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The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation, and to further explore in depth the impact of executive shareholding on corporate innovation under different industries.

This paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample to empirically study the relationship between executive shareholding, institutional investor shareholding and corporate innovation based on multiple linear regression models and panel fixed effects.

The research shows that: on the whole, the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation presents an inverted “U” shape; institutional investors will negatively regulate the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation; the impact of executive shareholding on enterprise innovation will show obvious industry differences in different industries.

The empirical results not only enrich the research on the effects of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice, but also provide targeted experience for promoting enterprise innovation. Due to the limitations of innovation indicators and industry sample selection, it is necessary to be cautious when extending the results to other fields.

Enterprises should fully consider the impact of executive shareholding on innovation and formulate a scientific executive incentive system according to the differences of their industries. The government should be aware of the important role of institutional investors in enterprises, improve the channels and ways for institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, and improve the basic system of capital markets.

On the one hand, this paper empirically tests the regulatory role of institutional investors' shareholding and the relationship between executive shareholding and enterprise innovation, which enriches the research on the effect of institutional investors' involvement in corporate governance practice. On the other hand, the research by industry is more targeted to provide experience for promoting enterprise innovation.

Based on upper echelons (UE) theory, the purpose of this study is to investigate a conceptualized moderated mediation model for examining the effects of top management team (TMT) heterogeneity and firm value in China through the mediating effect of product diversification, the moderating effect of ownership type between TMT heterogeneity and product diversification and the moderating effect of executive shareholding between product diversification and firm value.

Unbalanced panel data were collected over 5 years with a total of 6,597 observations, organized through the WIND (Wind Economic Database) and CSMAR (China Stock Market and Accounting Research) Database. The hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling and analyzed with stata15.0 software.

The results indicated that product diversification plays a mediating role between TMT heterogeneity and firm value. In China, TMT heterogeneity of non–state-owned enterprises plays a more significant role in promoting product diversification than that of state-owned enterprises; executive shareholding strengthens the relationship between product diversification and firm value.

The characteristic dimension of TMT is seen as a relatively static factor, and it is worth looking at whether a more dynamic system of evaluation and measurement can be established.

This study enriches theoretical research on TMT and contributes to UE theory in several ways. First, we studied the mediation effect of product diversification between TMT heterogeneity and firm value. This extends research on UE theory to possible process variables. Second, considering the influence of the unique institutional environment in China on corporate strategic decisions, the study investigates state-owned and non–state-owned enterprises. Specifically, it looks at the influence of ownership type as a moderating variable between TMT heterogeneity and product diversification. Third, the paper discusses the moderating effect of executive shareholding on the product diversification–firm value relationship. The research contributes to agency theory and expands research on different economic systems by implementing agency theory.

This study aims to investigate the tendency for firms, exhibiting an entrepreneurial spirit in their growth strategies, to engage in misconduct within the context of China's rapidly developing economy. The authors also examine how this relationship is influenced by governance mechanisms, specifically management shareholding and executive functional diversity. Furthermore, the authors explore the mediating roles of organizational complexity and performance pressure in linking entrepreneurial growth to firm misconduct. This research provides a novel perspective for understanding the impact of entrepreneurial growth on corporate ethical risks, and offers practical insights for maintaining ethical standards in firms during their pursuit of growth.

This study focuses on publicly traded, mature companies that exhibit an entrepreneurial inclination in their growth strategies, demonstrating entrepreneurial vigor through activities such as product innovation and market expansion. This exploration incorporates both theoretical and empirical approaches, scrutinizing A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019. To validate the robustness of this study's findings, the authors have applied diverse methodologies such as propensity score matching, classification regression, and alternative indicator analysis.

This study found that the entrepreneurial growth-oriented strategy is positively related to firm misconduct. It also uncovers that governance mechanisms like management shareholding and executive functional diversity moderate this relationship. Moreover, organizational complexity and performance pressure partially mediate the relationship between an entrepreneurial growth strategy and firm misconduct.

For instance, more detailed categorization of corporate misconduct, based on punishment severity, could be explored. Additional characteristics like age, education, gender, and team/board diversity could help further understand the relationship between entrepreneurial growth strategy and misconduct. By addressing these limitations and exploring further avenues for research, the authors can deepen the understanding of this relationship and provide valuable insights for firms seeking to mitigate potential risks.

First, for regulators, shareholders, creditors and investors, knowing and understanding the relationship between growth-oriented strategies and corporate violations is helpful for them to scientifically evaluate the potential risks that may exist in the company, and can also carry out differentiated supervision on the company based on different types of company-oriented strategies. Second, when designing the corporate governance mechanism, listed companies should fully consider the role of management shareholding. Finally, executives should treat cross-functional experience dialectically, especially in growth oriented strategic companies.

This research provides a novel perspective for understanding the impact of entrepreneurial growth on corporate ethical risks, and offers practical insights for maintaining ethical standards in firms during their pursuit of growth.

This study stands out by examining the influence of entrepreneurial growth strategy on firm misconduct, thus enhancing previous studies that primarily centered on entrepreneurial start-ups. The authors offer a nuanced comprehension of the potential risks intrinsic to corporate entrepreneurship and highlight the crucial role of efficient governance structures in curbing corporate misbehavior while fostering entrepreneurial growth.

This chapter examines the determinants of managerial incentives at the time of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange. We identify a trade-off relation between board monitoring and incentives that is specific to CEOs. We also investigate the role of stock option grants and share transactions at the IPO. We find that the IPO may be used as a wealth diversification opportunity. We report that undiversified managers with large pre-IPO shareholdings receive smaller stock options grants and sell more shares in the IPO than more diversified managers.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether regulatory restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises is beneficial to firm performance. The authors also examine the role of monitoring mechanisms in offsetting the effect of compensation restriction.

Multivariate analysis is conducted using archival data from Chinese listed companies over the period of 2007-2014.

The findings show that the restriction on executive compensation is negatively associated with a firm’s accounting performance, and this negative effect is ameliorated in firms with good internal control and a high level of institutional shareholding. Additional analysis reveals that the negative effect of pay restriction on firm performance is more pronounced in central government-controlled listed SOEs than in those controlled by local government.

This study is the first to investigate a government’s say-on-pay policy. Specifically, the findings pinpoint the inefficacy of regulatory intervention in corporate executive compensation. The findings add to compensation literature using China’s unique institutional setting.

The main purpose of the study is to examine the influence of family directors on the firm performance of public listed companies (PLCs) in Malaysia. This study provides empirical evidence on the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority interests in the concentrated ownership setting.

Samples of the study are 112 PLCs in year 2006. Two measures of firm performance are used: return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. Managerial ownership refers to the percentage shareholdings of executive directors with direct and indirect holdings. It was further categorized into family ownership and non-family ownership.

In relation to ROA, managerial ownership is found positively significant. The results also show that the positive relationship between managerial ownership is contributed by the managerial-non-family ownership. In relation to Tobin’s Q, the results show a U-shape with turning point at 31.38% for managerial ownership and 28.29% for the managerial-family ownership. The results found significant and positive relationships between managerial ownership and both measures of firm performance which indicates that managerial ownership and family ownership yield greater efficiency.

The study highlights the effects of corporate governance on ROA and Tobin’s Q are somewhat different. It provides some evidence on the need to use appropriate measure of firm performance. The significant relationship supports the argument of Chami (1999), Fama and Jensen (1983), and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and empirical evidence of Lee (2004) that family ownership enhances monitoring activities.

Differentiating the types of managerial ownership into family and non-family categories enriches our knowledge about who actually contributes to the improved performance.

The purpose of this paper is to identify firms in the UK adopting a policy of high cash and low leverage and investigate how executive ownership contributes to this decision.

Firms following this policy are identified both by using a fixed classification approach and the analysis of the distribution of cash and leverage. Logit analysis is then used to estimate the probability of adopting the policy as a function of executive ownership.

Extreme financial policies are suboptimal as firms adopting these policies tend to undershoot (overshoot) their target leverage (cash holdings) ratios. The impact of the executive ownership on the probability of adopting this policy is U-shaped, in line with the alignment–entrenchment hypothesis.

Despite the substantial presence of non-executive directors in the boards and a significant amount of shareholdings by executive directors, the firms under analysis have adopted suboptimal financial policies possibly because poorly governed or because executive ownership is the range where entrenchment is feasible.

This is the first attempt at recognising policies of high cash and low leverage as being explicitly interdependent. It is also the first study focussing on the UK, a country of interest, because ownership structure is relatively dispersed. Moreover, instead of choosing fixed threshold levels of the variable in defining the extreme financial policy, this paper proposes the analysis of the distribution of cash holdings and leverage and accounts for target levels of cash and leverage.

The authors expand the connotation of the research on the accounting information quality characteristics, provide empirical evidence for the factors of consistency and also help to deepen further their understanding of the economic consequences of ownership concentration and other ownership structures.

Using financial data of Chinese listed companies as samples, coupled with a method to calculate the consistency of the sample enterprises on the corporate level in the 2007–2019 period, the authors studied its impact of ownership concentration on consistency.

The study finds that after controlling other factors, ownership concentration could significantly reduce accounting information consistency. Further research finds that when the executives' shareholding is higher, the reduction effect of ownership concentration on consistency is weaker. After the robustness test, the conclusion remains basically unchanged.

First, maybe there is a limitation of De Franco et al. (2011) method the authors use in China. As some scholars pointed out, the systematic component of returns variation is large in emerging markets (Morck et al., 2000), so it is hard to determine to what extent market stock returns will capture the net effect of earnings. As is mentioned above, there are multiple methods for measuring comparability and consistency, but it is not easy to judge which way is the best. Maybe the authors will have a perfect process in the future. Second, in addition to the factors mentioned in this study's hypotheses, there should be other factors (these include internal factors and external factors) that play moderating role in the impact of ownership concentration on accounting information consistency. The authors have not thoroughly studied the effect of those factors. These limitations all need to be further explored in the future.

The study finds that after controlling other factors, ownership concentration could significantly reduce accounting information consistency, but the reduction will be affected by some other factors related to corporate governance. The new insights from these advances are that the conclusions provide a technical path for management of companies to improve corporate governance efficiency and the quality of accounting information, and also provide more reference and empirical evidence for information users to identify the company's accounting information quality, which contributes to creating a prerequisite for the usefulness of accounting information.

This study examined the influence of corporate governance (CG) in relation to venture capital (VC) investment on invested firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance in the Chinese context. More specifically, this paper examined the mediation of the proportion of independent directors (INDD), management shareholding (MSH) and executives' political connections (POLC) in the above-mentioned relationship.

This empirical study performed multiple mediation testing and bootstrap mediation robustness test on data from Chinese A-class shares IPO companies between 2010 and 2018.

The results of direct relationship analysis showed that VC support is detrimental to firm' CSR performance, consistent with previous research studies. The indirect effect analysis showed that VC reduced firm' CSR through reduction of INDD on board and increased MSH. Conversely, VC contributed to firm's CSR through higher POLC, which confirmed the significance of the joint mediation model.

This study offers stakeholders the opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the role of VC institutions, independent directors and executives, in terms of firm's CSR, as well as provides insights on control rights allocation and policy drafting on independent directors when considering accessing VC support.

By analyzing the mediation model of the VC–CSR relationship, this paper provides evidence to enrich the debate on the role of CG in the relation between VC and firm's CSR.

This study extensively aims to investigate the effects of different aspects of corporate governance (CG) mechanism, including board size, executive directors’ shareholdings, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, a family member as the CEO and/or chairperson of the board, independent directors in remuneration committee and number of board meeting, on executive directors’ remuneration in small firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (BM).

The sample of this study consists of 173 bottom-listed companies from Bursa Malaysia in Year 2010. The Year 2010 was chosen because the disclosure of remuneration committee activities and directors’ pay structure is required under the revised Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance, 2007. Furthermore, the period selected is after the global economic crisis (2008), which may have an effect on the remuneration structure in small firms. The ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the relationship between remuneration as dependent variable and other independent variables.

A finding from this study reveals that there is a significant positive relationship between executive ownership and executive remuneration, and between board size and executive remuneration. The results provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. This indicates that the independent directors are not truly independent to monitor and control the firm activities, including minimizing the excessive remuneration.

This study examines how the corporate governance (CG) affects remuneration among 173 small firms in Malaysia based on market capitalization, for one year, 2010. Hence, the results may not be generalizable to other periods or types of the companies. This shows the possibility of the absence of some additional variables in the research model and hence a limitation to the findings of the study. Although the study is being parsimonious in the choice of relevant variables, prior literature serves the guide in the selection of the used variables. This therefore gives room for future research using the potential omitted variables. Furthermore, the study focuses on total remuneration, such as fees, salaries, bonuses and benefits in kind, which makes aggregate directors’ remuneration. However, this study did not consider the remuneration related to stock options. Finally, this study only uses secondary data; hence, it could be interesting to use other instruments to collect data like a questionnaire to add more weight to the research. This study only uses one-year data; therefore, impact of changes between years cannot be analysed.

Results of the study provide evidence that the family members manipulate power and control remuneration in small firms. They reduce the effectiveness of non-executive directors because most of them are appointed by a family member and not socially responsible to their stakeholders.