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The purpose of this paper is to show the feasibility of effectual ethics on foundations of micro and macro issues of economics.

In this paper, the library research method has been used to reflect some ideas about the necessity of changing the concept of economic rationality and modifying it from some famous economists.

The entrance of ethics in economic discussions may affect them and suggests the new solutions or make considerable quantitative or qualitative changes to them.

If research is reported on in the paper this section must be completed and should include suggestions for future research and any identified limitations in the research process.

It may be possible to objectify the extended rationality presumption by revising public culture and correcting it in such a way that ethical values and norm are institutionalized in society.

This research shows that if ethical values and norms beyond economic benefits are institutionalized in a society, economic outcomes seen in economic books may be otherwise.

Comparative analysis of different effects of the two concepts of rationality – economic rationality and extended rationality – on life‐cycle hypothesis and efficiency of pollution tax shows new solutions or makes considerable quantitative or qualitative changes to them because of ethics.

The idea of what constitutes rationality has always been central to moral philosophy as well as to modern social science and economics; regardless of the fact that its meaning has also greatly changed during the last five hundred years. While for Aristotle and his followers, full rationality implied not only effective deliberation of means towards any given end, but also that such end had to be rationally selected with the guidance of reason or “practical wisdom”, since the age of Thomas Hobbes and David Humes, the concept of rationality has been reduced to one of seeking the best means to any particular end, wise or unwise. In the process, reason was relegated to mere “reckoning”, of adding and subtracting according to arithmetic rules. The good was simply what was desired, motivated by a physiological appetite for survival or otherwise. As could have been expected, such mechanical mode of reasoning readily provided the rudiments of contemporary computational theories of action, in particular game theory (see Cudd, 1993).

Drawing on recent research, which recognises the situated nature of accounting practices, the purpose of this paper is to extend the Burns and Scapens (B&S) framework and to illustrate its potential for studying the situated nature of management accounting practices. The extended framework distinguishes field-level institutions (which the authors term broader institutions) and institutions within the organisation (which the authors term local institutions). To extend the B&S framework the authors draw on recent debates in institutional theory, both new institutional sociology, where the focus is now on the institutional logics perspective, and old institutional economics, where there has been debate about the relationship between institutions and actions.

While the B&S framework focussed on institutions within the organisation, the extended framework explicitly recognises institutions which extend beyond the boundaries of the organisation. It also recognises the way in which rationality and deliberation are related to human agency, as well as the power of specific individuals and/or groups to impose new rules. To illustrate the usefulness of the extended framework the research note draws on a recent study of performance measurement in the Accounting and Finance Groups of the Universities of Groningen and Manchester.

It is argued that local institutions within the organisation combine with the broader institutions to shape the forms of situated rationality which are applied by individuals and groups within the organisation. Different groups within an organisation (e.g. engineers and accountants) can have different forms of situated rationality, and contradictions in these forms of rationality can be a source of institutional change or resistance to change within the organisation, and can explain why accounting changes can by implemented in different ways in different organisations and also in different parts of the same organisation.

The extended framework will be useful for studying: (1) how situated rationalities evolve within an organisation, more specifically how they are shaped by both local and broader institutions; and (2) how prevailing situated rationalities shape the responses to accounting change.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to argue that utility maximisation, taken from a narrow economic understanding of rationality, frames contemporary business school pedagogy and management theory. The chapter will illustrate this observation by detailing the rational framing assumptions in social capital literature. The chapter will argue that these framing rational notions foster a perspective that inclines towards excessive self-interest as well as a concomitant lack of fellow feeling or morality.

Methodology – Literature review of Social Capital theory.

Findings – The chapter demonstrates that the narrow economic understanding of rationality that predominates as the framing notion in management theory tends towards amorality as it privileges individual self-interest. In consequence, the significance of ethics and cooperation are under-reported and under-emphasised which leads to Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSI). These observations are discussed with reference to social capital theory.

Research implications – To consider the significance of the under-acknowledged rational background or framing perspectives in distorting theory and empirical research in social capital literature, and more generally in contemporary management literatures and business school pedagogy.

Social implication – There is a need to re-examine and challenge the validity and application of rational notions in contemporary management literatures and pedagogy.

Originality – The chapter identifies that a narrow utility maximising understanding of rationality frames and therefore inhibits current management literatures and pedagogy, including social capital literature.

Open access publishing is an increasingly popular trend in the dissemination of academic work, allowing journals to print articles electronically and without the burden of subscription paywalls, enabling much wider access for audiences. Yet subscription-based journals remain the most dominant in the social sciences and humanities, and it is often a struggle for newer open access publications to compete, in terms of economic, cultural, and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2004). Our study explores the meanings of resistance held by the editors of open access journals in the social sciences and humanities in Canada, as well as the views of university librarians. To make sense of these meanings, we draw on Lonnie Athens’ (2015) radical interactionist account of power, and expand on this by incorporating George Herbert Mead’s (1932, 1938) theory of emergence, arguing that open access is characteristic of an “extended rationality” (Chang, 2004) for those involved. Drawing on our open-ended interview data, we find that open access is experienced as a form of resistance in at least four ways. These include resistance to (1) profit motives in academic publishing; (2) access barriers for audiences; (3) access barriers for contributors; and (4) traditional publishing conventions.

Confidence, trust and loyalty are three social emotions necessary respectively for the social processes of agency, cooperation and organization. In addition to the centrality of emotion in social life, an examination of these emotions demonstrates the importance of future‐time in social structure. Temporality is seldom discussed in the sociological literature, but unavoidable in a consideration of confidence, trust and loyalty. An examination of confidence, trust and loyalty from the perspective of temporality clarifies issues of social rationality and indicates some of the limitations of rational choice theory.

This article models debt market equilibrium given an expanded notion of rational behavior. The model extends Diamond's model of reputation acquisition, by assuming that some prospective borrower‐investors are opportunistic utility maximizers, while others are unwilling to mislead borrowers as to their intended use of borrowed funds. We find that the presence of honest borrowers is necessary to the function of debt markets, and that, as in real‐world markets, opportunistic and honest agents can coexist. We further find that total economic activity is positively correlated to the proportion of trustworthy agents. A major research concern in financial economics is the reconciliation of observed behavior with the predictions of the perfect‐markets, utility‐maximization models, which have traditionally supplied the dominant paradigm in finance. The main focus of recent research has been on the predictions of Agency Theory, or simply Agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency has its origins in the property rights literature of economic theory (Alchian, 1969) and, in essence, addresses the following question: How do rational agents act in imperfect markets? A whole range of market imperfections have been analyzed ranging from the simplest type of moral hazard and adverse selection (Thakor, 1989) to the debt capacity of an industry (Maksimovic and Zechner, 1991). Indeed, few if any areas of business theory have escaped Agency's scrutiny; it has, in effect, recast the theory of the firm. In this light, the firm becomes a structure whose efficiency depends upon its ability to mitigate the costs associated with Agency. Firms are “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.310). One of the major gaps in the one‐period models of agency behavior has been the inability of these models to explain management's “honest” behavior (Thaler, 1992). That is, managers do not always engage in such “rational” acts as risk‐shifting, or paying excessive dividends, in order to enrich shareholders (and themselves) at the expense of bondholders. A significant move toward reconciling Agency's predictions with observed behavior has resulted from the reputation‐acquisition work of Diamond (1989), building on the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In these models, agents acquire reputations by demonstrating some consistent mode of behavior through multiple iterations of a contractual situation. Through these iterations, principals modify their beliefs concerning the future behavior of the agent by observing certain outcomes. In Diamond's model, rational agents will not continually choose either a risky project or safe project. Their choice is a function of the interest rate and the stage of the game. Specifically, these agents choose the risky project initially; then, as attrition among risk‐takers causes interest rates to drop, they shift to the safe project for some iterations. As the end of the game approaches, however, these agents once again revert to investing in the risky project. In comparison with the attention that has been devoted to identifying and analyzing market imperfections, the former part of the Agency question — namely the “rational agents” part — has attracted much less attention in the finance literature. In Agency models, rationality has been defined strictly in terms of the individual pursuit of pecuniary wealth. This expected‐utility model has been tested experimentally and has been found to be systematically violated, in at least two fundamental ways: 1) Individuals do not behave as if they are attempting to maximize wealth (Plott, 1986), and 2) Individual behavior is affected by notions of fairness and cooperation (Kahneman, et al, 1986). Attempts to construct a theory of capital market behavior which can accommodate this observed behavior are virtually nonexistent. This lack is probably due to the presumption that opportunistic agents will drive ethical agents out of the market. However, as we demonstrate in the model developed in this paper, this is not necessarily the case. By focusing attention specifically on Agency's rationality premise, the model developed here differs from antecedent Agency models. This article investigates the implication, for financial‐market equilibra, of an alternative rationality premise. We assume that some agents will display the virtues of honesty and trustworthiness in their dealings with Other agents. Modifying Diamond's (1989) model of reputation acquisition in debt markets, the impact of these ‘virtuous’ agents on financial‐market equilibria is investigated. The model indicates that the existence of trustworthy agents in financial markets is not merely desirable from an economic perspective, but actually is essential if debt markets are not to fail. Specifically, if lenders do not belief that some non‐trivial cohort of trustworthy agents exists, then lenders cease to lend and debt markets cease to function. Also, the greater the proportion of honest agents, the greater is the overall level of economic activity; indeed, the existence of honest agents will tend to induce at least some of the opportunistic agents to act virtuously. We find that, as Bowie observes in a more general context, “[i]t only pays to lie or cheat when you can free ride off the honesty of others” (1991, pp.11–12). In addition, the belief in a non‐trivial cohort of trustworthy agents can lead to the elimination of some agency problems.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: the primary purpose is to suggest a real estate paradigm spectrum to act as reference for the contextualisation of observed market phenomenon in system terms; the secondary purpose is for the spectrum to contextualise the efficacy of real estate and valuation theory, methods and techniques; and the tertiary purpose is to propose a confidence score for reporting uncertainty to the end user of a valuation report.

Literature was reviewed on the concepts of risk and uncertainty, rationality and several systems thinking domains.

The framework can provide context to observed market phenomenon and distinguishes between agency and mechanism in contributing to conditions of certainty and uncertainty. The argument followed in this paper is that it is necessary to contextualise the efficacy of real estate and valuation theory, methods and models under conditions of certainty, normal uncertainty and abnormal uncertainty. The characteristics of conditions can be used as basis to develop new theory and practical application or modify existing.

Real estate economic theory can be organised in terms of the spectrum and the framework can potentially identify where further research is required and the requirements it must meet as measured against the characteristics of the framework. Current valuation methods and models can continue to be used when valuing under conditions of certainty, however, modifications to methods and models are required to account for complexity when valuing under conditions of normal uncertainty and abnormal uncertainty. The confidence score included in this paper can also be used to report the conditions of certainty/uncertainty under which the valuation was performed.

This paper aims to set the basis for new theoretical and practical developments of insights into real estate economic and valuation theory, methods and models while also contributing to the reporting of uncertainty through the proposed confidence score.

Aims to determine why, in this “critical case”, a single‐union agreement was implemented in a top‐down manner, affected only contractors and was unique. Reports on in‐depth interviews of a representative sample of 20 managers, contractors, trade union officials and industry body representatives to triangulate archival data supplied by the refinery. Environmental changes were similar for all UK refineries. The implementation of a single‐union agreement is the result of a number of these but, crucially, new appointments in the case study refinery served to break with tradition. Suggests, however, that management does not always perceive itself to be a powerful agency; rather, it seems to need to proceed carefully and rationally in order to establish its own legitimacy to its peer group and within its own executive group to maintain its credibility as professional. States that this was an uncertain and risky venture, especially for a bureaucratic major oil company sensitive to public opinion.