what is transacted in the dissemination of human trauma through ICTs and how, within this affective architecture, we can come to understand the notions of wounding and woundedness as a pervasive condition of modernity invoking the human figure as continuously transgressed with the enlargement of trauma as a site of the political, visceral and commemorative whilst raising questions over our human qualities to feel as a community of affect through technologies which transmute trauma as part of their material commodification. The transmuting of trauma through technologies in the digital age means that trauma is re-absorbed as data and altered through its platform economics. Equally, trauma can be refracted through the digital terrain as banal content in which the wounded human becomes a transacted form within an incongruous spectrum ranging from the politics of pity to voyeurism. In the digital economy, trauma imagery enters another realm of disorientation in which it is pulled into typologies and vast ahistorical image repertories that hold non-contextual image as data. The digital economy re-modulates trauma through its own modes of (il)logic and turbulence, patterning trauma through its own modes of violence.

One feature of Utilitarianism that provides its link to rational decision making is that the basic principle of utility demands that one maximize the good. One can disagree about what exactly the good is – perhaps it is pleasure, autonomy, beauty, or some set of items on a list mixing a variety of intrinsic goods. However, whatever the good turns out to be, we ought – morally – to maximize it. A failure to maximize the good is seen as not only a moral failure but also a rational one. So, for example, suppose that a friend of yours offers you a choice between $100 and $10. Most would hold that the rational thing to do is maximize the good and take the $100, all other things being equal. The person who took the $10 option would be considered irrational and imprudent. Maximizing or optimizing one's finances, all other things being equal, would be prudent, but the general point about maximizing carries over to the moral area. What one ought to do, morally, is maximize the good. In the moral area, this means maximizing human well-being, impartially considered. The above illustration is an artificial one, and real life introduces all sorts of complexities such as how to weigh disparate goods and how to deal with risk and uncertainty. However, the basic point that one ought to maximize the good, or do the best one can, stands.

Effective competence-based management (CBM) requires in the first instance an ability to identify an organization’s competences and the sources of those competences. Identifying competences can be especially challenging in the context of not-for-profit organizations, which have often been characterized as being “different” from for-profit organizations. In this paper we argue that not-for-profit organizations have fundamentally the same systemic requirements for survival and success as for-profit organizations – and therefore that not-for-profits ought to be amenable to competence identification and analysis through use of CBM concepts and theory in essentially the same way as for-profit organizations. We support this basic proposition through a case study of competence identification and analysis in a humanitarian relief organization (HRO), an increasingly important kind of not-for-profit organization.

This paper proposes a competence that enables the pivot organization to dynamically combine (assemble/disassemble, activate/deactivate) resources as needed, and introduces the concept of “dynamic assembly” that integrates this new competence into the historic pivot’s capacities.

Two in-depth case studies performed in two different contexts support our theoretical construct and exhibit the strategic role of the pivot-assembler in the conception, combination, coordination, and control of temporary chains and networks.

The results of our research confirm that dynamic assembly is an important characteristic of both, the travel industry and humanitarian relief, in which the four dimensions (conception, combination, coordination, and control) were found.

From this research it is possible to consider that the theoretical construct of dynamic assembly is meaningful in these types of contexts where chains are temporarily assembled from a dynamic network. Complementary research should look at the characteristics of the organizational structure and the management of competences in loosely-coupled organizations (Weick, 1982) and hastily formed networks (Denning, 2006).