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The wave of regulatory reforms in European telecoms and electricity industries has had an important impact on the structure of the state as well as of corporations. The purpose of this paper is to explore the establishment of these regulatory organizations at the state and corporate levels within a unified theoretical framework, that is grounded in the politics of regulation.

The case selection includes governance structures at the state and corporate levels in 16 European countries in both telecoms and electricity.

The data reveal that regulatory agencies exist in both telecoms and electricity sectors in all 16 countries under study, with the notable exception of Switzerland's electricity sector. At the same time, business corporate reforms were also evident, mainly via the creation of corporate regulatory offices at the headquarters of the firms. These departments, which redefine the patterns of responsibility within the corporation and have played the leading role in the negotiations with the external regulatory environment.

This paper strives to overcome the tendency in the scholarly literature to look only at one or the other aspect of the growth of regulatory development and therefore also to offer a narrow understanding of the growth of regulation. It asserts that the commonalities in the expansion of autonomous regulatory agencies and corporate regulatory departments suggest that the growth in the regulatory professionalization of the state and of business corporations reflects the changing nature of capitalist economy and society and the rise of a new global order of “regulatory capitalism”.

This paper aims to consider recent arguments that post-crisis regulatory reform has misunderstood the nature of banks’ activities. These arguments suggest that a bank’s role is not that of intermediation between savers and borrowers but the systemically riskier one of private money creation.

The paper assesses whether banks’ activities are best understood as private money creation rather than intermediation. It considers the argument that regulatory reform has not gone far enough to prevent a recurrence of future credit spirals ending in financial crises.

This paper analyses banks’ activities and finds that it is incorrect to consider that they engage in relatively unfettered money creation. While fractional reserve banking does create flows of money through the economy, these flows are tethered to banks’ funding requirements. Multiple use of that money, rather than representing an ill-understood risk, simply reflects the nature of maturity transformation. This has not been missed in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework. The revised framework contains many features that are not fully recognised by proponents of the money creation critique and goes significantly further than they allow. Once completed, it will address many of the concerns they raise. They are right to call for further consideration of whether the countercyclical features of the new framework are sufficiently developed.

The paper provides an early detailed response to recent criticism of the post-crisis regulatory reform programme coming from a money creation perspective of banks’ role in the economy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the probable structure of bilateral derivatives contracts following international regulatory reforms.

The theoretical context of the paper is private and meta‐regulation, which the author applies to a case study and current industry analysis.

While regulations are still being written, it is likely that elements of oversight for the bilateral derivatives market will involve enforced self‐regulation. When combined with more specific outcome‐oriented regulatory requirements, the industry is well‐suited to this type of coordinated regulatory regime.

In light of the uncertainty of derivatives regulation and the future size of the bilateral, over‐the‐counter (OTC) derivatives market, practitioners should consider a likely broader range of regulation structures.

The paper fills a gap in the literature about non‐traditional governance structures for the derivatives markets following the financial crisis. Rather than considering regulation on a light/heavy axis, the paper examines whether this segment of the market can sustain a process‐oriented regulatory arrangement.

The purpose of this paper is to review the literature that measures the concept of firms' information environment (IE) with focus on the validity of proxies used to measure IE.

The paper reviews the IE literature using theoretically based categories and analyzes the contextual meaning and use of IE proxies. The review is based on a selection of 284 research articles from 51 journals between 2000 and 2018. A total of 37 different proxy measures of IE are found and analyzed with respect to causality based on categories and the use of IE variables as dependent, independent and control variables.

The study indicates that the IE measures are heterogeneous and there is a lack of consensus regarding their use. The different conditions used to study IE explain part, but far from all, of this heterogeneity. Furthermore, we find that the use of IE measures is only briefly discussed or motivated among the studies in the sample. These findings suggest a necessary discussion about causality in the use of IE as dependent, independent or control variables.

This study contains new and significant information on IE and IE proxy measures. It provides an extensive literature review and provides a novel typology to analyze IE.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

This paper aims to demonstrate how the European regulatory structure of the financial markets has changed after the financial crisis. Drawing from these findings, it discusses how the regulatory system might change and be adapted to a post-Brexit financial market.

The paper takes a systematic/legal approach. First, it analyses the recent reform against the background of European law and corresponding research. In a second step, it discusses the implications of Brexit by examining policy and legal contributions.

The changes to the European regulatory and supervisory structure of the financial markets have proven to be a pacemaker for European administrative and treaty law. Long-standing principles have fundamentally changed. Brexit, on the other hand, even though equally severe might not lead to similar results.

The paper proposes a limited reform to the existing regulatory structure to consolidate developments, ease constitutional frictions and enable the regulatory authorities to react quickly to volatile markets via rule making.

The paper draws attention to an almost unnoticed development in European law. It also illustrates the effects of Brexit on the European financial markets.

Examines Spain’s problems in implementing regulatory reform and offers suggestions for addressing them. Hopes to be instructive to other countries embarking on regulatory reform. Concludes that other countries should concentrate on problems on implementation that they are likely to face and should be prepared for.

Briefly outlines the background to the 1999 Review. Attempts to explore some of the regulatory options for the future legal framework at EU level. Examines the regulatory goals, instruments and scope of applicability of the future sector. Pinpoints some of the specific regulatory issues to be addressed with regard to mobile communications.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief introduction to the telecommunication reform process in Europe, its status, and upcoming policy issues. Furthermore, it also aims to provide an overview of the papers in this special issue.

The paper provides an introduction to the telecom reform process based on previous research and the papers in this issue of info.

The introduction argues that the European telecommunication reform process with the telecommunications green paper of 1987 as an important point of departure has been a success in many ways. It has, for example, facilitated the development of mobile, of the internet and its many applications, and considerably lowered prices. However, there are important areas where a single European market has not developed. Moreover, new challenges are rising in terms of upcoming reconfigurations of the whole information communications technology (ICT) area requiring new policy and regulatory answers.

The paper provides a brief introduction to the European telecommunication reform process, its achievements, present challenges, and the policy responses of the European Union. In addition, an overview of the papers of this issue of info is provided.

The regulation of electronic communications has been recently reformed in Europe. One striking feature of the review was to base most of the economic regulation – the so‐called significant market power regime – on antitrust principles. In particular, the regulated markets have to be defined according to competition law methodologies. This paper describes this approach and studies in detail the recently adopted Commission recommendation “on relevant markets susceptible to ex‐ante regulation”. The paper concludes with three policy recommendations. First, as regulation is more flexible and more complex, national regulators should co‐operate among themselves and national courts should only reform regulatory decisions in case of manifest error. Second, as regulation is not any more justified by the “original sin” of the previous monopolists, but by the inefficiency of antitrust to control market power, NRA should be cautious not to overly expand their intervention. Third, as ex ante market definitions are aligned on antirust principles, authorities should make sure that market definition is not a goal in itself but only a means to achieve the policy objectives of the sector‐specific regulation.