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This study aims to investigate how the presence of female executives on the board affects a company’s capital structure decisions. The critical mass of female executives on the board was also considered to observe their impact on capital structure.

Samples were taken from nonfinancial sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2012 and 2021 (3,707 firm-year observations). Capital structure was measured using four approaches, namely, debt-to-total asset ratio (DAR), debt-to-equity ratio (DER), short-term debt-to-total assets (STD) and long-term debt-to-total assets (LTD). The data were analyzed using panel data regression analysis, including a fixed effects model with clustered standard errors.

The presence of female executives on the board is significantly negatively related to capital structure as measured by DER and STD. The critical mass of women provided no evidence of a relationship with a firm’s capital structure. Robustness checks were performed, and the results were consistent with those in the main analysis.

Female executives can be appointed to management boards when determining a strategy to achieve the capital structure desired by a company.

This study increases the diversity of research in corporate governance by synthesizing various indicators from female executives into a single study to determine their relationships with companies’ capital structures. In addition, this study stands out by incorporating four distinct indicators for assessing capital structure and diverging from the norm observed in many other studies, many of which rely on just two indicators: DAR and DER. Moreover, it strongly emphasizes the unique economic, legal, social and cultural landscapes of developing countries like Indonesia in comparison to their developed counterparts, particularly Western nations.

The authors seek to analyze the impact of weak corporate governance by top executives of a firm on the firm's earnings reports. This research is meant to further emphasize the impact of co-opted executives on a firm, primarily through their impact on earnings management.

Using financial data from 11,473 firm-year observations, the authors utilize ordinary least squares (OLS), 2-stage IV regressions, propensity score matching (PSM) and entropy balancing to analyze the impact of a co-opted top management team on discretionary accruals and restatements.

The authors find empirical evidence that firms with weak corporate governance from top executives are more likely to manipulate reported earnings and have lower financial reporting quality. The authors also find that the effect of co-opted executives on earnings management is weaker when a chief executive officer's (CEO’s) incentives are not aligned with those of top executives, suggesting that executives prevent earnings management due to reputational concerns. Co-opted chief financial officers (CFOs) increase the magnitude of earnings management in a firm but are not solely responsible for the authors' results.

The authors' results suggest that the top executive team provides an important first defense in the prevention of earnings management and corporate wrongdoing. Co-option of the top executive team may be an important consideration when doing research into corporate governance.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

In the field of leadership development, a dilemma exists with many executives, who often support and fund leadership development programs. Executives know that great leaders are needed to drive results, and for the most part, they must develop those leaders internally. At the same time, the leadership development providers are content with showing executives that they have changed leader behavior. The same providers are reluctant to connect behavior change to meaningful and important business measures. Yet, when used properly, leader behavior will drive all types of important impact measures in an organization. That is what executives want to see. This purpose of this article is to show how leadership development providers can connect their programs to important business measures and deliver value at the Impact and ROI Levels using the ROI Methodology.

Executives prefer to have leader behavior connected to impact, which is their No. 1 measure and return on investment (ROI), their No. 2 measure. Impact and ROI is the world they live in. Executives know that new leader behavior is necessary for impact and often have input into the behaviors they would like to see. When it comes to measuring success, they want to see how the program connects to the organization and the value the new behavior delivers. To avoid the possibility of disappointing results, implement the ROI Methodology framework to design the leadership development program to deliver the desired results and make sure that everyone involved is helping to deliver the needed success.

Leadership development providers must address the challenge of showing the value of leadership development. It is not that difficult to show the impact and ROI of major programs. Literally, hundreds of organizations are doing this now. The authors have published four books with different publishers on the value of leadership development, with case studies, and more will be published.

This level of evaluation can set the leadership development program apart from the others.

This study investigates the impact of female directors on firms' financial performance by scrutinizing the different roles they are empowered to fulfill.

This study examines the impact of the roles performed by female directors on firms' financial performance using a panel dataset of the top 100 listed Indian firms over a period of 5 years. The study uses an appropriate panel data model for empirical analysis. For the robustness evaluation, a two-stage least square (2SLS) with the instrumental variable model were used.

The findings reveal a significantly positive impact of the total percentage of female directors on firms' financial performance. Further, by disentangling the impact of the total percentage of female directors between independent directors and executive directors, the study shows that independent female directors make a significant positive contribution to their firms' financial performance. By contrast, the performance impact of female executive directors was insignificant. In addition, the findings reveal that firms with a higher proportion of independent female directors outperform firms with a higher percentage of female executive directors.

This study is the first of its kind to unravel the performance impact of female directors and distinguish between the roles of independent directors and executive directors in the context of the emerging market of India, after the imposition of a gender quota for corporate boards.

This study aims to investigate the association between executives with foreign backgrounds and the audit fees paid by the Chinese-listed firms over the period from 2010 to 2020.

To examine the association between executives’ foreign experience and audit fees, this study constructs the following empirical model: Lnfee_i,t = β₀ + β₁Foreign background_i,t + ∑β_j Control_i,t + YearFE + IndFE + ε_i,t (1).

This study finds that auditors charge higher fees for firms hiring more executives with foreign backgrounds. The results are robust to a battery of robustness checks, including fixed effects, alternative measures of independent variable, controlling for other characteristics of executives and auditors and entropy balancing method.

This study sheds light on how executives’ foreign backgrounds affect audit fees, enriching the literature on executive heterogeneity and audit fees and providing important implications for audit practitioners.

This paper aims to investigate how a US firm’s political landscape affects the integration of environmental, social and governance (hereafter ESG) measures in CEO compensation contracts, thereby affecting the firm’s ESG performance and credit rating.

Based on the results of state senatorial and presidential elections and the location of a US firm’s headquarters, the authors categorize whether a firm has a political environment that is predominantly Democratic (blue) or Republican (red). The empirical analyses are based on a sample of US firms in the period 2014–2021.

The authors find that firms in blue states are more likely to link CEO compensation to ESG performance measures. Further, the results show that firms in blue states with ESG-linked compensation contracts have better ESG performance. Lastly, the authors find evidence that a firm’s ESG performance has a positive impact on its credit rating, but the impact is weakened if firms in red states link ESG performance to executive compensation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research that explores how a firm’s political environment affects the use of ESG performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. Furthermore, the authors contribute to the literature by showing evidence that the political environment interacts with the impact of ESG-linked compensation incentives on the firm’s ESG performance and, thus, its credit rating.

Research on the effect of executive equity incentives is equivocal. Based on agency theory, some scholars take the convergence of interest logic to highlight the benefits of executive equity incentives. In contrast, others adopt the entrenchment logic to emphasize the increased agency costs. This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil how executive equity incentives impact corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

Using the panel dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2022, this study integrates the convergence of interest and entrenchment logic to examine how executive equity incentives affect CSR performance.

We find that the relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance follows an inverted U-shaped form. According to the convergence of interest logic, executive equity incentives reduce agency costs when allocating resources to engage in CSR activities and enable firms to increase their CSR investments, ultimately realizing increased CSR performance. After a threshold, however, the accumulation of extensive equity incentives causes the entrenchment effect, resulting in declined CSR performance. Our empirical results also shed new light on its contingent perspective – the inverted U-shaped relationship is attenuated when firms’ stock liquidity is high.

This study attempts to reconcile the debate on executive equity incentives and integrates the opposing views to unveil the inverted U-shaped relationship between executive equity incentives and CSR performance. Our study opens promising avenues for further research on corporate governance and CSR strategies.

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) has huge impact and harm on real economy, so the economic logic and other economic effects behind this must be further studied. By constructing the “China Economic Policy Uncertainty Index” to capture the degree of EPU faced by Chinese companies, the authors empirically test whether and how EPU affects the level of executives' perquisite consumption.

This study investigates the relationship between EPU and executive perquisite consumption based on a sample of 3,185 publicly listed firms in China. To examine the relationship between EPU and executives' perquisite consumption, a mixed least squares method was used for regression. To alleviate the problem of missing variables that do not change over time and control the influence of unobservable individual heterogeneity at the firm level, the firm fixed effects model is used for regression.

The study finds that EPU is positively associated with executive perquisite consumption. This positive association is stronger for firms with smaller size, lower management shareholding and higher levels of separation of ownership and control. Effective external governance (i.e., analyst coverage, media coverage, auditor and market competition) can mitigate the relationship between EPU and executive perquisite consumption. Further analysis reveals that EPU increases executive perquisite consumption by holding more cash and decreasing firm risk taking. EPU hurts market value of firms by boosting executive perquisite consumption and tunneling.

In an environment with high EPU, the board of directors should reduce managers' compensation performance sensitivity to ease the agency conflict caused by uncertainty. Firms should improve their governance mechanisms and standard and pay attention to their environmental changes. Policymakers should pay attention to maintaining the continuity and predictability of policies, stabilizing the economic policy expectations of market entities and avoiding frequent changes in policies that can harm economic and firm value. The regulatory authorities should actively guide listed companies to increase active information disclosure during periods of high policy uncertainty.

This study contributes to the research on corporate governance by showing how EPU influences executives' behaviors. The authors advance relative studies by showing that this uncertainty embedded in a firm's external environments influences executive perquisite consumption. This study also contributes to the literature on how internal and external governances influence corporate behavior during uncertainty. These findings extend this line of research by suggesting that effective external governance is an attribute that can alleviate the effect of uncertainty on managers' opportunistic behaviors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial myopia on information technology (IT) investment. Specifically, it aims to investigate the influence of chief information officer (CIO) compensation on IT investment and the moderating role of the board monitoring strength on this relationship.

The study examines a sample of 194 firms listed on US stock exchanges with a CIO position in 2019. The authors employ hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypothesis.

The results show that CIO compensation negatively influences IT investment. Further, even though vigilant board monitoring does not necessarily reduce such opportunistic behaviors, weak board monitoring creates an environment for such actions.

First, the cross-sectional data can limit the results' generalizability. Second, the sampling frame is not perfectly random as it consists of firms that have CIO compensation information in the ExecuComp for 2019. Third, we include only two measures of board monitoring strength.

Board of directors should wisely select compensation packages' components since equity incentives potentially exacerbate managerial myopia. Moreover, firms may regulate CIOs' investment behaviors through board-level IT governance.

This study is one of the few studies that utilize CIO sensitivity to measure CIO compensation. Moreover, by examining the factors affecting IT investment behavior, this study sheds light on CIO incentives' impact on IT investment behaviors. Finally, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board monitoring's role in the relationship between CIO sensitivity and IT investment intensity.