Search results

1 – 10 of over 4000
To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 27 April 2020

Mengjie Liao, Jian Zhang and Ruimei Wang

This paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to recognize whether government policy supervision or social network platform supervision can effectively promote the control of misconducts of web celebrity brand eWOM marketing and to identify the key factors influencing the unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment.

Design/methodology/approach

Theoretical research was employed to develop a practical approach for applying evolutionary game theory to eWOM marketing controlling strategies modeling via dynamic visualization, systematic simulation experiments.

Findings

Evolutionary game theory combined with dynamic simulation modeling can provide a formal approach to understanding web celebrity brand eWOM marketing decision-making in social media, which can thus support the control of unhealthy web celebrity marketing environment. The results demonstrate that the reasonable control of social platform control costs may be more effective than the government policy on web celebrity fake brand eWOM marketing behaviors.

Originality/value

The study enriches the research on the management and control of eWOM marketing as well as provides guidance for the sustainable development of the web celebrity economy in social media.

Details

Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, vol. 33 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1355-5855

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 30 April 2021

Lei Song, Ping Lyu and Yingui Cao

The purpose of this study was to analyze the interest conflicts and strategy evolution process of various stakeholders in the process of homestead withdrawal, to reveal…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to analyze the interest conflicts and strategy evolution process of various stakeholders in the process of homestead withdrawal, to reveal which key factors can balance the interests of all parties.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors developed an evolutionary game theoretical framework for homestead withdrawal in Yujiang District, Jiangxi Province, China. The authors compared the dynamic process of strategy change in different situations based on system dynamics.

Findings

Compared with indirect external factors, direct economic factors, such as increasing compensation standards or increasing fines, are more likely to encourage peasants to withdraw from their homesteads. The dynamic subsidy strategy can increase the probability of peasants withdrawing from their homestead. Additionally, awarding officials with promotions can effectively encourage local governments during the process.

Originality/value

Previous studies have conceptualized farmers' willingness to withdraw from their homestead as a static process, ignoring the underlying dynamism. This paper analyzes the game mechanism among the stakeholders of the homestead withdrawal process from a dynamic perspective, to provide efficient suggestions regarding policymaking for homestead withdrawal.

Details

China Agricultural Economic Review, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1756-137X

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 14 June 2019

Weiwei Guo

Knowledge has become the basis of enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises in this era of knowledge-driven economies. Collaborative knowledge management not only…

Abstract

Purpose

Knowledge has become the basis of enhancing the core competitiveness of enterprises in this era of knowledge-driven economies. Collaborative knowledge management not only realizes the real-time exchange and communication of knowledge among different enterprises, but also facilitates the collaboration and integration of knowledge. Collaborative knowledge management has been successfully applied to different fields. To address the poor ecological responsibility of enterprises, the purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of collaborative knowledge management in this research to determine if the evolution of the decision-making process in collaborative knowledge management is involved in corporate ecological responsibility (CER).

Design/methodology/approach

This research established an evolutionary game model of collaborative knowledge management for CER. The behavioral, evolutionary law and stable behavioral, evolutionary strategy of the participants was identified according to the replicator dynamics equation. Simulation analysis was conducted using MATLAB software.

Findings

Research results demonstrated that, first, the strategic selection of firms is influenced by cost and interest coefficients. Second, the strategy, selection of enterprises, is related to the common benefits of enterprise cooperation. Third, during the systematic evolution and stabilization of strategies, enterprises adopt the same knowledge strategies.

Originality/value

On the basis of the research findings, policy suggestions were proposed to encourage enterprises to implement collaborative knowledge management strategies in ecological responsibility.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 13 August 2019

Jing Peng, Guoping Tu, Yanhong Liu, Hao Zhang and Bibing Leng

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check.

Design/methodology/approach

Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium.

Findings

The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform.

Practical implications

The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement.

Originality/value

Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 26 September 2019

Ruihua Wang

Knowledge sharing in a master-apprentice pattern is the process of transferring tacit knowledge from masters to apprentices. In addition, 90 per cent of knowledge required…

Abstract

Purpose

Knowledge sharing in a master-apprentice pattern is the process of transferring tacit knowledge from masters to apprentices. In addition, 90 per cent of knowledge required for organizational innovation is tacit knowledge in the master-apprentice pattern. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the evolution of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern and explore the consequences of how to improve the knowledge sharing in the master-apprentice pattern.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses asymmetric evolutionary game theory to study the evolutionary track of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern of innovative organizations by analyzing the utility of masters and apprentices during the process of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern of the innovative organization.

Findings

The results reveal that when the masters obtained utility from sharing knowledge is greater than that from hoarding knowledge, and the apprentices obtained utility from studying hard is greater than the costs, the innovative organization can get the largest utility from the knowledge sharing in the mater-apprentice pattern.

Research limitations/implications

The limitation of the research is that this paper mainly studies knowledge sharing among individuals and does not research knowledge sharing between individuals and organizations.

Practical implications

This research has extended the understanding of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice and its evolution path. Also, the obtained findings are conducive to promoting knowledge sharing in master-apprentice and improving human resource management in innovative organizations.

Originality/value

This paper attempts to construct the evolution path of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern, which is a useful exploration of the dynamics of knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern and makes up for the shortcomings of the existing research.

Details

International Journal of Innovation Science, vol. 11 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1757-2223

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 29 April 2020

Yan Zhang, Xiaoqiong You, Wenke Wang and Ting Lin

National student loans help solve the problem of tuition fees for students from poor families to a great extent. This paper aims to study the behavior of three main…

Abstract

Purpose

National student loans help solve the problem of tuition fees for students from poor families to a great extent. This paper aims to study the behavior of three main players involved in university student loans, namely, universities, banks and students and explores necessary conditions for promoting the steady development of student loans, as well as the sustainability of cooperation and coordination among players, thus promoting the further development of student loans.

Design/methodology/approach

First, from the perspectives of the three related players of banks, students and universities and their behavior, this paper establishes a three-player behavioral evolutionary game model, conducts a sustainable game analysis among the different players, and by replicating the dynamic equations with the Jacobian matrix solve the evolutionarily stable strategy. Finally, applying MATLAB tools, a sensitivity analysis of relevant impacting factors is carried out to explore the influencing mechanism of the sustainable development of student loans.

Findings

To achieve the mechanism of mutual coordination and cooperation between participants, banks need to be guided to actively issue student loans and conduct strict loan review. College students should be encouraged to establish good credit and strengthen penalties should be implemented for violations of regulations. Universities should be encouraged to help banks reduce information asymmetry, promote financial knowledge and student integrity education and promote the sustainable development of national student loans.

Originality/value

This research will help scholars better understand the interaction mechanism among universities, banks and students, and promote the sustainable development of national student loans.

Details

International Journal of Sustainability in Higher Education, vol. 22 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1467-6370

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 31 May 2021

Na Zhang, Xiaopeng Deng, Bon-Gang Hwang, Muchao Bi and Amin Mahmoudi

This paper aims to develop a partner selection approach for the high-speed rail (HSR) firms from the perspective of achieving competitive advantage in the international…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to develop a partner selection approach for the high-speed rail (HSR) firms from the perspective of achieving competitive advantage in the international competitive bidding sphere.

Design/methodology/approach

The current study developed a partner selection approach based on the evolutionary game theory. Firstly, the current study identified the influencing variables and logical formation path of competitive advantage on the international HSR project by literature review and case analysis. After that, a pay-off model was developed based on the theoretical foundation. Meanwhile, the evolutionary stable strategy was analyzed for different combinations of initial pay-offs.

Findings

A real-world case was simulated to verify the effectiveness of the developed approach. The simulation results secured support from three industry professionals, indicating the developed approach is valid.

Originality/value

The current study can help HSR firms to select their partners and develop a cooperation strategy from the perspective of winning awards. Also, the proposed approach is based on the advantage driving variables and formation path, which can contribute to HSR firms' understanding of the sources of competitive advantage.

Details

Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0969-9988

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 27 June 2019

Ruihan Zhang and Bing Sun

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to determine how high-tech firms should choose between independent research and development and technology introduction as well as to ascertain the effects of the three elements of competitive dynamics on the evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions and competitive results.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper describes the construction of an evolutionary game model and a multi-agent-based model of innovative behavior-based decisions by heterogeneous high-tech firms. The models are used to analyze the evolution path and evolutionarily stable strategy of innovative behavior-based decisions. In addition, multi-agent-based simulation is used to gain insight into the effects of competitive dynamics on the dynamic evolution of innovative behavior-based decisions.

Findings

This paper reveals four evolutionary equilibrium states of the innovation behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms. Based on the findings, these overall evolutionary trends are not affected by the timing of competitive market entry or the intensity of competition. In addition, simulated evidence is added that the timing of competitive market entry is an important factor affecting market-leading innovative strategies and dynamic competition results, and competition intensity is closely related to the evolutionary speed of innovation behavior-based decisions.

Originality/value

The key contribution of this paper is its new view of innovative behavior-based decisions from a competitive dynamics perspective. The new competitive dynamics-based framework for innovative behavior-based decisions of high-tech firms proposed in the paper can resolve the problem of obtaining a sustainable competitive advantage for high-tech firms in a competitive dynamics context.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 30 December 2019

This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

Design/methodology/approach

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context.

Findings

This research paper concentrates on the deployment of asymmetric evolutionary game theory to reveal how innovative organizations best effect knowledge sharing by aligning the incentivized desire of masters to share their expert knowledge with the self-interest of apprentices who are highly motivated to accept that knowledge on an accelerated training path. These insights improve the strategic capacity of human resources teams to add value to their organization by encouraging the optimum form of knowledge transfer between masters and apprentices.

Originality/value

The briefing saves busy executives, strategists and researchers hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and easy-to-digest format.

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 28 October 2020

Danrong Song, Jinbo Song, Hehui Yuan and Yu Fan

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the…

Abstract

Purpose

With the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.

Design/methodology/approach

An evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.

Findings

First, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.

Originality/value

In this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

Details

Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0969-9988

Keywords

1 – 10 of over 4000