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Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

This paper considers the brand awareness and anchor influence on consumers' live-streaming purchases, and explores the existence of “free-riding” behavior, the comparison of brand promotion effect and active live-streaming effect and the optimal strategic combination between the brand and the anchor. The authors investigate the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the bounded rational brand and anchor, and explore the conditions for the realization of the optimal strategy. Management suggestions for the development of live streaming commerce can be provided in this paper.

Two significant models are used in this paper. The Stackelberg model is used to study the “free-riding” behavior, the comparison of brand promotion effect and active live-streaming effect and the optimal strategic combination between the brand and the anchor. Using evolutionary game theory to get the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and analyze the binary equilibrium strategy of the bounded rational brand and anchor. In addition, relevant simulation analysis is conducted using realistic data to verify the conclusions and for further analysis, making the conclusions of the paper have realistic significance.

The study shows that “free-riding” behavior exists and the positive effect of brand promotion is greater than that of active live-streaming. The brand and the anchor take active actions as the optimal strategy. As the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to live-streaming effort and the sensitivity coefficient of consumers to brand promotion change, various evolutionary stabilization strategies will appear. When the two sensitivity coefficients are below a certain threshold, the game sides will reach the optimal strategic combination to obtain the maximum benefits. When they rise above this threshold, it is counterproductive instead. The system achieves the optimal strategic combination when the difference factor between effort cost and promotion cost must be higher than a certain value, but when it takes the smallest possible value, the game sides tend to take active actions. This study can provide management suggestions for the sustainable development of the live-streaming model.

This paper shows that under certain conditions, the brand and the anchor can evolve into the optimal strategy to maximize the profits of both parties, which has certain practical significance for the prosperous development of live streaming commerce. In future research, the authors will consider the regulatory role of the government and construct a more realistic game model to provide constructive suggestions for the sustainable prosperity of live streaming commerce. Meanwhile, there are also games between multiple brands and multiple anchors, as well as games among brands-anchors-the live streaming platforms, and the authors will conduct more in-depth research in the future.

So far, the co-impact of anchor influence and brand awareness has not been considered simultaneously in published articles. This paper provides theoretical guidance for the behavioral choices of the brand and the anchor under the live streaming commerce, which is conducive to the prosperous development of live streaming commerce.

This paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing and to identify the key factors influencing the unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment.

Theoretical research was employed to develop a practical approach for applying evolutionary game theory to eWOM marketing controlling strategies modeling via dynamic visualization, systematic simulation experiments.

Evolutionary game theory combined with dynamic simulation modeling can provide a formal approach to understanding web celebrity brand eWOM marketing decision-making in social media, which can thus support the control of unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment. The results demonstrate that the reasonable control of social platform control costs may be more effective than the government policy on web celebrity fake brand eWOM marketing behaviors.

The study enriches the research on the management and control of eWOM marketing as well as provides guidance for the sustainable development of the web celebrity economy in social media.

China's agricultural production trusteeship is characterized by the organic link between household operation of small-scale peasant economy and agricultural socialized services, which releases agricultural development vitality and promotes agricultural modernization. As one of the agricultural production trusteeship modes, the whole process trusteeship is suitable for the actual situation of China's aging population and labor force transfer. This paper aims to construct an evolutionary game model containing multistakeholder to explore the behavior decisions through numerical simulation and to provide useful suggestions for the formation of a positive and stable trusteeship relationship and the sound development of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production.

The paper incorporates village committees, service organizations and farmers into the same research framework, selects “guarantee + dividends” as the income distribution method and applies the evolutionary game method to analyze behavioral choices and evolutionary paths of stakeholders. By constructing the expectation function, establishing the replicator dynamic equations and analyzing the tripartite evolutionary stability strategy, the authors explore the factors that affect the stakeholders’ strategy choice and determine asymptotically stable points and stability conditions.

(1) There is a game relationship among village committees, farmers and service organizations in the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production, asymptotically stable points (0,0,1) and (1,1,1) are obtained through calculation. (2) The proportion of stakeholders' strategy choice, the weight of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production in the performance appraisal of the village committee, the village committee's supervision cost, the village committee's reputation effect and the penalty for false dividends of the service organization will affect the speed at which the curve representing the tripartite relationship approaches two asymptotically stable points.

The countermeasures proposed in the paper have excellent reference value. (1) For areas that have realized the project: Village committees can solve the trusteeship problems exposed in the initial areas and improve farmers' satisfaction with the project. (2) For areas that have not realized the project: Those regions will receive more experience references and enhance their confidence in this project. The limitation of the paper is that it takes the main grain-producing areas in only the three northeastern provinces of China as the research object. The next research object will be extended to the whole country.

This paper propose strategies for realizing the orderly operation of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production: first, increase the proportion of stakeholders' strategy choices; second, reduce the village committee's supervision cost; third, increase the weight of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production in the performance appraisal of the village committee; fourth, improve the village committee's reputation effect; fifth, increase the penalty for false dividends of the service organization.

Agricultural production trusteeship is in its initial stage in China. The interest relationships between stakeholders are not yet clear. The paper innovatively applies the evolutionary game method to the research field of the whole process trusteeship of agricultural production. According to conditions in China, based on ensuring the guaranteed income, the paper introduces the dividend income variable and establishes a tripartite game model of village committees, service organization and farmers. The paper provides suggestions for the orderly and healthy development of China's agricultural production trusteeship and provides experience for the operation of other modes of agricultural production trusteeship.

The COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading globally and will not be completely over in a short time. Wearing a mask is an effective means to combat the spread of COVID-19. However, whether the public wear a mask for epidemic prevention and control will be affected by stochastic factors such as vaccination, cultural differences and irrational emotions, which bring a high degree of uncertainty to the prevention and control of the epidemic. The purpose of this study is to explore and analyze the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public in an uncertain environment.

Based on the stochastic evolutionary game model of the Moran process, the study discusses the epidemic prevention and control strategies of the public under the conditions of the dominance of stochastic factors, expected benefits and super-expected benefits.

The research shows that the strategic evolution of the public mainly depends on stochastic factors, cost-benefit and the number of the public. When the stochastic factors are dominant, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the cost and the greater the penalty for not wearing masks, the public will choose to wear a mask. Under the dominance of expected benefits and super-expected benefits, when the number of the public is greater than a certain threshold, the mask-wearing strategy will become an evolutionary stable strategy. From the evolutionary process, the government’s punishment measures will slow down the speed of the public choosing the strategy of not wearing masks. The speed of the public evolving to the stable strategy under the dominance of super-expected benefits is faster than that under the dominance of expected benefits.

The study considers the impact of stochastic factors on public prevention and control strategies and provides decision-making support and theoretical guidance for the scientific prevention of the normalized public.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has considered the impact of different stochastic interference intensities on public prevention and control strategies. Therefore, this paper can be seen as a valuable resource in this field.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the interest conflicts and strategy evolution process of various stakeholders in the process of homestead withdrawal, to reveal which key factors can balance the interests of all parties.

The authors developed an evolutionary game theoretical framework for homestead withdrawal in Yujiang District, Jiangxi Province, China. The authors compared the dynamic process of strategy change in different situations based on system dynamics.

Compared with indirect external factors, direct economic factors, such as increasing compensation standards or increasing fines, are more likely to encourage peasants to withdraw from their homesteads. The dynamic subsidy strategy can increase the probability of peasants withdrawing from their homestead. Additionally, awarding officials with promotions can effectively encourage local governments during the process.

Previous studies have conceptualized farmers' willingness to withdraw from their homestead as a static process, ignoring the underlying dynamism. This paper analyzes the game mechanism among the stakeholders of the homestead withdrawal process from a dynamic perspective, to provide efficient suggestions regarding policymaking for homestead withdrawal.

Recycling and reuse of the electric vehicle (EV) batteries are ways to extend their limited lives. If batteries can be traced from production to recycling, it is beneficial for battery recycling and reuse. Using blockchain technology to build a smart EV battery reverse supply chain can solve the difficulties of lack of trust and data. The purpose of this study is to discuss the behavioural evolution of a smart EV battery reverse supply chain under government supervision.

This study adopts evolutionary game theory to examine the decision-making behaviours of the government, EV manufacturers with recycled used batteries and third-party EV battery recyclers lacking professional recycling qualification.

On the smart reverse supply chain integrated by blockchain technology, a cooperative recycling strategy of the third-party EV battery recycler is the optimal choice when the government tends to actively regulate. The probability of the EV manufacturer choosing the blockchain adoption strategy exceeds (below) the threshold, and the government prefers negative (positive) supervision. According to numerical analysis, in the mature stage in the EV battery recycling industry, when the investment cost of applying blockchain is high, EV manufacturers' willingness to apply blockchain slows down, the government accelerates adopting a negative supervision strategy and third-party EV battery recyclers prefer cooperative recycling.

The results of this study provide opinions on the strength of government supervision and the conditions under which EV manufacturers and third-party EV battery recyclers should apply blockchain and cooperate. On the other hand, this study provides theoretical analysis for promoting the application of blockchain technology in smart reverse supply chain.

Compared with previous research, this study reveals the relevance of government supervision, blockchain application and cooperation strategy in smart EV battery reverse supply chain. In the initial stage, even if the subsidy (subsidy reduction rate) and penalty are high and the penalty reduction rate is low, the EV manufacturer should rather give up the application of blockchain technology. In the middle stage in the EV battery recycling industry, the government can set a lower subsidy (subsidy reduction rate) combined with a penalty or a higher penalty (penalty reduction rate) combined with a subsidy to supervise it. The third-party EV battery recycler is advised to cooperate with the EV manufacturer when the subsidy is low or the penalty is high.

Knowledge has become the basis of enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises in this era of knowledge-driven economies. Collaborative knowledge management not only realizes the real-time exchange and communication of knowledge among different enterprises, but also facilitates the collaboration and integration of knowledge. Collaborative knowledge management has been successfully applied to different fields. To address the poor ecological responsibility of enterprises, the purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of collaborative knowledge management in this research to determine if the evolution of the decision-making process in collaborative knowledge management is involved in corporate ecological responsibility (CER).

This research established an evolutionary game model of collaborative knowledge management for CER. The behavioral, evolutionary law and stable behavioral, evolutionary strategy of the participants was identified according to the replicator dynamics equation. Simulation analysis was conducted using MATLAB software.

Research results demonstrated that, first, the strategic selection of firms is influenced by cost and interest coefficients. Second, the strategy, selection of enterprises, is related to the common benefits of enterprise cooperation. Third, during the systematic evolution and stabilization of strategies, enterprises adopt the same knowledge strategies.

On the basis of the research findings, policy suggestions were proposed to encourage enterprises to implement collaborative knowledge management strategies in ecological responsibility.

This paper aims to find out the factors that influence the choice of dual innovation strategies in the process of knowledge pricing and transaction between first-mover and late-mover companies in an open innovation environment and also to find the key factors that affect the company's strategic choice in factors such as heterogeneous market environment, demand elasticity, exploration risk intellectual property prices and transaction cost.

This study uses the Cournot equilibrium and Stackelberg two-stage master-slave game model to describe the evolutionary process of knowledge pricing in an open innovation environment of first-mover and late-mover companies.

Research shows that in an open innovation environment, the formation of a dual innovation strategy in the pricing process of corporate intellectual property transactions is a complex process. Changes in one-time transaction costs and changes in the inverse demand coefficient of the innovation market play the decisive role in the choice of dual innovation strategies. When the demand of the innovation market is moderate, the inverse demand coefficient of the innovation market and the one-time transaction cost has an inverted U-shaped influence relationship. As the innovation market's inverse demand coefficient and the one-time transaction cost increase at the same time, the degree of differentiation of the enterprise's dual innovation strategy choice gradually reduces; when the one-time transaction cost is the largest, the degree of strategy differentiation is minimized.

Based on the above relationship, suggestions are made to guide enterprises in the knowledge pricing and transaction process in an open innovation environment, promote enterprises to form a dislocation development and complementary advantages in the knowledge innovation ecological chain and improve the overall innovation efficiency of the industry.