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To analyze the August 2016 court decision in Sivolella v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. and its implications for cases concerning mutual fund advisory fees under Section 36(b) of the of the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Discusses Section 36(b), the plaintiffs’ arguments and the judge’s decision in favor of the mutual fund adviser. Provides insights from the judge’s analysis of the advisory fees at issue, including the independence of the mutual fund board and quality of the annual advisory contract renewal process, whether the language of the advisory and subadvisory agreements fully reflects the nature and extent of services provided, the board’s reliance on outside experts and advisers when considering the advisers’ fees and services, and continuous improvements in the boards’ annual advisory contract renewal process.

AXA was a decisive victory for the adviser, and serves as a reminder to boards and advisers alike that a diligent focus on board process and independence can pay twofold after litigation is filed.

Boards and advisers should consider AXA’s implications, and whether the decision raises issues that should be reviewed by independent counsel with experience advising funds and advisers with respect to the Investment Company Act.

Practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This study aims to examine the effect of state-level legal risk on audit fee pricing in the USA. This study hypothesizes that auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees to clients headquartered in states with higher legal risk in terms of probability of being sued, expected size of damages allocated to the auditors and breadth of third parties able to claim damages.

This study hypothesizes that higher state-level legal risk leads to higher audit fees. To test this, this study estimates ordinary least squares regressions of audit fees for 56,576 company years from 2001 to 2018 with the three measures of state legal risk and other factors known to affect audit fees.

This study finds that state-level legal risk is positively associated with audit fee pricing for two of three measures. Interestingly, the third measure, breadth of third parties able to claim damages, is negatively associated with audit fees.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper fulfills an identified need and is the first study to comprehensively test the association between state-level differentials in legal risk and audit fees.

Directors help determine the strategic direction of a corporation and are responsible for ensuring the institution has a good system of internal control. Banking institutions without a strategic direction emphasizing sound lending practices that promote the long-run financial health and viability of the institution will be sued more frequently than peer institutions. Institutions that do not have a good system of internal control will also be sued more frequently. Hence, legal expense is a bank corporate governance measure. We compare the performance of bank legal expense and a widely cited corporate governance index in a regression framework to determine which better predicts bank performance. The regressions indicate legal expense is a much better predictor, hence a better measure of bank corporate governance. Regulators should require legal expense reporting and rank institutions by the ratio of legal expense to assets to help identify institutions with weak governance. Seven case studies illustrate the role of legal expense in corporate governance.

We study how different rules for allocating litigation costs impact on royalty negotiation when a non-practicing patent holder asserts its patent against a product developer.

A theoretical framework is proposed which distinguishes between three legal-cost allocation systems: the American system, where each party bears its own costs; the British system, where the loser incurs all costs; and the system favoring the defendant, where the defendant pays its own costs if it loses and nothing otherwise. The model considers both flat lawyer fees and contingency fees.

We first determine conditions under which, in the assumed contexts, the American system is preferable to the British one. Successively, we show that the less usual system favoring the defendant proves to be an interesting alternative.

In this way, in addition to extend the standard model of patent holdup, we furnish an analytical treatment of recent legislative proposals, such as the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013.

Drawing on “Strategic Alliance” literature and qualitative research methods, the purpose of this study is to examine the initiation and operations phases of the relationship between Australian litigation funders and class law firms. The initiation phase examines factors such as complementarity between needs and assets compatibility between the funder and the class law firm goals of the alliance trust and alliance structure. The operations phase considers factors such as governance, communication and risk management and accountability. Because of its focus on the fairness of settlement, case law provides limited understanding of the drivers of the class law firm and funder relationship. An “inside look” of how the funder-law firm is initiated and made operational provides a more accurate picture and has important implications for the management of the ethical issues that arise during the course of that relationship.

This paper is a content analysis and contains qualitative interviews.

The strategic alliance between class law firms and litigation funders has evolved within an institutional climate that has acknowledged the benefits that the alliance can bring to the conduct of class actions. That same institutional environment has led to an alliance which is informal and transactionally oriented, where each of the parties maintains a demarcation in function. Although they share aspects of the strategic management of class actions, funders continue to be diligent monitors of class law firms, and class law firms continue to advance the legal rights of class members.

It is observed that the size of the sample is small driven by a number of market participants.

The paper confirms that the litigation funder–law firm strategic alliance works well as a result of institutional constraints.

Each of the alliance partners was keen to ensure that neither they nor their partner acted in a way which might attract judicial disapproval. Each also believed that they played a positive role in promoting class member interests, albeit that their primary motivation was to earn fees or a commission. The success of the alliance between class law firms and litigation funders has substantially improved access to justice in Australia for small claims holders.

The paper provides insight into a strategic alliance which is formed primarily for the benefit of third parties. This is one of the first papers to consider the litigation funder–law firm relationship through the lens of strategic alliance literature.

In recent years, the European Commission and various Member States, citing increasingly integrated markets and higher levels of cross-border activity within the European Union (“E.U.”), have called for the adoption of effective collective redress mechanisms for victims of violations of E.U. law. Although many Member States have already adopted collective action procedures under national law, these procedures have been ineffective in stimulating private enforcement of E.U. law and are often divergent in their approach to consolidating claims. E.U. lawmakers, after a lengthy period of investigation and study, have identified a set of guiding principles for the Member States to use in enacting new collective redress procedures within their national systems. The studies and papers solicited from the public during the Commission’s deliberations are explicit in their rejection of the U.S.-style opt-out class action mechanism. In their effort to avoid similarly calamitous results, European lawmakers propose that Member States adopt “opt-in” class actions, while rejecting many of the economic incentives that some believe lead to filing nonmeritorious claims, such as punitive damages and contingency fee arrangements. The European proposal is unlikely in the authors’ view to stimulate private enforcement of European law or increase victims’ access to compensation, given the flaws inherent in the opt-in class action device. Instead of looking to adopt a “U.S.-lite” approach to victim redress which is fundamentally incompatible with many judicial systems within the E.U., the authors propose that Europeans consider adopting a regulatory administered compensation system, modeled after such U.S. examples as the Securities and Exchange Commission Fair Funds and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. The authors also propose that regulatory administered funds can provide more effective and efficient restitution to victims than traditional litigation.

Using the most recent observations (2005‐2011) from a sample of UK listed companies, This paper aims to investigate whether Big 4 audit firms exhibit a “fee premium” and, if this is the case, whether the premium is related to the delivery of a better audit service.

Univariate tests, multivariate regressions and two methodologies that control for self‐selection bias are used to answer the proposed research questions. Data are collected from DataStream.

Findings provide consistent evidence about the existence of an “audit fee premium” charged by Big 4 firms while they do not highlight any significant relationship between audit quality and type of auditor with respect to the audit quality proxies investigated.

Evidence from this paper might signal the need for legislative intervention to improve the competitiveness of the audit market on the basis that its concentrated structure is leading to “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients. Findings might also enhance Big 4 client bargaining power. However, as the paper analyses only one country, generalizability of the results might be a limitation.

This study joins two streams of the extant literature that investigate the existence of a “Big 4 audit fee premium” and different levels of audit quality among Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients. Evidence supports the concerns raised by the UK House of Lords in 2010 that the concentrated structure of the audit market could be the driver of “excessive” fees for Big 4 clients as it does not find differences in audit quality between Big 4 and non‐Big 4 clients.

This paper discusses New Zealand's attempt to deal with insider trading by statutory means. New Zealand's attempt is of particular interest since it has two features which distinguish it from other jurisdictions. The first feature is the decision to reject the criminalisation of insider trading and to instead rely upon civil enforcement of insider trading alone. The second feature is the failure to provide a state agency with powers to take action (whether civil or criminal) against insider trading. The New Zealand legislation, the Securities Amendment Act 1988 (‘the Act’), was put in place after the stockmarket crash of 1987 in response to outcries against perceived abuses in the market. The Act has been in force for seven years, yet no case involving allegations of insider trading has been taken to completion. The basis of the insider trading regime is private enforcement which, in the light of its failure to provide effective remedies and control, needs to be reviewed.

The purpose of this paper is to show that claims filed against law enforcement agencies alleging the violation of constitutional rights continue to plague police administrators, officers, agency trainers, and risk managers. This technical paper seeks to report on the analysis of 151 police and sheriff departments' claims, losses, and litigation in order to assess the trends, costs, and nature of these claims.

Using official records of a risk management entity in Michigan, 15 years of incidents were analyzed in order to identify the trends in third‐party claims, liability, and losses of police and detention centers.

The general findings of 11,273 claims are provided as well as a detailed analysis of 2,929 claims, representing 25 common categories in police work and detention facilities. The findings illustrate the current trends in police liability and reveal important managerial concerns which can direct administrators in revising policy and procedures, in focusing training endeavors, and incorporating risk management strategies in order to reduce the risk of police liability.

The findings will be useful for police trainers in structuring their training efforts. Suggestions for future research which examine successful risk management practices and avert liability are also discussed.