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In the domestic credit market creditor and debtor rights are clearly defined. In contrast, sovereign debt repayment is largely contingent on the debtor government’s willingness to repay as enforcement of contracts at the international level is limited. In this chapter we explore different sources of sovereign debt crises as opportunistic and myopic behavior by debtor nations, over-consumption of imported goods, credit temptation by lenders eager to allocate savings surpluses, and unexpected consequences of initially seen appropriate policies. We explore how these factors have played out in the Euro-debt crisis and outline a framework for creditor responsibility to complement debtor self-restraint.

The paper examines the impact of the deteriorating fiscal conditions of Eurozone countries on spillover effects on bank credit margins. It is investigated whether these effects have been reduced after European Central Bank’s (ECB) signaling of pursuing an expansionary, unconventional, monetary policy to address the debt crisis in Eurozone.

A general econometric panel model is applied to investigate spillover effects between Eurozone countries and bank credit margins. In total, three periods are examined: the period before the peak of the global financial crisis and the beginning of the Irish banking crisis, the period during the debt and bank crisis in Eurozone and the period after ECB's signaling of extremely aggressive monetary easing.

According to empirical results, before the peak of the global financial crisis there was no substantial credit risk transfer from Eurozone sovereigns to banks. During the period of debt and bank crisis in Eurozone, the deterioration of the fiscal situation of Eurozone countries had a significant impact on bank Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. After ECB's signaling of extremely aggressive monetary easing, it does not seem to be any significant relationship between Eurozone sovereigns and bank CDS spreads. These findings reinforce the assessment that ECB's measures were effective, achieving the key objective of normalizing economic conditions and ensuring financial stability in Eurozone.

A question is whether effects can change when the corresponding contraction will lead to a reinstatement of “normal” conditions. Would there be a reversal of risk premium trends in bond markets? Although the answer from casual observations seems to be negative, it is a valid research question to be examined. An interesting issue concerning the unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by ECB concerns the issues of moral hazard that they incorporate, something that could not be addressed. Another research perspective could be the use of the beta coefficient to measure the systematic and unsystematic risk of banking sector shares.

The results have strong implications for ECB and European banking regulation. Regulators should mainly pay more attention to the amount and concentration of sovereign debt held by banks. Eurozone financial system could be less vulnerable to the sovereign credit risk. It raised the critical question of whether a more strict regulation is needed. Regulators should not intervene if not necessary, but they must prevent the transmission of crises between markets. This will likely bring trust to the developed countries' sovereign debt and the portfolios of the financial institutions, which hold most of this debt will be considered safe as well.

The conclusions provide a safe counterweight in various respects. First, the negative effects and the need to rapidly cease or limit such policies. Second, the financial stability aimed by ECB. Such policies contain the possibility of a subsequent moral hazard related to Member State and bank behavior. However, these contingencies need to be assessed with the benefits resulting from the restoration of financial markets and the disconnection between banking and sovereign credit risk. This leads Eurozone's financial system to become less vulnerable to the sovereign credit risk and therefore more safe, helping to restore confidence in the real economy.

Contribution in terms of methodology and conclusions. It offers important conclusions regarding the limitations of yields and volatility of CDS spreads. It examines the spillover effects of the fiscal situation of Eurozone countries on banking institutions by extending the existing methodology and introducing new questions focusing on the reaction of CDS market to the ECB monetary policy, the reduction of risk premiums at sovereign and banking level and the gradual reduction of interdependence between them.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that major credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been inconsistent in assessing the implications of monetary union membership for sovereign risks. It is frequently argued that CRAs have acted procyclically in their rating of sovereign debt in the European Monetary Union (EMU), underestimating sovereign risk in the early years and over-rating the lack of national monetary sovereignty since the onset of the Eurozone debt crisis. Yet, there is little direct evidence for this so far. While CRAs are quite explicit about their risk assessments concerning public debt that is denominated in foreign currency, the same cannot be said about their treatment of sovereign debt issued in the currency of a monetary union.

While CRAs are quite explicit about their risk assessments concerning public debt that is denominated in foreign currency, the same cannot be said about their treatment of sovereign debt issued in the currency of a monetary union. This paper examines the major CRAs’ methodologies for rating sovereign debt and test their sovereign credit ratings for a monetary union bonus in good times and a malus, akin to the “original sin” problem of emerging market countries, in bad times.

Using a newly compiled dataset of quarterly sovereign bond ratings from 1990 until 2012, the panel regression estimation results find strong evidence that EMU countries received a rating bonus on euro-denominated debt before the European debt crisis and a large penalty after 2010.

The crisis has brought to light that EMU countries’ euro-denominated debt may not be considered as local currency debt from a rating perspective after all.

In addition to quantifying the local currency bonus and malus, this paper shows the fundamental problem of rating sovereign debt of monetary union members and provide approaches to estimating it over time.

This study aims to analyze the impact and effectiveness of the regulation on the European sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. The European sovereign debt crisis has drawn considerable attention to the CDS market. CDS have the ability of a speculative instrument to bet against a sovereign default. Therefore, the Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 was introduced as the worldwide first uncovered CDS regulation. It prohibits buying uncovered sovereign CDS contracts in the European Union (EU).

First, this paper measures spread changes of sovereign CDS of the EU member states around regulation specific event dates to detect whether and when European sovereign CDS reacts to regulation announcements and the enforcement of regulation. Second, it compares the CDS long-term stability of the EU sample with a non-EU sample based on 44 non-EU sovereign CDS entities.

The results indicate widening CDS spreads prior to the regulation, and stable CDS spreads following the introduction of the regulation. In particular, sovereign CDS of European crisis-hit entities are stable since the regulation was introduced.

The results show that since the regulation of uncovered CDS in the EU has been enacted, the sovereign CDS market is stable and less volatile. Based on the theory about speculation on uncovered sovereign CDS by betting on the reference entity’s default, the introduction of Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 appears to be an appropriate measure to stabilize markets and reduce speculation on sovereign defaults.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and then analyze the interdependency between bank and sovereign risk before, during and after the financial crisis.

The authors' approach is based upon an examination of 44 large banks headquartered in 13 countries; eight of these countries belong to the European Union, seven belong to the eurozone, and the remaining five belong to neither group. This provides a good comparison group of countries.

Evidence is found supporting the existence of significant bank and sovereign risk linkages. There are, however, different patterns in the relationships across countries and even across banks within the same country. Also, higher correlations between bank and sovereign risk are found in countries in which the ratio of the assets of banks relative to their home country's GDP is relatively high.

Based upon the empirical results, allowing banks to invest in sovereign debt without requiring them to hold any capital against the “true” risk of such debt increases the likelihood of insolvency. This means that interdependencies between bank and sovereign risk are extremely important when setting regulatory capital requirements and considering whether action is needed to limit any increase in the likelihood of contagion.

The paper provides a new examination of the interdependencies between individual bank risk and the sovereign risk of the countries in which they are headquartered, with special emphasis on the recent global financial and eurozone crises.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the co-movements between the Portuguese, Greek, Irish and German government bond markets after the subprime crisis (2007 to 2013), with a special focus on the European sovereign debt crisis. It aims to assess the existence of contagion between the Portuguese, Greece and Irish bond markets and to explore the phenomenon of flight-to-quality from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German market.

The analysis is undertaken using a DCC-GARCH model with daily data for 10-year yield government bonds. The change in correlation from the stable periods to the crisis periods is used to identify contagion or flight-to-quality.

Results suggest that there was contagion between the Greek and Portuguese markets, and to a lesser extent between the Irish and Portuguese markets. During most of the identified crisis periods, there are evident flight-to-quality flows from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German market.

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the methodology DCC-GARCH to several crisis episodes for the analysis of contagion and flight-to-quality during the European sovereign debt crisis.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

This paper aims to study the determinants of the sovereign debt ratings provided by the 3 main rating agencies for 32 European countries. It verifies the clusters of countries existing for each of the agencies, considering regional bias, and then analyzes whether the determinants were different before and after the global financial crisis. It also aims to explain how the determinants are taken into account for rich and developing countries, using a sample for the period between 2001 and 2008 and the period between 2009 and 2016.

To this purpose, this paper performs panel data estimation using an ordered Probit approach.

This method shows that for developing countries after the crisis, the relevant explanatory variables are the unemployment rate and the presence in the Eurozone. For rich countries, the inflation rate is pivotal after the crisis period.

This paper is the first to use a clustering methodology within sovereign debt rating literature, grouping the countries into cohesive clusters according to their sovereign debt ratings along with the proposed time frame. Moreover, it explains, which countries belong to strong or weak groups, according to the rating agencies under discussion; and, in these groups, it identifies the sovereign rating determinants.

This study is the first that aims to investigate international transmission channels of sovereign risk among G20 and explore its influential factors by applying the multidimensional SAR model.

Multiple spatial weight matrices can capture the contiguity of spatial units from various dimensions, which could be exploited to improve the precision of inference as well as prediction accuracy. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate international transmission channels of sovereign risk among G20 and explore its influential factors by applying the multidimensional SAR model.

With network structure analysis, this study finds that they contain different information content from the perspective of graphical display, node strength and correlation. Developed and emerging countries all play major roles in trade connection, while only developed countries play major roles in financial linkage. Second, by applying the multidimensional SAR model, only the spatial autocorrelation coefficients for trade and financial linkages are significant during the full sample period, which is in sharp contrast to published studies using the SAR model with a single matrix. Third, the spillover channels that play major roles in various periods are different. Only trade channel plays a role during crisis periods and it is the most important. Fourth, the spatial correlation among countries greatly amplifies the shock’s impacts on one market. And spatial effect for developed countries is larger than those for emerging countries, while the mean spatial effect of a unit shock in the USA on emerging countries is slightly greater than that on developed countries.

Multiple spatial weight matrices can capture the contiguity of spatial units from various dimensions, which could be exploited to improve the precision of inference as well as prediction accuracy. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate international transmission channels of sovereign risk among G20 and explore its influential factors by applying the multidimensional SAR model.