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The Korea-China-Japan Investment Promotion, Facilitation and Protection Agreement is the first treaty in the economic field that binds the three Northeast Asian countries together under a single legal instrument. The existence of effective dispute-settlement procedures under the treaty will contribute to the creation of a favourable investment climate in the host country. Nevertheless, there have been fears about frivolous or vexatious claims that could inhibit legitimate regulatory actions by governments. How to compose an investment chapter of the Korea-China-Japan FTA that is being negotiated is a pressing demand for all in the region. Any pertinent answers to such a quest require a thorough comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of any development of relevant rules and governance. In the end, a quest for better international investment governance in Northeast Asia in the future requires sound evaluation of lessons from the past and present.

The study, by focusing on a context dominated by firms with a concentrated ownership, in which type-II agency problems (principal-principal conflicts) may occur, aims to depict which board configurations may be effective in protecting minority shareholders by mitigating the risk of controlling shareholders' expropriation via cash holdings.

The research adopts a configurational approach and empirically conducts a fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis on a sample of 268 Italian listed companies.

The analysis depicts three combinations of board configurations and ownership structures that can be considered effective, namely Active Independent Control, Female Active Control and Double Internal Control.

The study revisits the topic of the risk of expropriation via cash holdings in a type-II agency problem framework and delineates the meaning of board effectiveness in a mature context ruled by family firms, like Italy. Furthermore, by drawing on a configurational approach, it overcomes the causality relationship between each board characteristic and cash holdings policies and reasons from a “bundle” perspective.

Although tax-motivated income shifting has been widely explored, no studies have as yet analyzed the association between ownership structure and management decisions about income shifting. The ownership structure of multinational groups is characterized by different levels of minority interests, and our aim is to establish whether income shifting is explained by the aim of expropriation of minorities, as well as taxation avoidance.

We collect data on a sample of European parent companies located in five countries and their foreign subsidiaries, and run a multivariate regression based on the Huizinga and Laeven (2008) model.

Our results support the idea of minority expropriation, finding evidence of ownership-motivated income shifting. We also find that the level of minority protection affects ownership-motivated income shifting, and that, when both are present, expropriation is statistically significant.

Although the study looks at a wide range of subsidiaries, a limitation may be that it examines only firms having parent companies in five European countries. Further research would overcome this limitation and extend the literature and take into account other income-shifting contextual variables. Our results may lead regulators to pay more attention to the protection of minority interests.

This research offers insights to companies and investors, and should help them to make better-informed decisions and evaluate the best contexts for investments.

This study enriches the literature on income shifting by revealing that it can be caused by factors other than the desire to avoid taxation. It suggests that ownership structure is crucial.

This paper aims to investigate the link between agency costs mitigation via three levels of rights protection (minority rights protection, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency issues) provides the propitious climate for financing investment opportunities around the world.

We use Bartlett’s three-group method to stratify countries based on how well they protect investors as measured by the scores provided in the Doing Business dataset developed by the world bank for 189 countries. We then test a variety of independent hypotheses that the alleviation of agency costs via three levels of protection (minority investors’ rights, contract enforcement, resolving insolvency issues) is associated with better access to credit via the banking system, better valuation of listed firms via the stock market and higher investment and growth.

Our findings support Agency Theory which explains why the absence of legal protection of external investors leads to stock markets and financial institutions failing to fulfill their role of financing the economy.

The policy implication from this study indicates that countries ought to (1) develop legislation that protects investors’ rights, (2) improve the quality of their judicial system in terms of enforcing the legislation and (3) build the framework for resolving disputes during insolvency as these are important ingredients for a developed financial system.

We use the World bank dataset and a new methodology to quantify the significance of the relationship between minority rights protection, ineffective enforcement, lack of bankruptcy laws and access to firm financing via the banking sector and the stock market. It provides new evidence that the quality of the judicial system in a country matter for firms’ ability to raise financing and enhance value creation.

本文旨在探討一個假設，該假設為透過三級別權利保障（保障少數群體的權利、執行合同、解決破產問題）的代理成本緩減會為世界各地的金融性投資機會提供良好的氣侯。

我們以巴特利特（Bartlett）的三組法把國家分組，分組方法是基於該國家保障投資者的程度，而保障程度是以世界銀行為189個國家而制定的營商資料集內提供的評分來衡量的。我們把國家分組後，便就各樣的獨立假設進行測試。這些假設是：透過三級別保障（保障少數股權投資者的權利、合同的執行、解決破產問題）的代理成本緩減是連繫於透過銀行系統而產生的更佳信貸途徑，透過股市的更佳上市公司估值及更高的投資和增長。

研究結果証實了代理理論，該理論說明為何當外來投資者沒有得到法律保障時，結果會導致股票市場和金融機構不能履行其為經濟提供資金的角色。

本研究具有政策方面的意義，因研究顯示了國家應該：（1）設立保障投資者權利的法律；（2）在執行法律方面，改善其司法系統的素質；（3）建立解決破產時爭議的體系。這些是應該做的，因它們是一個已發展的金融體制的重要元素。

本文強調了一個保障投資者權利的法律環境所需的三個特定要素：對少數股權投資者權利的保障、有效的執行、有效的破產法律及透過銀行部門和股票市場而取得公司融資。這提供新的證據, 證實這三級別權利保障對公司籌集資金及提高價值創造的能力而言至為重要。

This study aims to take advantage of the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in China in December 2012 and examine the effect of improved public governance on tunneling.

This study uses a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies from 2010 to 2014 and conduct regression analyses to investigate the effect of improved public governance attributed to the anti-corruption campaign on tunneling.

This study finds that the level of tunneling decreased significantly after the anti-corruption campaign, suggesting that increased public governance effectively curbs tunneling. Cross-sectional results show that this mitigating effect is more pronounced for non-SOE firms, especially non-SOE firms with political connections, firms audited by non-Big 8 auditors, firms with a large divergence between control rights and cash flow rights and firms located in areas with lower marketization.

This study highlights the importance of anti-corruption initiatives in improving public governance and in turn reducing tunneling. This study provides important implications for many other emerging economies to improve public governance.

This study contributes to the literature on the role of public governance in constraining corporate agency problems and advances the understanding of the economic consequences of China's anti-corruption campaign in the context of tunneling.

This study investigated the impact of corporate ownership structure on agency costs in the insurance industry.

The study sample included 23 insurance companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2010 to 2019. Panel regression was used to account for the firm- and time-specific unobservable variables and system-GMM estimation was used to address endogeneity concerns.

The results show that managerial ownership positively (negatively) affects selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (assets turnover), implying that unmonitored managers engage in activities that serve their own interests rather than those of shareholders. The largest shareholder's ownership has no impact on agency costs, implying that the ownership of the largest shareholder is irrelevant. However, as the wedge between the percentage of capital owned by the largest shareholders and managers increases, SG&A expenses (efficiency ratio) decrease (increases), indicating that the existence of large non-management shareholders reduces agency costs. After accounting for the endogeneity problem, the impact of ownership structure on agency costs measured by asset turnover remains robust.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to provide unique evidence and useful insights into the determinants of agency costs from a frontier market in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with a focus on the insurance sector. Additionally, this study uses a new measure of separation between ownership and control by calculating the wedge between managers' and large shareholders' ownership.

Political Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), based on ideas about deliberative democracy, have been criticised for increasing corporate power and democratic deficits. Yet, deliberative ideals are flourishing in the corporate world in the form of dialogues with a broad set of stakeholders and engagement in wider societal issues. Extractive industry areas, with extensive corporate interventions in weak regulatory environments, are particularly vulnerable to asymmetrical power relations when businesses engage with society. This paper aims to illustrate in what way deliberative CSR practices in such contexts risk enhancing corporate power at the expense of community interests.

This paper is based on a retrospective qualitative study of a Canadian oil company, operating in an Albanian oilfield between 2009 and 2016. Through a study of three different deliberative CSR practices – market-based land acquisition, a grievance redress mechanism and dialogue groups – it highlights how these practices in various ways enforced corporate interests and prevented further community mobilisation.

By applying Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony, the analysis highlights how deliberative CSR activities isolated and silenced community demands, moved some community members into the corporate alliance and prevented alternative visions of the area to be articulated. In particular, the close connection between deliberative practices and monetary compensation flows is underlined in this dynamic.

The paper contributes to critical scholarship on political CSR by highlighting in what way deliberative practices, linked to monetary compensation schemes, enforce corporate hegemony by moving community members over to the corporate alliance.

This study aims to explore the relationship between promoter share pledging and the company’s dividend payout policy in India. Furthermore, this study also analyses the moderating impact of family involvement in business on the association between share pledging and dividend payout.

A sample of 236 companies from the S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive (BSE) 500 Index (2014–2023) has been analysed through fixed-effects panel data regression. For additional testing, robustness checks include alternative measures of dividend payout and promoter share pledging, as well as alternative methodologies such as Bayesian regression. Lastly, to address potential endogeneity, instrumental variables with a two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) methodology have been implemented.

Upholding the agency perspective, a significantly negative impact of promoter share pledging on corporate dividend payouts in India has been uncovered. Moreover, family involvement in business moderates this relationship, highlighting that the negative association between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts is more pronounced in family companies. The findings are consistent throughout the robustness testing.

The present study represents a pioneering endeavour to empirically analyse the link between promoter share pledging and dividend payouts in India. It enhances the theoretical underpinnings of the agency relationship, particularly by substantiating the existence of Type II agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. The findings of this research bear significant implications for investors, researchers and policymakers, particularly in light of the widespread prevalence of promoter-controlled entities in India.