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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that remuneration consultants consider when selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking. It explores how the different factors influence the level of pay and whether the factors encourage pay-for-performance. Furthermore, it investigates whether the factors used form part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay.

This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA.

This paper demonstrates that there is no uniformity in the factors used by remuneration consultants when selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking. The paper shows that company performance is not a major factor considered justifying why executive pay is not linked to company performance. The paper further demonstrates that the factors that remuneration consultants consider in selecting comparator groups for executive remuneration benchmarking justify high pay and affirm that remuneration consultants are associated with high pay.

This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels and the weak link between pay and performance. This paper will inform companies on what to demand from remuneration consultants when hiring their services. Second, it will provide the shareholders with vital information that they need to vote on remuneration reports in the annual general meeting. Finally, it informs policy makers on the grey areas of practice that require best practice.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of advice that the remuneration consultants offer to the companies on executive pay. It explores how the advice offered affects the level of executive remuneration. Furthermore, it investigates whether the nature of advice offered forms part of the reasons why remuneration consultants have been criticised to be correlated with high executive pay.

This paper analysis the data obtained from interviewing remuneration consultants from prominent consultancy firms that operate in the UK and the USA.

This paper demonstrates that remuneration consultants’ advice on executive remuneration is not always objective. The nature of advice depends on whether the consultants have a balance of portfolio of companies (self-interest) or whether they have the courage to stand up to confrontations from the executives (fear of executives). This study shows that the purpose of using remuneration consultants in advising on executive remuneration is defeated. Also, the practice pushes up pay levels.

The research focused on large consultancy firm operating in the UK and/or the USA. Access to the participants was very difficult due to their busy schedules.

This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels.

This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting.

This paper demonstrates the effect that lack of best practice on benchmarking is partly responsible for the high executive pay levels. This paper will inform companies on the nature of advice that remuneration consultant’s offer and its effect on pay levels. Secondly, it will provide the shareholders with vital information they require to vote on remuneration policy in the annual general meeting. Lastly, it informs policymakers on the grey areas of practice that requires best practice.

The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK.

The paper reviews the past and existing regulation and corporate governance recommendations on executive remuneration.

The paper demonstrates that the failure of regulatory mechanisms to curb excessive executive remuneration can be justified on the grounds of human greed. Greed is facilitated by the potential conflict of interest that exists as a result of the executives’ position in the company. The position of the law has given greed the opportunity to manifest, making it quite difficult for executive remuneration to be effectively regulated.

The paper adds to the existing debate on excessive executive remuneration by demonstrating that human greed is the basis of excessive executive remuneration on which limited literature exists.

This paper aims to examine the two different approaches adopted in the UK to regulate directors’ remuneration. The paper also aims to explore the two approaches to understand which one better regulates directors’ pay and why. It provides an account of the two approaches’ evolution, effectiveness and challenges towards the regulation of directors’ remuneration. The paper will also make some recommendations on both approaches and the way forward to better regulate directors’ remuneration.

The paper reviews various corporate governance codes, its recommendations on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and the challenges it face in regulating directors’ remuneration. The paper also reviews provisions of the Companies Act 2006 on directors’ remuneration, its effectiveness and challenges faced.

The paper finds that corporate governance adopts a better approach to regulating directors’ pay than the Companies Act 2006 because it targets the pay setting process. However, the existence of grey areas and lack of enforcement procedure poses a challenge on its effectiveness. The Companies Act 2006 is unable to regulate directors’ pay adequately because it adopts a corrective approach and it considers directors’ remuneration as a management responsibility.

The paper offers an up-to-date assessment of the two approaches to regulating directors’ pay in the UK. It highlights the challenges faced by both approaches and which approach could regulate directors pay better and its challenges. The paper further makes recommendations on how the regulation of directors’ remuneration can be effective in the UK.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse 100 of the largest family firms and their personnel costs and employee numbers compared to non-family firms in the Czech Republic and confirm if there exist differences between personnel costs for family and non-family firms.

The sample consisted of 100 family firms and 97 non-family firms from the Czech Republic for the comparison. Four hypotheses about relation between personnel costs for family and non-family firms and their governing body were set. Descriptive statistics were calculated, and t-tests and Kruskal–Wallis test for confirmation of set hypothesis were used.

Sales volume and production consumption results are used as variables, which were compared between family and non-family firms to achieve the most relevant possible conclusions. Based on our results, it can be stated that differences between personnel costs, which, in this study, comprise employee wages, are not statistically significant in the largest Czech family firms. There are significant differences in personnel costs for company boards. In comparing employee numbers and the number of members of statutory bodies, however, no significant difference was ascertained.

This study responds to a gap in the literature, by exploring the differences between personnel costs (for employees and governing body) in the area of the Czech Republic. This study also contributes to the understanding of the remuneration within family firms, by assessing the role of executive remuneration in family firms.

This paper seeks to make the case for new research into the perceived fairness and impact of executive pay.

The paper reviews the literature regarding executive compensation and corporate performance and examines the evidence that a more egalitarian approach to pay could be justified in terms of long‐term shareholder value.

There would appear to be no evidence to suggest that the growing gap between the pay of executives and that of the average employee generates long‐term enterprise value, and it may even be detrimental to firms, if not the liberal capitalist consensus on which the corporate licence to operate is based.

The paper outlines a new approach to tracking income differentials with corporate performance through the development of a corporate Gini coefficient “league table”.

The proposed research is expected to point towards better practice in executive remuneration, and support the growing momentum for a sustainable and enlightened approach to business, in which the key goal is long‐term enterprise value based on a fair distribution of the rewards of business.

In producing a deeper understanding of the impact of widening income differentials, the paper should be of interest to senior executives in publicly quoted companies as well as press commentators, government officials and academics.

The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation governing the determination/reporting of executive remuneration in UK stock market listed companies. Practical points from actors involved in executive remuneration decision-making/reporting are presented, set within the context of neo-institutional theory.

This qualitative research systematically analyses UK Corporate Governance Codes, the FRC’s recent Review/Consultation and peer-reviewed published studies of executive pay determination based on in-depth interviews with non-executive directors, institutional investors, executive pay advisers and human resources (HR) professionals.

Further regulation, while providing coercive influence over executive remuneration decision-making, is likely to lead to only limited change in processes and reporting due to benchmarking, the make-up of Remco membership and shareholders' preferences. Mimetic and normative isomorphic forces work against coercive isomorphism leading to resistance to change as decision-makers strive to safeguard their social status/reputations.

Reviewing executive remuneration package components and paying attention to company strategy, sustainability and values in pay determination are welcomed but recognised as difficult to achieve. Drawing upon a wider range of information sources/voices can assist in broadening the discussion. HR professionals can help widen stakeholder input to executive remuneration decision-making.

The authors’ viewpoint is grounded in peer-reviewed empirical data that draws directly upon the views/experiences of executive remuneration decision-makers to identify problems in adhering to FRC recommendations for change. The authors extend the meta-theoretical perspective of neo-institutional theory – specifically institutional isomorphism – as providing explanatory and predictive power to understand executive pay decision-making.

Drawing on institutional theory, this study aims to analyse the regulation of executive remuneration as espoused in the United Kingdom (UK) codified corporate governance principles, focussing on sources of advice to decision-makers, the nature of the advice sought and given, and interaction of those involved in the process.

A qualitative research design was used. Data were assembled from interviewing non-executive board/remuneration committee members; institutional investors; external remuneration consultants and internal human resources (HR)/reward specialists. Results were analysed in accordance with the Gioia technique.

Tensions inherent in the interpretation of corporate governance codes are illustrated. Emphasis on independent advice combined with constraints on decision-makers' capacity to navigate the nuances of a complex field and reputational concerns risks standardised instead of bespoke remuneration approaches aligned with corporate contexts.

There is a role for internal HR advisors to add value through their potential to reduce the gap within remuneration committees between institutional contexts and independent decision-making, facilitating more strategic human resource management inspired executive remuneration.

Application of institutional theory indicates the relevance of balancing external with internal sources to secure advice that is horizontally and vertically aligned within an organisation to meet the letter and spirit of corporate governance norms. Extending the explanatory power of institutional theory, care is needed though not to overlook the normative underpinnings of professional advisors' own value sets.