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This essay explores evolutionary and competence‐based theories of the firm. Evolutionary theories can be regarded as a subset of a wider class of theories, variously described as “capabilities”, “resource‐based”, or “competence‐based” theories of the firm. These contrast with a different set of contractarian theories, emanating largely from the work of Coase. It is argued that the contractarian theories of the firm misleadingly assume given individuals thus neglecting processes of individual learning and transformation. Similarly underestimated is importance of technology and the persistence of variety in firm structure and performance. The genesis of the alternative, competence‐based approach is outlined, including the important subset of “evolutionary” approaches of the Nelson‐Winter type. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the competence‐based approach to strategic management.

This paper aims to explain how the dynamic demand environment influences strategic firm behavior along an industry’s evolutionary path. A conceptual gap concerning the influence of demand-side environmental factors (vis-à-vis changes in technology and policy) on firms’ strategic choices motivates the theory developed herein. The paper’s contribution to the literature on “evolutionary perspective in strategy” also addresses an important gap in the emerging literature on “strategy dynamics”.

The conceptual framework in this paper features a dynamic demand environment that provides the structural context for firms’ strategic choices. It conceptualizes demand-side competence as a mediating firm-specific construct to explain the endogenous relationship between the characteristics of the demand environment and firms’ path dependent demand-side investments.

A review of the literature on evolutionary perspective in strategy reveals an important conceptual gap concerning the structural determinants of dynamic firm behavior. There is no explanation of the endogenous relationship between dynamic demand structure, firms’ dynamic demand-side competence, and temporally heterogeneous strategic choices.

The demand-side explanation of how idiosyncratic firm behavior is endogenously determined, with both structural characteristics (demand structure) and firm competences (demand-side competence), addresses an important conceptual gap. The novelty of the theory developed herein lies in its explication of the effect of dynamic demand environment on the evolution of idiosyncratic strategic firm behavior – entry, investment and exit – along the evolutionary path of an industry. The theory developed herein not only explains the effect of both determinants of idiosyncratic strategic firm behavior – the external industry environment (dynamic market structure) and internal firm environment (dynamic firm competences) – but also explains how the determinants evolve along the industry’s lifecycle.

The approach is based on an evolutionary interpretation of the fundamental concepts of cybernetics, general systems theory, information theory, theory of automata, autopoiesis, etc. In the author's view, this enables us to formulate principles of the evolutionary theory of cybernetic systems which is visualised as the theory of structures, functions and evolution of cybernetic or control systems. This suggests a heuristic idea of cybernetic evolution as the higher stage of negentropic universal evolution of open systems.

The purpose of the study is to propose a framework for understanding the dynamism of the human self-system from evolutionary and socio-psychological perspective. The study aims to help scholars interested to use an evolutionary lens for examining consumer behaviour.

Relying on the principle of self-cybernetics, the study proposed a general framework explaining the operating mechanism of human self-system. The proposed framework incorporates the socio-psychological and the evolutionary perspective of the human self-concept.

The framework may help consumer scholars to integrate socio-psychological and evolutionary theories to produce novel and testable hypotheses.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to propose a framework based on the principle of cybernetics to facilitate the use of an evolutionary lens in consumer research.

Team social capital (TSC) has been attracting increasing research attention aiming to explore team effectiveness through within- and cross-team resource conduits. This study bridges two disconnected theories – TSC and evolutionary theory – to examine gaming clans and analyzes mechanisms of the clans' TSC building from an evolutionary perspective.

This research draws longitudinal data from a sample of gaming teams (N = 1,267) from anonymized player data from the game World of Tanks spanning 32 months. The authors explored teams' evolutionary patterns using hidden Markov models and applied longitudinal multilevel modeling to test hypotheses.

The results showed that teams of different sizes and levels of evolutionary fitness vary in team closure and bridging social capital. The authors also found that larger teams are more effective than smaller ones. The positive association between team-bridging social capital and effectiveness is more substantial for smaller teams.

This research advances the theoretical development of TSC by including the constructs of teams' evolutionary status when analyzing strategic social capital building. Adding to existing literature studying the outcome of TSC, this research also found a moderating effect of team size between TSC and effectiveness. Finally, this study also contributes to a longitudinal view of TSC and found significant evolutionary patterns of teams' membership, TSC, and effectiveness.

This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive theory of interactive behavior.

This study suggests a way of the evolutionary game-theoretical model.

The model presented in this paper demonstrates coopetition is derived from balance points in multi-actor games. As the political–philosophical address of those strategic games will of all becomes convention in this balance point at which common knowledge occurs global optimum.

This study explores the connections between several streams in philosophy and strategic management. What does a particular philosophy contribute to strategic management with respect to game theory? When addressing this question in historical or exploratory terms, or in a combination of both, the end result is similar: particular philosophical issues, properly explained, are discussed in relation to important questions in strategic management.

What are the psychological and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decisions of this kind? What type of cognitive frames and managerial mental models, such as the game-theoretical model, might enable or hinder the integration of real-world problems in strategic decision-making?

What explains the evolution of such mental models, as well as the development of philosophical ideas, in informing the origins? How does the evolution of social and political contexts influence change in the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decision-making?

This study highlights the overt power of strategic management ideas – competition, cooperation and coopetition – which have historically been built on the foundations of organizational theory, while also underlying the potential of philosophies, collective wisdom and Condorcet’s jury theorem and Rousseau’s (1998) correctness theory in games of evaluation. This study investigates whether the many produce better decisions than the wise few.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

Owing to multiple superiorities to traditional counterparts, prefabricated construction (PC) has gained increasing attention worldwide. The development of PC projects reflects the effects of both policy supervision and PC practice, which aids the government in reasonably identifying the key issues of PC's promotion and rationally improving the policy deployment. However, existing studies fail to address this aspect, especially lacking quantitative exploration. This study explores the micro mechanism of PC's promotion, from the perspective of developing PC projects.

A tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory of the government, developers and contractors is constructed. After rigorous theoretical deduction, this study adopts Changchun in China as a case city and collects the data using the Delphi technique, policy documents and literature analysis.

Results indicate that contractors are generally willing to implement PC projects and the government chooses to actively supervise PC's promotion. The negative investment behavior of developers is the main obstacle to promote PC in Changchun currently.

The conclusions are applicable to other comparable regions. This study is of value to promote PC with high efficiency and effect.

The tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory proposed in this study is conducive to reveal the essence of PC's promotion. This is an important breakthrough in extant studies, with a broad applicability in the PC domain beyond China.

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to ascertain the effects of the three elements of competitive dynamics on the evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions and competitive results.

This paper describes the construction of an evolutionary game model and a multi-agent-based model of innovative behavior-based decisions by heterogeneous high-tech firms. The models are used to analyze the evolution path and evolutionarily stable strategy of innovative behavior-based decisions. In addition, multi-agent-based simulation is used to gain insight into the effects of competitive dynamics on the dynamic evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions.

This paper reveals four evolutionary equilibrium states of the innovation behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms. Based on the findings, these overall evolutionary trends are not affected by the timing of competitive market entry or the intensity of competition. In addition, simulated evidence is added that the timing of competitive market entry is an important factor affecting market-leading innovative strategies and dynamic competition results, and competition intensity is closely related to the evolutionary speed of innovation behavior-based decisions.

The key contribution of this paper is its new view of innovative behavior-based decisions from a competitive dynamics perspective. The new competitive dynamics-based framework for innovative behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms proposed in the paper can resolve the problem of obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage for high-tech firms in a competitive dynamics context.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to analyse what theories assume about multinational enterprises (MNEs) when they claim these are superior and to discuss possible explanations for why MNE superiority seems to be dominant in the international business (IB) research field.

A common theme in mainstream IB theories is that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are superior in terms of cost efficiency and innovativeness compared with other types of organizations. A closer look at transaction cost economics (TCE)/internalization theory, evolutionary theory and dynamic capability theory reveal a bias toward MNE supremacy because of how MNEs are conceptualized as firms and therefore fail to explain the essence of “multinational advantage”. These revelations and the strong dependence on the benevolence to provide unbiased data means that MNE supremacy posited by mainstream IB theories is as much a rationalized myth as an empirical fact.

Although mainstream theories differ when it comes to the building blocks that constitute MNE supremacy, they have one attribute in common: they are silent as to why MNEs are superior compared with, for example, domestic firms or other types of economic agents. Irrespective of whether the focus is the strength of the hierarchy, the skill of managers or a common identity, nothing in the theories tells us that these factors are more pronounced in MNEs than in other types of economic actors.

The paper deals with the issue of multinational advantage. It claims that mainstream theories of MNEs tend to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that MNEs are superior in terms of cost efficiency and innovativeness compared with other types of economic agents. The analysis demonstrates that this tendency is a consequence of how MNEs are conceptualized as firms in the different theories as well as of the strong dependence in IB research on the benevolence of MNEs to provide unbiased data. It is concluded that MNE supremacy posited by mainstream IB theories is as much a rationalized myth as an empirical fact.