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Documents evidence on the interdependence between the mechanisms used to control the agency costs in Turkish manufacturing firms where the external control devices are restricted and most of the firms have concentrated ownership. The ownership concentration, board size and composition, managerial shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, and family shareholdings are the selected devices. Evidence reveals that the proportion of insiders on the board is positively related to the percentage of family shareholdings and negatively related to the percentage of foreign institutional shareholdings and ownership concentration. Board size shows a significant negative relation with all the control mechanisms except the debt ratio. The finding that the managerially controlled firms have lower debt ratio than the institutionally controlled firms and the family controlled firms supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The capital market seems to complement the institutional shareholdings, family shareholdings, and ownership concentration in monitoring the CEOs.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, corporate governance (CG) best practices, and the extent to which board characteristics and shareholding structures can explain discernible differences in the level of voluntary CG disclosure in a number of emerging Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) economies.

The paper uses a number of multivariate regression methods, namely, ordinary least squares, weighted, non-linear, lagged-effects, two-stage least squares and fixed-effects regression techniques to analyse data collected for a sample of listed corporations in emerging MENA economies from 2009 to 2014.

First, in general, MENA listed firms have a relatively lower level of voluntary compliance with, and disclosure of, CG practices compared to listed firms in developed countries. Second, the evidence suggests that corporate board characteristics, including board diversity, have a positive association with the level of voluntary CG disclosure. In contrast, the findings indicate that unitary board leadership structure, director shareholdings and government shareholdings negatively impact on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. The study does not, however, find any evidence to suggest that family shareholdings have any significant relationship with the level of voluntary CG disclosure. The findings are generally robust to alternative measures and potential endogeneity problems.

This is one of the first empirical efforts at investigating the association between CG mechanisms and voluntary disclosure in emerging MENA economies that observably relies on a multi-theoretical framework within a longitudinal cross-country research setting.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of family ownership on investment-cash flow sensitivity and on firm performance.

The author uses panel data to examine the relationship between investment and cash flow and between family ownership and the firm performance of Thai listed firms from 2001 to 2008. To account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable, the investment equation is estimated by the generalized method of moments, following Arellano and Bond (1991).

The presence of family owners reduces the sensitivity of investment and cash flow. At low and high levels of family ownership, an increase in family shareholding leads to lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. In contrast, firms with medium family ownership levels have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. Only at high levels of family ownership is firm performance positively related to family shareholding.

The ownership levels of family shareholders affect the investment-cash flow sensitivity in an S-shaped relation, supporting the interest alignment and entrenchment effects. When family shareholders have high ownership incentives, their interest alignment reduces the agency costs of free cash flow problems and leads to higher firm performance.

The purpose of this paper is to explore corporate social performance attained by listed family and non-family firms in Japan. They are measured by the composite CSP index and five attributes composed of employ relations, social contributions (SCs), firm security and product safety, internal governance and risk control, and environment concern.

The authors employ univariate and regression analyses on the quantitatively aggregated CSP score data of Japanese firms from 2007 to 2009.

Japan non-family firms tend to perform better than family firms in terms of attaining corporate social performance overall. Family CEOs positively affect CSP in the foods, textiles and apparels, and pharmaceutical industries as well as in retail trade, wholesale, and services industries, but negatively affect CSP in the heavy manufacturing industry. In these industries the joint effect of the percentage of family shareholdings and the fraction of family members on the board also augments the positive role played by family CEO. The findings are robust when the sample is ranked by Tobin’s q.

The observation period is short due to the data availability of CSP by Toyo Keizai Inc. This data covers all the listed firms which answered the questionnaire, which may also contain sample selection problems.

Positive role of CEO and negative effects of shareholdings among listed family firms in Japan call for attention and corrective measures for top management and family shareholders.

While family firms in Japan may accumulate socioemotional wealth, they should exert more efforts to advance CSP and create social capital.

This is the first comprehensive quantitative study in the field, which explored CSP of all the listed family firms vs non-family firms in Japan with large sample.

The objective of this study is to understand the linkages among executive compensation, corporate governance and performance of the Indian family and non-family firms. Further, the study also analyzes the level of shareholding pattern of the Indian family firms on their performance and the executive compensation.

The authors have collected panel data of the companies listed on the National Stock Exchange of India Limited. The data set consists of 284 companies (both family and non-family) for the period 2005–2014. The authors have made use of a dynamic panel data model with generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to formulate the hypotheses and used fixed-effects regression model to check the robustness of our findings.

The authors find support for the agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory in the paper. Specifically, variables related to executive compensation, corporate governance (board size, proportion of independent directors on board, chief executive officers duality and other directorships held by the executive directors outside the company), firm performance (Tobin’s Q), leverage and shareholding pattern of the family are significant in this study.

The study has practical implications for all stakeholders of the family and non-family firms, especially in the emerging market economies. It can be used as a reference guide by various other stakeholders of the family firms, viz., customers, educators, tax authorities, government and society.

The authors confirm that their research is original and provides valuable insights on the Indian family firms. The authors study cross-holding of directorships, inter alia, in the Indian family business groups. As most of the previous studies in the Indian context ignored this important aspect, this study is unique in nature.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between family firms and audit fees in an emerging economy setting. As family firms either face Type 1 or Type 2 agency problem, it seeks to gain a better understanding on family firms in an emerging economy such as Malaysia. Additionally, this study introduces political connections to investigate whether it can moderate the association between family firms and audit fees. Political connection is chosen as an important institutional feature because of its many and well-documented politically connected firms and pervasive political patronage system in Malaysia.

Based on a dataset of 750 firms or 7,848 firm-year observations from 2002 till 2015, panel regression analysis is used to investigate the research questions. As a robustness test, Heckman’s self-selection model is used to deal with the self-selection problem.

The results reveal that family firms are associated with higher audit fees, indicating that Type 2 dominates Type 1 agency problems in Malaysia. This positive relationship is stronger in family firms which are older and have higher family controlling shareholding. Further, the association is exacerbated if it is also connected to the ruling elite.

This study contributes to the literature by showing that institutional feature such as family firms and political connections can produce different firm outcomes between emerging and advanced economy, particularly in auditing. This study responds to calls for more research on auditing in family firms, particularly in emerging economy.

The phenomenon of defamilization of family firms is gradually increasing for the growth of family firms, that is, nonfamily executives are increasingly present in the executive teams of family firms. Although previous scholars have identified various determinants of family firms' defamilization, whether and when innovation underperformance affects the decision to defamilize family firms has not been explore. This study aims to fill the aforementioned research gaps.

This study empirically tests the theoretical view based on the data of Chinese A-share family listed companies from 2009 to 2017.

The authors found that innovation underperformance drives family companies to increase the percentage of nonfamily executives in their executive teams. Further, the authors found that family firms are less willing to hire nonfamily executives with an increase in socioemotional wealth, particularly when founders of such businesses serve as directors or are major shareholders, even when they are not directors.

This study shows that innovation underperformance and socioemotional wealth are important predictors of family firms’ defamilization decisions.

This paper examines the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value and how this relationship is moderated by ownership concentration at low and very high level on a sample of Malaysian family and non-family firms.

For hypotheses testing, panel data analysis using the fixed effects model (FEM) is used because the FEM can address any endogeneity problems effectively (Chi, 2005). The panel data regression is conducted on both family firms and non-family firms.

We find that there is a significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks engaged by family firms, operating in industries where these firms do not have absolute monopoly, and firm value. However, there is no evidence that this significant negative firm value effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, the significant positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on this relationship within family firms in such industries is evident only at low level of ownership concentration. Interestingly, at very high level of ownership concentration, this significant positive moderating effect becomes negative. There is no evidence that these significant moderating effects are stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms.

This research has focused only on family and non-family firms.

An implication of this research is that there is a need for the capital market regulators to introduce appropriate policies to deter family firms from having a close relationship with domestic banks as well as monitor the number of domestic banks engaged by such firms. There may be policy implications for consideration by the Central Bank of Malaysia as well.

This research provides some insights to both academia and industry regarding the consequences of domestic banking relationship and different levels of concentrated ownership in family firms in an emerging market. These insights can help improve the corporate governance as well as ownership structure of Malaysian public-listed family firms which dominate the capital market. Our findings refute the argument by Peng and Jiang (2010) by demonstrating that corporate reputational effects may be a substitute for institutional deficiencies.

The aim of this study is to explore and understand corporate governance patterns in family firms across Latin America. This is in response to several calls in the academic literature urging for more empirical studies in corporate governance in developing regions.

Following a configurative perspective, a hierarchical cluster analysis is applied to a sample of the 155 largest Latin American family firms.

The authors identify three main corporate governance configurations across Latin American countries. First, the exported governance model resembles many characteristics of Anglo-American and Continental Europe governance patterns of public listed control, having independence from the board of directors, and mainly hiring non-family management. Second, the super-familial governance model describes private ownership where one or multiple families control both the board of directors and the top-management team. Finally, the hybrid governance model is the largest cluster identified in the sample and combines governance characteristics of both of the foregoing configurations. This configuration exhibits ownership structured through public offerings of shares combined with leadership of the board of directors by a family member as well as moderate family influence on the board and management.

This is the first study to investigate corporate governance in the largest listed and privately-owned family firms in Latin America. The article extends the conversation on family firm heterogeneity and contributes to the configurative approach in the family business field by offering a cross-country perspective and identifying meaningful taxonomies that are applicable beyond national boundaries.

While advantageous, the role of family control is under‐explored in finance. Family ownership can help guarantee stability of business and long‐term planning. The purpose of this study is to examine whether block‐holder ownership differentially affects the long‐term performance of initial public offerings (IPOs), and verifies whether this effect differs between family and non‐family IPOs.

Using a sample of 163 French IPOs from 1996 to 2000, this paper examines the links between family control and the first‐year market performance. It focuses on IPOs where both families and Venture Capitalists (VCs) are engaged to lock‐in their shareholdings for a period of one year following the IPO date, and are thus expected, at least in the case of families, to provide an effective monitoring during this period.

The main findings bring support to the entrenchment hypothesis and show a negative, but weak, relationship between block‐holder ownership and the first year market performance (p=10 per cent). Moreover, there is cubic relationship between family ownership and post‐listing market performance where the first‐year buy‐and‐hold first decreases, then increases, and finally reverts to decline.

While most of prior research focuses on the association between ownership and governance effects on firms’ performances in publicly‐owned firms, this study demonstrates links between family control and performance in issuing firms operating in France, where family‐controlled IPOs are a common model of corporate governance.