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This paper aims to establish a theoretical framework that can comprehensively explain the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the context of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The author develops a theoretical framework for executive compensation in SOEs from the perspective of Marxist economics and points out that the executives in SOEs are engaged in management labor, and their compensation should adhere to the principle of distribution according to labor contribution.

Based on this theory, the author posits that the continuous upward trend of executive compensation in SOEs, is consistent with the trend of SOEs' ongoing expansion, which reflects a continuous improvement of SOE executives' management labor in both quality and quantity.

It is necessary to start with Marxist economic theory and scientifically study the issue of SOE executive compensation, adhere to the principle of distribution according to work in the context of a socialist market economy and implement the specific guideline of the Party Central Committee; only in this way can the long-term healthy development of SOEs be promoted continuously.

The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are more likely to pay their executives at a level that is in line with economic determinants.

Using the expected compensation model developed by Core et al. (2008), the authors test our hypothesis using a large sample of US public companies.

The authors find that CSR performance is negatively associated with how much executive compensation deviates from the expected level. The authors further examine whether CSR performance is associated with excess compensation or inadequate compensation and find that socially responsible firms are less likely to pay their executives either excessively or inadequately.

This study provides evidence on the association between CSR performance and abnormal executive compensation, especially how CSR is associated with inadequate compensation, an area that has been largely overlooked by the literature.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between board of directors' independence and executive compensation disclosures transparency.

The paper examines compensation disclosure practices of a sample of 181 firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Board independence from management is assessed through an aggregate score which takes into account the proportion of independent directors, board leadership structure (i.e. CEO is the board chairperson), and the existence and independence of board committees. A cross‐sectional regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between board independence and the extent of compensation disclosure.

The paper finds that board independence from management is positively related to the transparency of executive compensation‐related information. In addition, this study documents a positive (negative) relation between firm size, US cross‐listing, growth opportunities (leverage) and the extent of executive compensation disclosure.

The study's results provide support to the managerial opportunism hypothesis in executive compensation. These findings highlight the importance of the board of directors as an effective governance mechanism which limits managerial rent‐seeking in the design as well as the disclosure of executive compensation practices.

This paper extends prior disclosure studies by examining the impact of board characteristics on the transparency of executive compensation disclosures in a principles‐based governance regime. Furthermore, executive compensation disclosure provides an interesting setting in which to examine the ability of the directors to act independently from managers in a conflict of interests situation.

While there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.

Using data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).

The authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.

Inevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.

The study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.

This paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

The research on corporate governance has different perspectives on the relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation, and the empirical findings on this linkage are also inconclusive. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of ownership concentration on executive compensation in emerging economies.

By connecting different perspectives with the characteristics of emerging economies together, this research explores the impact of ownership concentration on executive compensation, and then empirically tests the hypotheses based on the archival data of publicly held firms in China.

The paper finds that there is no significant relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), while there is a U‐shaped relationship in non‐SOEs.

This study not only offers an empirical test of the effect of ownership concentration on executive compensation, but also provides some insights into the debates on the relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation in emerging economies.

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between accounting conservatism and executive compensation-performance sensitivity with a view to identify the influence of accounting conservatism on the efficiency of executive compensation contracts.

This study uses multiple regression models based on the approach of Iyengar and Zampelli (2010), Clarkson et al. (2011) and Huang and Kisgen (2013) with the data from all of China’s listed non-financial firms over the period of 10 years to test the relationship between accounting conservatism and the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance.

This study finds a positive association between executive compensation and accounting-based measure of performance. More importantly, it reveals that conservatism has a positive relation with the executive compensation-performance sensitivity after controlling for a number of firm-specific factors and control variables. This study shows that the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance is higher for firms with higher accounting conservatism.

This is one of the few studies to examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and executive compensation-performance sensitivity. It provides supportive evidence to the argument that accounting conservatism, being an efficient governance mechanism, can help mitigate information risk and moral risk for agency problems.

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether socially responsible firms recognize the potential conflicts that come with higher levels of executive compensation, and thus limit executive pay relative to what is being paid in other firms. In the process, the relationships between executive compensation and financial performance, and corporate social performance and financial performance are examined to determine whether potential compensation and social performance links are coming at the expense of company financial performance.

The empirical data for this research were obtained from a stratified sample of Fortune 1000 companies pulled from across more than 15 industries. Multiple regression analysis is utilized to test three hypotheses.

In line with the hypotheses, results indicate that companies identified as good corporate social performers do in fact have lower levels of executive compensation and there is some support found for a positive relationship between social and financial performance.

The results provide support for the view that firms concerned about social responsibility can put restrictions on executive compensation and still achieve good financial performance, and make a case that executive compensation should in fact be a concern of all socially responsible firms.

There are few studies that examine the direct link between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility. This study addresses this gap in the literature and adds to the discussion as to whether socially responsible firms might seek to better balance compensation across the firm and emphasize that profit, both individual and corporate, must be earned within a system that is fair and balanced for all.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the effects of influence and reciprocity as the elements in the determination of executive compensation.

A purposive sample was drawn, which comprised of 13 respondents chosen for their expertise relating to the determination of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A semi-structured interview guide was used as the data-gathering instrument. A thematic analysis technique was used for data analysis.

The findings in this study identified three themes resorting under influence as crucial in the process of determining executive compensation, namely an executive’s social capital, intellectual capital and social comparison. Two major themes emerged under reciprocity, namely the pay-performance relationship and role complexity. Finally, the political-symbolic role emerged as the main theme that described the relationship between influence and reciprocity.

The findings provide a more detailed description of the process involved in determining executive compensation in SOEs.

There has been limited if any, empirical study on the process involved in setting executive compensation. The limited focus has always been on accounting measures. Incorporating the socio-psychological view attempts to provide a more comprehensive and conclusive explanation of the process of determining executive pay in theory and practice.

The purpose of this paper is to illuminate issues surrounding executive compensation as it relates to current understandings of Islamic business law.

The emerging bodies of literature in the fields of executive compensation and opinions of stock options under Shari'a law are reviewed.

It appears that the trend in offering employee stock options as part of a Shari'a compliant compensation package is acceptable in most cases, yet because of its close association with the more problematic idea of derivative transactions, the company must be vigilant in obtaining the approval from its Shari'a Standards Board before offering it as part of an overall compensation package.

Existing quantitative data in this area are limited. Given the qualitative, exploratory nature of the design, generalizability is not as robust as other designs.

The paper makes recommendations about the inclusion of employee stock options as part of a Shari'a compliant executive compensation package.

This paper advances the extant literature on the ethics of executive compensation in general as well as adding to the extant literature on Shari'a compliance of executive compensation packages.

The use of covariance structure modeling is explored as a means of moving toward a resolution of the debate over the antecedents of executive compensation. The major strength of this methodology is that it enables researchers to measure the effects of unobserved factors on measured variables. It is suggested that covariance structure modeling is a promising way of studying the effect of institutional isomorphism on executive compensation. The popular business press has questioned repeatedly the justification for and the performance effects of prevailing executive compensation systems (Crystal, 1988; Loomis, 1982; Patton, 1985). These articles argue that executives are more interested in creating wealth for themselves than for stockholders. They also underscore the absence of an obvious link between executive compensation and firm performance. Recent academic research on executive compensation adopts an agency perspective that emphasizes potential conflicts of interest between managers and stockholders. It contends that, in the absence of effective disciplining and monitoring systems, executive compensation plans may direct managers' efforts toward personal wealth enhancement to the detriment of firm value (Baumol, 1958; Berle & Means, 1932). In response, scholars have urged that executive compensation plans contain monetary incentives that only accrue to executives when shareholder wealth is maximized (Kerr, 1985; Rappaport, 1983; Tehranian & Waegelein, 1985). However, designing compensation systems that effectively align the interests of managers and stockholders requires a knowledge of the role and effect of relevant driving forces on compensation. Statistical research on executive compensation has been guided predominantly by a search for tangible, observable determinants (Ciscel & Carroll, 1980), examples of which have been firm size or growth rate (Baumol, 1967; Marris, 1963), inter‐firm and inter‐in‐dustry differences (Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985), and performance (Murphy, 1986). The emphasis on such tangible explanations is not surprising given the overwhelming use of econometric techniques, such as ordinary least squares regression (Ciscel & Carroll, 1980; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988), logistic regression (Walking & Long, 1984), time series analysis (Murphy, 1985), and event studies (Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, 1985; Coughlan & Schmidt, 1985; Tehranian & Waegelein, 1985). This paper argues that the focus on tangible, observable variables by compensation researchers is a methodologically ‐ driven practice that constrains theory building and testing. As a result, we may have ignored interesting and relevant theoretical frameworks for the study of executive compensation. We also have overlooked the use of analytical techniques that allow us to examine the role of potentially relevant latent constructs. In this paper, we will describe and illustrate the use of covariance structure modeling for the study of institutional pressures on executive compensation.