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The theoretical contribution provided by the transitional theories has fundamentally helped develop a better understanding of the migration process, by showing how migration is interacting with other processes of development. They show that along with development, emigration is following an upside down ‘U’ shaped pattern, being overreached by immigration, while the region changes its migration profile from emigration to immigration. This was the case for the southern European states, which followed a rapid migration transition during the second half of the twentieth century. After large emigration to Western and Northern Europe, these managed to attract large immigration flows from the less developed countries in Africa and Latin America, but also from Eastern Europe after the fall of communist regimes. This chapter aims to test whether Eastern Europe is heading to the same migration transition pattern as the South and change their current status of net migration provider. Thus, the impact of the migration transition drivers in explaining net migration balance is analysed using a panel data for the 2000–2013 period. As a country can encompass both emigration and immigration regions, the current analysis is carried out at European Union (EU) regional level data (NUTS II), while controlling for the regional specifics and unobserved time effects. Overall, most of the factors which led to the migration shift, from emigration to immigration, in Southern Europe were proven to be fundamental at EU regional level as well. Migration flows were shown to be more sensitive to unemployment, urbanisation, segmentation of the labour market and active population share in the eastern as compared to the southern European regions. Nevertheless, accessing the transition drivers evolution during 2011–2013 period, eastern regions are still highly unattractive and their chances for becoming destination regions are currently at low levels.

The purpose of this paper is to review monetary policy options in countries assumed to be suffering from two common economic problems: deficient private demand and high and rising public debt.

The analytical approach assumes that relevant authorities have decided that new money creation is necessary to address their economic problems. The paper asks the question: how should this new money creation best be deployed to create the required economic stimulus in the context of rising public debt?

The first finding is that the latest rounds of “quantitative easing” in the USA (QE2) and Japan are likely to be inefficient, largely ineffective and have adverse side‐effects, and that in periphery countries the risk of debt default is being increased by current defensive policy settings. The second finding is that the policy of financing budget deficits by printing new money is likely to be more effective (than “quantitative easing” and current Eurozone policy) in raising demand, output and employment without adding unnecessarily to already high levels of public debt.

There are very substantial practical policy implications, involving a potential change of monetary policy strategies for two of the world's largest economies and for Eurozone periphery countries. Post‐earthquake reconstruction in Japan could be financed in the manner recommended in this paper.

The originality/value lies in demonstrating that current monetary policy orthodoxy is misplaced, and that an alternative policy strategy has been overlooked and is likely to be more effective.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the recent changes in the role played by Africa as a traditional natural resources supplier for the world economy in a multipolar context. We highlight, on the one hand, how Africa remains a prominent supplier of critical minerals needed for information and communication technologies (ICT), including platinum, vanadium, coltan, chromium, manganese, zirconium, etc., and how the boomerang effect results in Africa also importing electronic waste. On the other hand, we show how the BRICS’ growth model, based on a very intensive use of natural resources acquired through international trade, is now being fuelled by Africa too. BRICS countries (especially China and India) are making foreign direct investments in Africa using their state companies to ensure the supply of natural resources under favourable economic terms. Thus, Africa appears as a disputed territory between the old domination of the advanced capitalist countries and emerging powers like the BRICS. However, this should not mask the fact that the European Union and North America are still the dominant foreign powers in the continent. Finally, we discuss which scenarios are open to further this multipolar moment, particularly in the wake of the great crisis.

The paper adopts an organizational perspective to explore the conditions of possibility of the recent re-emergence of overt class-based discourse on one hand, epitomized by the ‘We are the 99%’ movement, and the rise on the other hand of a populist, nativist and sometimes overtly fascist right. It is argued that these phenomena, reflecting the increasingly crisis-prone character of global capitalism, the growing gap between rich and poor and a generalized sense of insecurity, are rooted in the dismantling of socially embedded organizations through processes often described as ‘financialization’, driven by the taken-for-granted dominance of neoliberal ideology. The paper explores the rise to dominance of the neoliberal ‘thought style’ and its inherent logic in underpinning the dismantling and restructuring of capitalist organization. Its focus is upon transnational value chain capitalism which has rebalanced power relations in favour of a small elite that is able to operate and realize wealth in ways that defy and often succeed in escaping the regulation of nation states.

The general purpose of the paper is to examine the effect of financial globalization on income inequality. The specific purposes are: 1) To examine the effect of overall financial globalization on income inequality. 2) To analyze whether de facto and de jure financial globalization have differential effects on income inequality. 3) To scrutinize whether the effect of financial globalization on income inequality varies across countries of different income groups and quantiles of income inequality.

The authors employed panel quantile regression using 73 countries over 2000–2016 to examine the effect of financial globalization on income inequality. The authors employed fixed effect and panel quantile regressions and classified the countries into income groups to compare differential effects of financial globalization across different income groups. Further, the authors unbundled financial globalization into de facto and de jure financial globalizations to investigate whether their effects on income inequality vary.

Overall financial globalization raises income inequality more at lower quantiles of inequality. De jure financial globalization reduces income inequality in high-income countries. In high-income countries, de jure financial globalization has more favorable income distribution at lower quantiles of inequality. In contrast, de facto financial globalization raises inequality regardless of income classification of the countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the authors for the first time employed panel quantile regression to analyze whether financial globalization affects income inequality across different quantiles. In addition to de facto globalization, the authors used the newly developed de jure financial globalization index to examine its impact on income inequality. The de jure dimension is largely neglected in the literature. The authors provide empirical evidence on how the different dimensions of financial globalization, de facto and de jure, impact inequality in high-income, middle-income and low-income countries.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between R&D internationalization and finance decisions by providing survey evidence on the funding sources of R&D in light of recent perceptions of MNEs' decentralized knowledge-related competitiveness.

The study draws upon a survey of 83 decentralized R&D units located in countries outside the EU core of mature economies. Funding sources are classified as MNE-internal and external. Using simulation-based models, six ordered probit regression models were run with each funding source forming the dependent variable.

There are three significant findings. First, decentralized R&D funding relies mainly on MNE-internal sources. Second, decentralized R&D funding patterns reflect on the interdependencies within an overall MNE R&D strategy that is articulated through varied laboratory roles. Third, while the strategy-finance interaction is confirmed, the prevalence of parent funding is challenged. Instead, evidence recorded here suggests support for the decentralized, “subsidiary-focused” perspective that has recently regained a considerable momentum in the literature.

Notwithstanding that this study reinforces the interaction between strategic decisions and funding patterns, more work is required to identify the effects of other aspects of strategy on the funding sources of decentralized R&D activity. However, it is seemingly the first study that investigates MNEs' R&D financial decisions in economies outside the EU core, incorporating also a wide array of external funding sources.

Funding choices for decentralized R&D labs should be contingent upon their unique contribution to the competitive evolution of the MNE group. Further, R&D activity seems to leverage the autonomy of subsidiary managers.

This research is one of the very few empirical studies providing evidence on the funding sources of decentralized R&D laboratories, and suggests possible predictors that have not been put forward hitherto.

The unequal distribution of economic activities, transposed in economic, social and territorial disparities is the general characteristic of the European economy. Gaps increased in the context of European Union (EU) enlargement towards Eastern and Central Europe and of the economic crisis, thus bringing new differentiations among member states’ economies. The main aim of the chapter is to emphasise the centre-periphery differentiations in the European economy, by using a composite index of peripherality, in order to better understand the determinants of growth and convergence in Central and Eastern European countries and to reach normative conclusions for increasing Cohesion Policy (CP) effectiveness. The first part of the chapter provides a short overview of the main theories and models of the peripherality analysis and the relationships between the centre and the periphery, in order to find out how this analysis relates to the research in the field. The second part provides a comparative analysis of the evolution of European economies during 2003–2014, in order to find out whether the EU enlargement process stabilised the EU core-periphery pattern or, on the contrary, the process of core-periphery structural convergence occurred. The third part includes the suggested model of analysis (methodology, data, and main results) from a multidisciplinary perspective, underlining the centre-periphery differentiations on the two axes, North–South and West–East. The results have been interpreted in conclusions, with a focus on their relevance for the European CP challenges.

The last enlargements of the European Union (EU) shifted the geographical focus of the periphery from the south to the east, upgrading the position of many southern European countries and regions, which were already in a process of convergence with the EU average. The current financial/economic crisis, however, which has particularly hit southern European countries, revitalized the traditional core-periphery division, known as the North-South divide. In parallel, the relocation of economic activity (industrial production and services) within the EU territory, from western-core countries to the eastern periphery, raised the competitiveness and economic significance of many areas in the new, vis-a-vis the old, periphery, leading to the emergence of a number of new centres in its metropolitan regions. A number of questions are raised in the context of the above development, such as: Which factors underlie the differences in growth paths and ‘resilience’ between the eastern vis-à-vis the southern periphery? How important has the industrial relocation from the West to the East been? And what has been the general impact of the EU’s Cohesion Policy? What would the implications of a possible further expansion towards the EU’s ‘Eastern Neighbours’ be on its core-periphery pattern? This chapter approaches critically some of the above issues, adopting a qualitative methodology with the use of graphical presentations. In its conclusions, the chapter examines the appropriateness of the new economic geography’s theoretical interpretation.

“It should also be noted that the objective of convergence and equal distribution, including across under-performing areas, can hinder efforts to generate growth. Contrariwise, the objective of competitiveness can exacerbate regional and social inequalities, by targeting efforts on zones of excellence where projects achieve greater returns (dynamic major cities, higher levels of general education, the most advanced projects, infrastructures with the heaviest traffic, and so on). If cohesion policy and the Lisbon Strategy come into conflict, it must be borne in mind that the former, for the moment, is founded on a rather more solid legal foundation than the latter” European Commission (2005, p. 9)Adaptation of Cohesion Policy to the Enlarged Europe and the Lisbon and Gothenburg Objectives.