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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance by conducting a meta-analysis of 25 previous studies. The analysis has three specific concerns, i.e. the moderating effects of legal systems (common law or civil law), governance mechanisms (external or both external and internal governance together) and performance measures (accounting or market value).

The methodology used is the meta-analysis technique developed by Hunter et al. (1982).

The findings show that the external governance mechanisms measured by anti-takeover provisions and market value of firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and market to book value are the key moderators of this relationship.

This paper has important implications for regulators and directors by proposing external governance to be an influential factor of firm performance. This paper is also of interest to the investors and companies by highlighting the significant relationship between corporate governance and market value of the firm.

As the author finds that the external governance mechanism (anti-takeover provisions) exerts more influential effect on firm performance than both external and internal governance together, this research confirms the imperative for external governance to increase the firm value.

Microfinance practitioners have emphasized that appropriate control mechanisms are critical for the success of a microfinance institution (MFI). The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of external governance mechanisms on MFIs' performance, whereby external governance is defined as the control exercised by stakeholders and markets, and accountability mechanisms that operate to enforce internal governance.

This paper uses a database of 108 MFIs operating in over 30 countries and analyzes their performance by adopting an empirical approach usually employed in cross‐country banking research on the impact of market forces and regulation on performance. MFI performance is measured by sustainability and outreach indicators and is modeled as a function of external audit, microfinance rating, and regulatory status and controls for MFI and country‐specific characteristics.

Results indicate that regulatory involvement and financial statement transparency do not impact performance, while some but not all rating agencies may play a disciplining role.

At the time of the study, available data are limited to 108 organizations and since then more MFIs have made their financial statements available, therefore, the hypotheses of this paper can be retested.

Stakeholders should be aware that external control mechanisms in microfinance are weak, thus adequate internal governance mechanisms are important.

This paper offers empirical evidence that external governance mechanisms have limited impact on MFI performance.

The purpose of this study is to explore how governance mechanisms (internal and external) enhance the performance of the return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratios (DP) of the banks of Pakistan. The study incorporates not only the internal factors of governance (board size, out-ratio, annual general meeting, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, block holder stock ownership and financial transparency) but also the external factors (legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, and the market for corporate control).

The sample size of the study consists of 30 banks (public, private and specialized) listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for the period 2008-2014. The panel data techniques (fixed or random effect model) have been used for the empirical analysis after verification by Hausman (1978) test.

The results revealed that not only do the internal mechanisms of governance enhance the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan but external governance also plays a substantial role in enriching the performance. The findings conclude that for a good governance structure, both internal and external mechanisms are equally important, to accelerate the performance of the banking sector.

Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance can also be checked by adding some more variables (ownership i.e. foreign, female and family as internal and auditor as external), but they are not added in this work due to data unavailability.

The study contributes to the literature and could be useful for the policy makers who need to force banks to mandate codes of governance through which they can create an efficient board structure and augment the performance. The investments from different forms of ownership can be accelerated if they follow the codes properly.

The study facilitates the bankers in incorporating sound codes of corporate governance to enhance the performance of the banks.

This work is unique as no one has explored the impact of external mechanism of governance on the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan.

This paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

To avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks on www.ecb.int

The empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.

This analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.

The changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.

Culture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.

This paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.

This study examines the effects of a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative on its employees’ organizational attachment and intent to leave. We propose that employees’ perceived authenticity of their firm’s CSR activity mediates the effects of a firm’s CSR initiative on employees’ attachment to the firm and intent to leave. We also hypothesize that employees understand the authenticity of their firm’s CSR initiative based on internal and external attribution mechanisms. We propose that internal attribution enhances authenticity, while external attribution reduces it.

We surveyed a sample of 450 employees from 38 Korean companies that were included in the 2009 Dow Jones Sustainability Index Korea (DJSI Korea). To test the theoretical model, we employed a linear structural equation modeling which allows the causal estimation of theoretical constructs after taking into account their measurement errors.

As predicted, internal attribution significantly increases employees’ perceptions of their firm’s CSR authenticity, whereas external attribution significantly reduces such perceptions. Employees’ perceptions of authenticity, in turn, increase their affective attachment and decrease their intent to leave. In addition, the effects of the two attribution mechanisms on organizational attachment and intent to leave were mediated by employees’ perceptions on authenticity.

Research on authenticity has been case studies or narrative ones. This is one of the first studies investigating the role of authentic management empirically.

We demonstrate that a firm’s CSR initiative is a double-edged sword. When employees perceive inauthenticity of their firm’s CSR initiative, the CSR initiative could be detrimental to employees’ attachment to the firm. This study calls attention to the importance of authentic management of CSR.

Informational transparency through social network services become the foundational reality to the contemporary management. To maintain competitive edge in this changing world, every stakeholder of a firm including managers, employees, customers, shareholders, government, and communities should collaborate and help each other live the principle of authenticity.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how a politically connected firm moderates the relationship between media coverage and market value. More specifically, the authors are interested in the interplay of an external corporate governance (CG) mechanism with an internal one. By interacting different mechanisms, this paper advances the empirical setting of application and functions of the corporate governance.

This paper tests the hypotheses presented using panel data with a fixed-effect model, by assembling and exploiting a unique, hand-collected set of data on media coverage consisting of over 164,000 media reports and a politically connected board of directors comprising over 12,000 CVs tracked from 2010 to 2014. Data is originally from Brazil, a country where political connections are highly used by firms and that has been a place of much research on corporate political activity.

The results of this paper suggest that a politically connected board of directors can mitigate the negative effects of media coverage on market value. Overall, the results imply that the validity of a CG mechanism might be affected by other mechanisms.

The findings of this paper imply the need for research focusing on the mutual effects of different CG mechanisms. While CG is understood as a set of mechanisms, new research could focus on the interplay of these mechanisms.

The findings suggest that the presence of former politicians and government officers on the board dissipates bad news reported by the media and boosts market value when media is positive. To maximize investment returns, investors should analyze firms' political human capital.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first to develop hypotheses on the moderation effects of a politically connected board on the relation between media coverage and market value. This is relevant because this brings insights on how firms could jointly manage these mechanisms.

The study explores extant knowledge on the nature of the relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, particularly board characteristics and audit quality, respectively, while also investigating how the relationship varies across geographies.

The extant knowledge is synthesized using a meta-analysis, which is conducted using a sample of 56 empirical studies from publications of varying grades. The studies span over 25 years (1996–2021) and cover 147 empirical samples (343,787 firm-year observations) across more than 20 countries. The dependent variable is audit fees, and the independent variable captures 12 different measures of board characteristics.

Overall, the results reveal a positive association between board characteristics and audit fees, indicating complementarity between governance mechanisms. Effect size analysis shows board characteristics, like size and independence, are positively associated with audit fees. However, heterogeneity is noted for some characteristics, and further analysis by geography (developed vs emerging countries) explains the heterogeneity.

This study helps multiple stakeholders like firms, shareholders, boards, regulators and policymakers in designing and strengthening governance frameworks.

Both governance and auditing literature benefit from identifying specific board characteristics that drive audit quality consistently across different institutional settings and samples. Heterogeneity analysis helps improve the understanding of contradictions documented in prior literature.

This meta-analysis is the first to explore the interplay between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, with a focus on board characteristics and audit quality. The study provides valuable insights on how different governance mechanisms influence each other while highlighting, for the first time, how the interaction between governance mechanisms varies by a country's level of development.

This paper aims to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of intellectual capital (IC) disclosure among companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE).

A content analysis approach was used. The association between dependent and independent variables was examined using multiple regression analysis.

The results suggest that corporate governance mechanisms strongly influence the quantity of IC information disclosed in the annual reports of KSE-listed companies. Specifically, companies with larger boards, higher proportions of external directors and higher blockholder ownership are associated with higher levels of IC disclosure.

The findings highlight the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in promoting IC disclosure. They are a useful guideline for regulators, company management and shareholders regarding corporate governance mechanisms that influence the extent of IC disclosure. Given recent Kuwaiti Government initiatives to promote transparency and the informational efficiency of the stock market, this research provides timely empirical evidence in support of these initiatives.

In the frontier market context, the study contributes to a theoretical understanding of the corporate reporting of IC and the relationship between IC disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms. The findings provide empirical support for the theoretical notion that effective corporate governance plays an important role in increasing the extent of voluntary disclosure.

This paper aims to analyse the use of level of debt as an external control mechanism against an entrenchment strategy based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices.

The authors use a database of 1,916 international companies for the years 2002 to 2010.

The evidence obtained confirms in a context of asymmetric information, bounded rationality and divergent interests, the use of debt as a control mechanism of managers’ discretionary comportment. In other words, CSR practices can be used by managers as an entrenchment strategy and self-defence with the aim of decreasing the possibility of being identified by those shareholders and stakeholders whose interests have been damaged. In this context, the market demands higher debt levels to solve agency frictions, playing an active role in monitoring the management. Moreover, the demand of higher debt as a control mechanism that minimises the expropriation risk by managers through CSR is lower in contexts of greater investor protection.

The findings reveal that CSR engagement can be explained by the hypothesis of being a strategy of entrenchment and self-defence. Overall, this study differs from previous literature in this field by taking an alternative approach to CSR practices, in contrast to the conventional wisdom of the benefits of CSR practices. The authors contribute by empirically testing the theoretical model proposed by Cespa and Cestone (2007) who suggest the discretionary use of CSR from an agency perspective. They also give empirical relief showing the use of CSR as an entrenchment strategy. Moreover, they demonstrate that the capital market of debt decreases in a context with a greater degree of investor protection, likewise under CSR promoted as an entrenchment tool, the demand for debt as a disciplinary mechanism is less necessary to control managers. In addition, the study is enriched by the database analysis.