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The purpose of this paper is to examine expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation practices and their impacts on expropriated households.

This study employed a mixed research approach. The target populations of the study were expropriated households in Debre Markos City from 2019 to 2022. The study uses purposive and systematic random sampling techniques. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, narration and thematic clustering.

The findings of this study revealed that the expropriation process was not participatory and the right holders were not treated as what is expected. It is further found that economic losses, moral damage and social disturbance payments were not considered in the compensation package. The displacement compensation given was also inadequate and sometimes delayed and the time value of money was not taken into account for delayed payments. This creates social and economic problems. The rehabilitation and resettlement program was inadequate and ineffective. The expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation practice in general lack transparency and accountability.

To ensure efficient and effective expropriation, valuation and compensation, there should be a well-organized government system that provides an accurate valuation on the one hand and restores the livelihood of the displaced on the other.

This paper is the first on expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation within the framework of transparency, accountability, effective rehabilitation and resettlement and institutional arrangements to ensure the sustainable livelihoods of affected households.

This study aims to investigate the impact of exchange rate volatility and the risk of expropriation on the decision to repatriate foreign earnings.

The current study uses secondary data for foreign subsidiaries of US multinational corporations (MNCs) in 40 countries from 2004 to 2016. We use the dynamic panel difference generalised method of moments (GMM) to estimate the dynamic earnings repatriation model.

The findings show that foreign subsidiaries of US MNCs in countries with volatile exchange rates tend to repatriate more earnings to the parent company. The findings also reveal that a greater risk of expropriation in the host country leads to the higher repatriation of foreign earnings to the parent company. The findings support the notion that MNCs use the earnings repatriation policy as a means of mitigating risks arising in the host country.

Practical implications for modern managers include shedding light on how financial managers can use earnings repatriation policy to mitigate exchange rate risk and the risk of expropriation in the host country. The findings also contain policy implications at the host country level that how exchange rate volatility and risk of expropriation can reduce foreign investment in the host country.

This study adds to the earnings repatriation literature by analysing the direct effect of exchange rate volatility on earnings repatriation decisions, as opposed to the impact of the exchange rate itself, as suggested by previous research. Hence, the findings broaden our understanding of the direct influence of exchange rate volatility on the decision to repatriate foreign earnings. The present study also examines the role of the risk of expropriation in determining earnings repatriation policy, which has received little attention in prior empirical studies.

The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance usually considers two conflicting perspectives: monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. Past studies have produced mix findings. This study aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing on a specific measure of firm performance, firm growth. The moderating effect of industry growth in the aforementioned relationship is also considered, which advances knowledge on the role of moderators.

This study resorts to data from a sample of 21,476 Portuguese firms, which is examined using hierarchical linear modelling. This approach is adequate because the data has a hierarchical structure: the firms are nested within industries.

The results show that equity ownership concentration has a positive effect on firms’ growth and that industry growth amplifies this relationship. Ownership concentration can spur effective monitoring, thereby alleviating principal–agent conflicts of interest and speeding up decision-making, enabling timely competitive actions that promote growth.

The research conceives ownership structure in two groups. However, equity ownership concentration often acquires more complex shapes. In addition, the data used is from a single country.

The results show that firms pursuing growing strategies and operating in growing industries benefit from equity concentration.

Different from past studies, this study focuses on firm growth performance and considers the moderating effect of industry growth.

The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.

Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).

This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.

This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.

The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.

Motivated by the growing interest of governance regulators and researchers on internal audit function (IAF), this study examines the influence of family ownership on the levels of investment in IAF.

A sample of Malaysian listed companies for the period 2009 to 2016 is used. To test our hypothesis, the authors use pooled panel data regression based on two-way cluster-robust standard errors (firm and year).

The findings show that family ownership is negatively related to investment in IAF; in particular, investment in IAF is lower for family companies than non-family companies.

This study contributes to existing knowledge of IAF, and it provides significant insights for regulators and managers into the variation in governance structures between family and non-family companies, particularly in emerging markets in which substantial family ownership is common.

This study analyzes whether industry relatedness between a corporate borrower and its group peers significantly affects that firm's borrowing cost.

A regression analysis is run on bank-loan data of a sample of Indonesian companies for 2010–2020. The main variables of interest are the natural logarithms of the borrowing firm's number of affiliates classified within either similar 2- or 4-digit GICS industries, and the Caves weighted index of these firms' related diversification. This index measures how firms in a group are diversified in relation to the borrower. The dependent variable is the all-in credit spread, stated in basis points, over the LIBOR or similar benchmark, as of the loan issuance date.

Findings support the industry-relatedness hypothesis and contradict the risk-reduction hypothesis and show that banks charge lower loan spreads on a borrowing firm that either operates within a similar industry as its affiliate or diversifies into related sectors or industries. Consistent with the co-insurance-effect hypothesis, the results also underline the importance of the parent and first-layer firms as supporting instead of the tunneling vehicles within business groups. These conclusions hold even after segregating the sample and using the loan maturity as the dependent variable.

This study uses a unique diversification measurement based on the borrowing firm's sector or industry, relative to other group members, and offers new insights on business group diversification and bank loan costs.

Political risk has been identified as a major impediment to the success of foreign invested projects, in developing countries. Infrastructure projects are especially sensitive to host-country political climates. Governance in emerging economies can be unstable, which adversely impacts infrastructure projects, given their high capital-intensity, long operational periods and high asset specificity. While the detrimental impact of political risk is well documented, the mitigation of such impacts on infrastructure projects remains largely unexamined. This study, therefore, addresses this by exploring the available identified political risk management (PRM) strategies based on resilience theory and evaluating their effectiveness.

A mixed-method approach was employed to identify PRM strategies. Firstly, a comprehensive literature review identified 40 potential PRM strategies. However, the applicability of those 40 strategies was uncertain due to the scarcity of PRM studies. Thus, expert interviews, drawing on the insights of Chinese infrastructure industry professionals with experience in FII, were applied to review the identified strategies. This process reduced the pool of applicable strategies to 34. Subsequently, 356 questionnaires were sent out to investors from China, Australia and Singapore, with 218 valid responses returned. Based on the data collected from the surveys, statistical analysis was used to evaluate and classify applicable PRM strategies.

Results reveal the most effective top five strategies for offsetting the detrimental effects of political risk on foreign infrastructure investment to be: (1) selection of suitable markets and projects; (2) maintaining good relationship with government; (3) purchasing political insurance; (4) utilizing capable contractors from both host country and home country; and (5) adopting an appropriate entry mode. The 34 strategies were further consolidated into four meta-strategies through factor analysis, resulting in the formulation of a strategy selection matrix.

The findings of this study offer a rational means by which infrastructure investment practitioners considering projects in developing countries, may arrive at an optimal political risk mitigation strategy. The findings also offer government of host countries directives to improving the political environment in order to attract foreign investment flows into local infrastructure projects.

As a key driver of organizational agility, open innovation allows for improving time-to-market and complexity, which are the mechanisms that most significantly lower the risk of knowledge expropriation in emerging markets. For this reason, there is concern about the negative impacts of hiding knowledge in the context of inter-organizational collaborative work. Therefore, the research goal is to analyze the moderating effect of the three types of knowledge hiding (playing dumb, evasive hiding and rationalized hiding) on the relationship between open innovation (both inbound and outbound) and agility.

The research model was tested with survey data from a sample of 248 companies located in an emerging country, mostly from sectors of high turbulence in demand and technology.

None of the three types of knowledge hiding has a negative effect on the relationship between open innovation and agility. Surprisingly, evasive hiding has a positive and significant effect, specifically on the relationship between inbound open innovation and agility.

The study contributes to the discussion on the contradictory influence of knowledge hiding. Although the presence of knowledge hiding in business relationships with their external partners is undeniable, this research makes clear that, when faced with the particular need to be agile, businesses recognize that the benefits of open innovation in terms of time-to-market improvement and complexity outweigh the protectionism underlying hiding. Moreover, the study results suggest evasive hiding is essential for the inbound process to use time effectively and avoid wasting it in discussions that do not promote agility.

The study analyzes the influence of corporate governance and ownership concentration levels on the cost of equity. Further, the authors extend the literature by investigating the moderating effect of ownership concentration levels (i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%) on the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity.

The study applies several robust panel regression techniques to a sample of 114 active non-financial companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2016. Corporate governance was measured through a unique index comprising 30 governance attributes. The cost of equity was measured through the capital asset pricing model. Further, the authors construct three variables for ownership concentration levels, i.e. at 5%, 10% and 20%. To address the endogeneity problem, the one-lagged variable model and GMM approaches were also applied.

The results indicate that better corporate governance reduces the cost of equity, while ownership concentration at high thresholds would increase the cost of equity. Further, the authors find that ownership concentration at the 20% threshold moderates the relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity. Thus, the authors argue that firms can minimize the risk faced by shareholders by implementing substantive corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, effective corporate governance mechanisms at high ownership concentration levels are imperative for managing the cost of equity.

The study reports novel evidence that ownership concentration at a high threshold moderates the effect of corporate governance on the cost of equity.