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As one of the most influential theories in strategic management, Hambrick and Mason’s Upper Echelons Theory has yielded significant conceptual and empirical advancements linking executive characteristics and perceptions to decision-making. Specifically, work on this theory consistently shows that CEOs’ decisions are biased by personal characteristics to the benefit and detriment of firms. While this stream of research links executive decision processes to outcomes such as executive dismissals, analyst evaluations, and press coverage, surprisingly little is understood about if and whether the information CEOs convey is subject to the same filtering process by a firm’s key evaluators. Thus, in this chapter, we aim to extend Upper Echelons Theory by positing that a double filtering process occurs whereby the cognitive aids CEOs use can be informed by not only their cognitive base and values but also the characteristics and priorities of those who evaluate the nonverbal and verbal signals they send. To do so, we build on recent conceptual and empirical advancements to make a case for the decision-making biases and tendencies that influence signal interpretation by three key evaluator groups internal and external to the firm: boards of directors, financial analysts, and the media. We conclude by considering the implications of evaluators’ information filtering and how this more holistic view of Upper Echelons decision-making can enable executive teams to be strategic with the cognitive aids they use to influence evaluations.

The erosion of autonomy in traditional professions has been explained by client capture – professionals increasingly work under close control of powerful corporate clients. However, research is missing on how knowledge workers in rapidly rising knowledge professions of the twenty-first century experience and respond to the risk of client capture. Evaluation is one such exploding field. This study examines the narratives of professional evaluators to understand how they navigate their mandate to deliver independent assessments of complex social programs under the threat of client capture. Data come from 29 interviews with evaluators of 65 interdisciplinary graduate training projects funded by the US National Science Foundation in the first two years of the program (2015–2016). Evidence of client capture is found in how evaluators discuss scope creep with limited resources, being asked to misrepresent their findings, and burying of evaluation reports. The authors also find evidence of evaluators navigating client capture by rationing their labor, using state-based rules to mediate demands, drawing on professional expertise, and generating savvy emotional labor. But this study argues the client capture concept obscures the dynamics of knowledge production, in which evaluators shape scientific programs in innovative ways. This study sheds new light on the context in which inequalities operate in this emerging profession, and how the structure of knowledge work may generate novel pathways of professional influence where work conditions might otherwise rule against it.

Commentators express concern that when auditors investigate for but fail to detect fraud, jurors might effectively penalize the auditors for having investigated for the fraud (AICPA, 2004; Coffee, 2004; Golden, Skalak, & Clayton, 2006). Consistent with these concerns, Reffett (2010) finds that, in a between-participants setting, evaluators in cases of undetected fraud are more likely to hold auditors liable for damages when the auditors identified the perpetrated fraud as a fraud risk and then investigated for the fraud, relative to when the auditors did neither. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which identifying versus investigating fraud risks increases evaluators’ between-participants assessments of auditor liability. That is, when auditors investigate for, but fail to detect fraud, is the increase in evaluators’ liability assessments due to the fact that the auditors identified (i.e., were aware of) the fraud risk but did not detect the fraud, or that the auditors unsuccessfully investigated for the fraud (or both)? This study addresses these questions by reporting evidence that both identifying and investigating fraud risks can each, in isolation, increase evaluators’ perceptions of auditor negligence. The processes by which identifying and investigating fraud risks increase evaluators’ negligence verdicts, however, appear to differ.

The “categorization as a theoretical tool” framework is delineated to clarify how innovation is possible even though candidates for exchange face a “categorical imperative” – pressure from their audience to adopt the conventional practices associated with existing categories. The key insight is that categorization is generally a useful tool for sorting and screening exchange opportunities. This insight is developed to suggest how the nature of the imperative varies with the audience’s objectives and the theory of value it espouses and how the strength of the imperative varies with the social challenges and opportunities for engaging in, and learning from, experiments with unconventionality.

Teamwork represents a democratic logic that may contradict the bureaucratic logic characterizing many organizations. I develop arguments based on new institutional theory suggesting that such a contradiction threatens a team’s legitimacy. My study of 71 teams lends support for two claims that capture a legitimacy paradox confronting teams: (1) Egalitarian work processes do correspond to more effective interactions within teams, however (2) To the extent that egalitarianism is uncommon in the organization in which a team is embedded, external evaluations of team effectiveness are less favorable. I discuss the implications of these arguments for subsequent research on organizational teamwork.

This study examines the impact of different Balanced Scorecard (BSC) formats (table, graph without summary measure, graph with a summary measure) on various decision outcomes: performance ratings, perceived informativeness, and decision efficiency.

Using an original case developed by the researchers, a total of 135 individuals participated in the experiment and rated the performance of carwash managers in two different scenarios: one manager excelled financially but failed to meet targets for all other three BSC perspectives and the other manager had the opposite results.

The evaluators rated managerial performance significantly lower in the graph format compared to a table presentation of the BSC. Performance ratings were significantly higher for the scenario where the manager failed to meet only financial perspective targets but exceeded targets for all other nonfinancial BSC perspectives, contrary to the usual predictions based on the financial measure bias. The evaluators reported that informativeness of the BSC was highest in the table or graph without summary measure formats, and, surprisingly, adding a summary measure to the graph format significantly reduced perceived informativeness compared to the table format. Decision efficiency was better for the graph formats (with or without summary measure) than for the table format.

Ours is the first study to compare tables, graphs with and without a summary measure in the context of managerial performance evaluations and to examine their impact on ratings, informativeness, and efficiency. We developed an original case to test the boundaries of the financial measure bias.

What are the boundaries of a case study, and what should new evaluators do when these boundaries are breached? How does a new evaluator interpret the breakdown of communication, how do new evaluators protect themselves when the evaluation fails? This chapter discusses the journey of an evaluator new to the field of qualitative evaluative inquiry. Integrating the perspective of a senior evaluator, the authors reflect on three key experiences that informed the new evaluator. The authors hope to provide a rare insight into case study practice as emotional issues turn out to be just as complex as the methodology used.

This experimental study examined whether sustainability performance measures matter in managerial appraisal and bonus decisions. Participants received financial and non-financial information about four branch managers of a commercial bank, with different combinations of sustainability and financial performance. Participants perceived sustainability measures as being less important than financial ones; still, the experiment revealed that sustainability performance had some impact on appraisal and bonus decisions (albeit it mattered less than financial performance). Evaluators seemed to penalize inferior sustainability performance less than they penalized inferior financial performance. They also seemed to reward sustainability success less than financial success. These findings have practical implications for the implementation of sustainability measures in managerial evaluation systems. The experimental results indicated that incorporating these measures in evaluations does not necessarily mean they will have a sizable effect in decision-making. Results from a companion experiment suggested that organizations using a sustainability balanced scorecard for appraisal and bonus purposes might benefit from an increased emphasis on communication and evaluator training, with a focus on how sustainability performance impacts the attainment of strategic objectives.