Search results

We investigate the effect of the adoption of formal board structure and board processes on firm performance in Colombian family firms, in a context where firms can choose specific aspects of board structure and processes. We deploy insights from the behavioral governance perspective to develop arguments about how family businesses may choose board elements based on their degree of control over the firm (absolute control or less), and its effect on firm performance.

We use an unbalanced data panel of 404 firm-year observations. The data was obtained from the annual financial and corporate governance reports of 62 Colombian stock-issuing firms for the period 2008–2014 – due to change in regulation, data could not be added beyond 2014. Panel data technique with random effects was used.

The results show that board structure is positively associated with financial performance, however, this relationship is negative in businesses where family has absolute control. We also found that there is a negative association between board processes and performance, but positive association in family-controlled businesses.

Our research contributes to research streams on effects of family control in firm choices and on the interactive effect of governance choices and institutional context and more generally how actors interact (rather than react) with their institutional context.

This paper aims to analyze the effect of family control and influence dimension of the socioemotional wealth (SEW) on capital structure of large listed firms in the North African region.

The study uses panel data of the top 98 largest listed firms in the North African capital markets over the period from 2018 to 2022. The analysis is conducted employing random effects models.

Findings suggest that large listed firms in North African region rely on more use of equity rather than debt financing. Further, results show that family control and influence dimension of the SEW, has no significant impact on the capital structure of North African large listed firms. This implies that the financing behavior of large firms listed in the North African countries is driven by financial and rationale factors rather than non-economic considerations. Indeed, findings support assumptions of the pecking order theory.

This transnational study provides new insights into relevancy of socioemotional theory in explaining capital structure decisions within large family businesses in emerging markets. Findings have the potential to enhance analysts', investors' and practitioners' understanding of financing decisions by large listed firms in this region. This, in turn, can aid in conceiving adapted financing solutions.

This study seeks to fill a gap in the literature by examining the role of family firm succession in shaping the firm's approach to financialisation, which has received limited attention in the previous research. In addition, the study explores the influence of factors such as clan culture, concentration of control and generational differences on the relationship between succession and financialisation.

Data were based on a sample of 7,023 firm-year observations, compiled from the listed family firms in China's A-share. Several tobit models are used for analysing the data and testing the hypotheses.

Family firm succession is negatively related to the level of financialisation, and this relationship is influenced by clan culture, concentration of control and the stage of succession. Specifically, a higher clan culture, a greater concentration of ultimate control by the controlling family member and the dominance of the first generation in management strengthens the negative relationship between family firm succession and financialisation.

This study offers new insights into the consequence of family firm succession on a new area of the firm's strategy, i.e. financialisation. The study further advances the understanding of family firm succession by considering the role of clan culture, the concentration of control and the stage of the succession process.

From an agency perspective, the authors investigate whether family ownership and control configurations are systematically associated with a firm's choice of auditor and audit fees. Agency theory is an economic theory that purposes the existence of a contract between two parties, principals and agents. Auditor choice and audit fees by family firms provide interesting insights given the unique nature of the agency problems faced by such firms.

The authors employ Big-4 auditors (PWC, KPMG, E&Y and Deloitte) as a proxy for high quality auditor (Big N) for the auditor choice model. For the audit fee model, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees (LnAF). The authors use two measures for family firm as explanatory variables: (1) a dummy variable (FAM_Control), which equals one if the firm is classified as a family firm and (2) FAM_Ownership, which is an indicator variable with a value of one if a firm has family members who hold CEO position, occupy board seats, or hold at least 10% of the firm's equity. Data of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021 are used. The authors adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue involved in the selection of Big-N auditors.

The findings suggest that compared with non-family firms, Chinese family firms have a less tendency to employ Big-4 auditors due to less severe agency problems between owners and managers. Additionally, Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees than non-family firms. Similar to the prior literature, however, Chinese family firms audited by Big-4 auditors incur lower audit fees than family firms audited by non-Big-4 auditors in this study. In contrast to young-family firms, old-family firms are less likely to pick top-tier auditors and sustain lower audit fees. Consistent and robust results are found from endogeneity tests and sensitivity analyses.

The empirical evidence provides a unique insight, for accounting practitioners, policymakers, family owners and other capital market participants concerning the diverse effects of various family ownership and control features on selecting high-quality auditors and audit fees. This study advances the understanding, showing that a lower demand for audit quality occurs in Chinese family firms as they encounter less severe Type I agency problems. However, the more severe Type II agency problems in Chinese family firms sustain higher audit fees due to higher audit risk and greater audit effort.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.

To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.

The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.

The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.

The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.

The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and pledging of shares by controlling shareholders of a firm to obtain a loan. The pledging of shares by the controlling shareholders of a firm results in alterations to the payoff and risk structure for these shareholders. Since accounting numbers have valuation implications, pledging of shares by a controlling shareholder has an impact on accounting policy choices made by the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of controlling shareholder share pledging to obtain a loan on a specific accounting policy choice, namely, conservatism.

The paper uses a large data set from India comprising 14,786 firm years consisting of 1,570 firms belonging to 58 industries for a period of 11 years (2009–2019). The authors use ordinary least square regression with robust standard errors. The authors conduct robustness checks and the results are consistent across alternative statistical methodologies and alternative measures of the primary dependent and independent variables.

The primary results show that pledging of shares by the controlling shareholders results in higher conditional conservatism and lower unconditional conservatism. Further analysis reveals that the relationship is stronger when the controlling shareholder holds a majority ownership in the firm. Additionally, the results show that for business group affiliated firms, which are unique to developing countries, both the conditional and the unconditional conservatism are incrementally lower when the controlling shareholder pledges the shares. For family firms with a family member as CEO, the conditional conservatism is incrementally higher and the unconditional conservatism is incrementally lower. Finally, the authors show that the results hold when the pledge intensity variable is measured with a one-year lag and finally, the authors show that conditional conservatism is incrementally higher in the year of the increase in the pledge and the year after, but there is no such incremental impact on unconditional conservatism.

The research is limited to the listed firms in India. Since majority of the listed firms are controlled by families and the family firms around the world are heterogeneous the findings of the research may not be applicable to other countries.

The study has implications for policy-making and monitoring of the pledging by the controlling shareholders. It also helps the investors in making investment decisions with respect to family firms in India.

The study is unique as it focuses on the relationship between pledging of shares by the controlling shareholders and its impact on accounting conservatism. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research integrating these two aspects.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of environmental dynamism on different EO dimensions in family firms. The authors also examine the moderating role of national culture (uncertainty avoidance and in-group collectivism) and the level of family control and influence in fostering/hindering this relationship.

A survey was conducted among 1,143 family firms from twenty-eight countries. The authors developed and tested hypotheses through a fixed-effects regression analysis.

The findings suggest that environmental dynamism has a positive effect on all three EO dimensions. Analysis reveals a positive moderating role of family control and influence and negative moderating roles of in-group collectivism and uncertainty avoidance.

The findings imply that family firm managers should carefully interpret the influence of their national culture on family firm behavior. More specifically, family firms in dynamic environments should consider the importance of the national culture in which they are embedded. Those operating in high uncertainty avoidant and highly collectivist cultures should take proactive steps to cultivate a corporate entrepreneurial culture. On the other hand, the family should not undermine the effect of its control and influence. In dynamic environments, family control and influence may be a competitive advantage in reinforcing entrepreneurial orientation.

The study contributes to the literature on EO in family firms by expanding the previous research on the antecedents of EO and examining moderation effects of culture and family control and influence across a broad multi-country sample. In contrast with the common findings regarding the effect of family logic on EO, the study shows the strengthening role of family control and influence in the relationship between environmental dynamism and EO. The authors show that culture as an informal institution may also play a critical role in hindering/strengthening the relationship between environmental dynamism and EO.

Under the background of continuous sluggishness of the real economy and expansion of asset sectors, the Chinese economy exists a trend of “from the real to the virtual.” Managing the corporate financialization is the key to prevent the real economy “from real to virtual.” The paper explores the influence of family involvement on corporate financialization since family firms are an important proportion of real sectors.

Based on Socioemotional Wealth Theory, this paper makes empirical study using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2022 to explore the influence of family involvement on corporate financialization, mainly from the perspectives of family engagement, family identity of CEO and family control power.

These are the findings: (1) Family engagement will inhibit corporate financialization; (2) Compared with employing external managers, family members acting as CEOs will decrease corporate financialization; (3) The proportion of family ownership is negatively correlated with the level of corporate financialization.

The originality of this paper include these: (1) Analyzing the differences in the financialization of real enterprises with different characteristics and attributes; (2) Expanding the research on the internal motivation of the financialization of the real enterprises, and supplementing the research literature on family firms and corporate financialization; (3) Exploring the internal influence mechanism of financialization of family firms under the background of Chinese culture.

This study explores family firms' ex ante conflict management strategies to preserve their socioemotional wealth (SEW) under predictable conflict through the succession process. Specifically, the authors examine how family firms leverage the insurance-like benefits of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to mitigate the threat of foreseeable family feuds among the sons of firms' family heads.

The authors focus on the charitable donations pledged by Korean family business groups (chaebols). Using the data of 62 chaebols with generalized least squares (GLS) models, the authors analyze 711 observations from 2005 to 2017.

The authors find a positive relationship between the number of sons of a family firm's head and the firm's CSR activities such as spending on charitable donations. Furthermore, the number of daughters of heads in executive positions strengthens such a positive relationship, whereas the number of business and political marriage ties weakens this relationship.

Family heads of family businesses may leverage CSR activities and marriage ties to elite families interchangeably to ward off negative impacts from foreseeable family feuds and preserve their SEW. Thus, a policy-based incentive for CSR that encourages more family heads to use CSR as insurance would serve the public interest.

The authors contribute to the family business literature by suggesting that CSR activities can be used by family firms as an instrument to mitigate foreseeable damage to the SEW caused by family feuds. The authors also shed new light on CSR research by finding that marriage ties to elite families may reduce the strategic value of CSR activities.

As the benefit of gender diversity continues to receive significant attention, a holistic investigation of its effect on corporate financial distress (CFD) is lacking. Therefore, this study examines the effects of board gender diversity, measured in different forms, such as the presence and proportion of female directors, family-affiliated female directors and the chief executive officer (CEO) gender, on CFD in Pakistan. The study also investigates the interacting effects of family-controlled (20 and 50% family-owned) companies on the association between board gender diversity and CFD.

The study applied the pooled cross-sectional logistic regression model to examine the effect of board gender diversity (presence and proportion of female directors, family-affiliated female directors and CEO gender) on CFD through a sample of 285 non-financial companies in Pakistan over the period of 2006–2017.

The results reveal that gender diversity on boards is significantly and negatively associated with CFD in Pakistan. In addition, when family ownership is 50% or more, the interacting effect of family control is found to be significant, while gender effects remain negative. The results suggest that female directors contribute to the long-term viability of companies, especially family-owned companies. Female directors are also found to be more prevalent in family-owned companies compared to their non-family counterparts.

The findings imply that female directors may efficiently manage and control all functions necessary to guarantee the company's long-term prosperity. Similarly, gender effects can outweigh the detrimental impact of family control when female directors are in reasonable numbers and of high quality in the boardroom.

The practical relevance of the findings is that female directors play a significant role on the corporate board. Thus, it is a wakeup call for Pakistani companies to recognize the critical role and uniqueness of women on the corporate ladder. Family companies can also galvanize on the uniqueness of women to improve their governance structure.

This study adds to the literature on the benefits of gender diversity in family and non-family-owned companies. Specifically, this study applied multiple measures of gender diversity and family control in a single study. In addition, the study was conducted in a country that is ranked as the second worst country in the Global Gender Gap Index 2022, implying that investigating this type of research would go a long way towards changing the minds of corporate executives and regulators about the critical role that women can play in the economy.