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As technical barriers gradually become the important tools of trade protection, it is important to understand whether intensified enforcement of border controls is adopted as a hidden tool of trade protectionism and differs across periods and industries.

This article applies a panel structural vector autoregression (PSVAR) model to investigate the potential role of trade protectionism motives in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) import refusals on China's agricultural exports, utilizing newly constructed monthly data at the industry level.

The results show that import refusal is mainly driven by the inspection history, highlighting the importance of the intrinsic product quality and maintaining an excellent inspection history in border inspection. The novel finding is that US employment contractions would also lead to a small increase in FDA import refusals, especially those taking place within ten months and made without sampling tests. Such an association is driven by industry-specific employment shocks and becomes stronger after the financial crisis. It is also more evident in industries where the US lacks competitiveness against China, being manufactured without mandatory safety regulations, and with negative skewness of employment growth.

This research is one of the preliminary attempts to understand whether the de facto border controls are worked as a hidden tool of protectionism to agricultural products, and what the specific trajectory and duration of the impacts at the monthly level. This study provides empirical evidence showing the role of protectionism motives in FDA import refusals and is heterogeneous across industries, which generate new insights and policy implications to predict and cope with additional barriers on agricultural trade.

The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), designed to establish and enforce food-safety standards for foods from domestic and foreign origins, focuses federal regulation on the prevention of food contamination. Many concerns have been expressed about how FSMA-compliance costs will affect the economic viability of very small and small farms, which have higher average compliance costs than do larger farms, thus marginalizing their ability to compete in the marketplace. The purpose of this study is to estimate how FSMA will affect differently sized US and international tomato producers in the fresh-tomato industry. A simulation approach is applied for changes of quantities demanded, revenues, and profits for differently sized farms based on elasticities estimated using a differential approach. Our findings indicate that both domestic and foreign tomato producers with both very small and small farms are expected to see significant losses in profit after the adoption of FSMA. The practical implications of these findings are that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should be aware of, be concerned about, and take into consideration the adverse consequences of their regulatory decisions on food prices, food-industry costs, the structure of the food industry, and product diversity. In essence, the FDA needs to strike a balance between food safety (the primary objective of FSMA) and market performance.

We formally investigate the effects of an inspection system influencing safety of foreign and domestic food products in the domestic market. Consumers purchase domestic and imported food and value safety. Potential protectionism à la Fisher and Serra (2000) can arise: inspection frequency imposed on foreign producers set by a domestic social planner would be higher than the corresponding policy set by a global social planner treating all producers as domestic. The domestic social planner tends to impose most if not all of the inspection on foreign producers, which improves food safety for consumers and limits the production loss for domestic producers. Despite this protectionist component, inspections address a potential consumption externality such as health hazard in the domestic country when unsafe food can enter the country undetected. We then calibrate the analytical framework to the U.S. shrimp market incorporating key stylized facts of this market. Identifying protectionist inspection requires much information on inspection, safety, damages, and costs. We also investigate how to finance the inspection policy from a social planner perspective. Financing instruments differ between the domestic and international welfare-maximizing objectives.

The author attempts to examine the existence and pattern of coalitions in international relations across countries, and investigates whether international relations of coalition partners influence a country's enaction of agricultural non-tariff measures (NTMs).

The author adopts a machine learning technique to identify international relation coalition partnerships and use network analysis to characterize the clustering pattern of coalitions with high-frequent records of global event data. The author then constructs a monthly dataset of agricultural NTMs against China and international relations with China of each importer and its coalition partners, and designs a panel structural vector autoregressive (PSVAR) model to estimate impulse response functions of agricultural NTMs with regard to international relation shocks.

The author finds countries to establish coalition partnerships. Two major clusters of coalitions are noted, with one composed of coalitions primarily among “North” countries and the other of coalitions among “South” countries. The United States is found to play a pivotal role by connecting the two clusters. The PSVAR estimation reveals reductions of NTMs against China following improved international relations with China of both the importer and its coalition partners. NTM responses are more substantial for measures that are trade restrictive. These results confirm that coalitions in international relations lead to coordination of agricultural NTMs.

The author provides international political insights into agricultural trade policymaking by showing interactions of NTM enaction across countries in the same coalition of international relations. These insights offer useful policy implications to predict and cope with hidden barriers to agricultural trade.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness (through the analytic prism of “corporate citizenship”) of the US pharmaceutical industry's political strategy behind the Partnership for Prescription Assistance, the program that the industry has recently initiated to address the prescription drug needs of senior and other low‐income American citizens.

By reviewing data collected by PhRMA, the industry's association, over a one‐year period, the Partnership for Prescription Assistance program is evaluated for: performance (over periods of one month, three months, six months and one year); congruence with the concept of corporate citizenship; and effectiveness as an industry political strategy.

During its first year of operation, the Partnership for Prescription Assistance has matched two million Americans with public and private assistance programs that meet their prescription health needs. Furthermore, the Partnership for Prescription Assistance fits into the corporate citizenship perspective, and offers the pharmaceutical industry a viable alternative (“industry political strategy”) to state and federal legislative efforts to establish prescription drug importation programs.

This article addresses recent efforts (in the form of the Partnership for Prescription Assistance) by the US pharmaceutical industry to counteract proposed legislation to allow prescription drug importation in the USA. The article provides evidence of industry political strategy success in the implementation of the Partnership for Prescription Assistance. This article will have value to pharmaceutical industry management, health care advocates, public policy makers, and business faculty whose research interest lies in the area of business and society.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the packaging design on consumers’ perception of the food quality, safety, healthiness and preference to buy.

A cross-sectional study recruited a convenience sample of 547 Lebanese adults with a median age of 30 years old and 54% being females, between November and December 2016, using an interviewer-based questionnaire.

As identified by the participants, packaging should “protect the food” (54.9%) and be safe (52%). Most participants especially those who reported that protecting the food is the most important packaging functionality tended to select the vacuum package [OR (95% CI) = 2.19 (1.32; 3.66); p = 0.002] for having the highest quality, being the healthiest and the more frequently bought (24.3, 30.2 and 29.1% respectively). Regarding the juice, most of the participants thought that the glass bottles have the highest quality, were the safest, the healthiest and the most frequently bought (64.9, 37.4, 68.4 and 52.9%, respectively). Those who reported that safety is the most important characteristic for food packaging, have selected transparent as the most attractive color to use [OR (95% CI) = 2.10 (1.25; 3.55); p-value = 0.005]. Among the consumers, 87% considered that nutrition and health claims were among the most important informative cues. Around 73.1% (n = 399) were willing to pay more for a better packaging with 59.4% willing to pay 3% more.

This market research identifies the packaging characteristics and features which have positive effects on consumer attitudes. Therefore, it will help manufacturers track consumers’ trends and interests, and accordingly impact their business decisions in responding adequately in their package design. The social behavior will increase the product sale and its market success leading to direct economic implications.

There have been several “food scares” in Europe and across the Atlantic in recent years. They have led to nationally orientated reaction – often in the face of otherwise apparently binding international commitments. This article is concerned with such events and the planning, development and emergence of an international food safety agency for the European Union, taking into account “enlargement” and certain transatlantic perspectives. Concludes that the appliance of science should supersede the politics of nation states and the desire for re‐election, while bearing in mind that this is an unlikely dream.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

The long controversy that has waxed furiously around the implementation of the EEC Directives on the inspection of poultry meat and hygiene standards to be observed in poultry slaughterhouses, cutting‐up premises, &c, appears to be resolved at last. (The Prayer lodged against the Regulations when they were formally laid before Parliament just before the summer recess, which meant they would have to be debated when the House reassembled, could have resulted in some delay to the early operative dates, but little chance of the main proposals being changed.) The controversy began as soon as the EEC draft directive was published and has continued from the Directive of 1971 with 1975 amendments. There has been long and painstaking study of problems by the Ministry with all interested parties; enforcement was not the least of these. The expansion and growth of the poultry meat industry in the past decade has been tremendous and the constitution of what is virtually a new service, within the framework of general food inspection, was inevitable. None will question the need for efficient inspection or improved and higher standards of hygiene, but the extent of the

The growing range of EEC Directives and Regulations for food products, some of which have never been subject to statutory control in this country, with compositional standards, and in particular, prescribed methods of analysis — something which has not featured in the food legislative policies here — must be causing enforcement authorities and food processors to think seriously, if as yet not furiously. Some of the prescribed methods of analysis are likely to be less adaptable to modern processing methods of foods and as Directives seem to be requiring more routine testing, there is the matter of cost. Directive requirements are to some extent negotiable — the EEC Commission allow for regional differences, e.g., in milk and bread — but it has to be remembered that EEC Regulations bind Member‐states from the date of notification by the Commission, over‐riding the national law. Although not so frequently used for food legislation, they constitute one of the losses of sovereign power, paraded by the anti‐market lobby. Regulations contain usual clauses that they “shall enter into force on the day following publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities” and that they “shall be binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”.