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Much analysis considering the putative political challenges of the European Union (EU) has focussed on the (lack of) participation and identifications of European citizens. But what about the bureaucrats working on their behalf? This contribution will address the issue of representative bureaucracy and identification in the EU, specifically in the European Commission. While the literature on representativeness of public administration has focussed on issues of social class, ethnicity and gender, it is also important to consider geographical representativeness. This is particularly important when region (in this case of the EU nations) is relevant. As the authors point out, this question is all the more relevant given the assumption that individuals who join the Commission will identify with Europe more than their home country. Yet, at a time of ongoing discussions about a crisis of the EU and in the midst of populist governments, such an assumption is at least questionable. While it is difficult to assess the extent to which decision-making may be influenced by nationality, at least understanding patterns of representation can be important for understanding how passive – if not active – representation functions. The formal emphasis on representative bureaucracy within the EU raises several potential conflicts with other important principles of public management. It also creates a conflict with the fundamental commitment to creating transnational personnel who eschew strong attachments to nation states.

One often thinks of competition as a mechanism whereby undertakings are forced to answer more efficiently the needs of clients. One may wonder whether that system could be used to organize the institutional environment. Competition already exists among states or regions, where it affects their capacity to attract investment or skilled workers. Could we go further and organise institutional competition among authorities within the same territory? Electronic communications provide a good case study, with the same competencies being attributed to regulators, competition authorities and judicial power.

Recently many European countries have incurred crises in public finance despite the fact that EU institutions have pushed the national governments toward the sustainability of public finance with compulsory and voluntary rules regarding fiscal governance. This paper investigates the relations between the quality of fiscal governance and the financial virtuosity of national fiscal policy. We proposed a general framework for analyzing the fiscal governance issue and we empirically tested the correlation between the dimensions of fiscal governance and the budgetary performance of EU countries. The results showed a positive correlation between the quality of fiscal governance in the EU countries and financial surplus in the period concerned. However further investigations are needed and an effort should be made to collect uniform data on fiscal governance in the European Union.

European air transport policy, emerged through the confluence of case law and legislation, in four broad areas: liberalization, safety and security, greening, and the external policy. Following the implementation of the single market for air transport, policy shifted to liberalizing and regulating associated services and in recent years to greening, the external aviation policy, and safety and security. Inclusion of air transport in the Environmental Trading Scheme of the European Union exemplifies the European Commission’s proactive stand on bringing the industry in line with emission reduction trajectories of other industries. However, the bid to include flights to third countries in the trading scheme pushed the EU into a controversial position, causing the Commission to halt implementation and to give ICAO time to seek a global multilateral agreement. The chapter also discusses how the nationality clauses in air services agreements breached the Treaty of Rome, and a court ruling to that effect enabled the EC to extend EU liberalization policies beyond the European Union, resulting in the Common Aviation Area with EU fringe countries and the Open Aviation Area with the USA. Another important area of progress was aviation safety, where the EU region is unsurpassed in the world, yet the Commission has pushed the boundary even further, by establishing the European Safety Agency to oversee the European Aviation Safety Management System. Another important area of regulatory development was aviation security, a major focus after the woeful events in 2001, but increasingly under industry scrutiny on costs and effectiveness. The chapter concludes by arguing that in the coming decade, the EU will strive to strengthen its position as a global countervailing power, symbolized in air transport by a leadership position in environmental policy and international market liberalization, exemplified in the EU’s external aviation policy.

The aim of the chapter is to examine whether the challenges to administering the EU outlined by Les Metcalfe in his famous article, ‘After 1992, can the Commission manage Europe?’ have now been met. Metcalfe not only identified a ‘management deficit’ in the implementation of the single market programme arising from an oversight among policy makers, but highlighted a neglect of the administrative dimension of European integration among scholars.

The chapter draws on primary and secondary literature to track developments in respect of the three elements identified by Metcalfe: the small size of the European Commission, its poor internal coordination and weak leadership; the responsiveness of administrative bodies in the member states to the need for inter-organizational coordination; and the network-building and management capacity of the Commission.

Despite changes, such as further enlargement, agencification at national and EU levels, and the expansion of EU competencies that have exacerbated the management challenge confronting the EU, there have been significant developments that have closed the deficit. First, the Commission has become far better integrated, coordination upgraded, and leadership strengthened. Second, through networking, cooptation and other strategies the Commission has sought to assure the effective implementation and enforcement of the single market rules. Third, member state governments, ministries and agencies have sought to cultivate networked relations that have increased the manageability of EU administration.

To the knowledge of this author, this is the first attempt to revisit Metcalfe’s diagnosis and to review the extent to which the management deficit he identified has been addressed subsequently.

The chapter has implications for how inter-organizational coordination within the EU administrative system could be improved.

The chapter bears on the administrative capacity of the EU to deliver the policies decided by EU policy makers.

As well as offering an assessment of the extent to which progress has been made in addressing the management deficit identified by Les Metcalfe in his classic article, this chapter conceptualizes the EU administration as an entity that encompasses both EU institutions and administrative bodies in the member states. It advances the concept of the EU as a multi-level administration.

This chapter provides a framework for organisational analysis of the newly created position of ‘independent’ Commissioner, especially whether it is sufficiently backed by administrative capacities.

In the many variables that determine organisational behaviour (Mintzberg, 1989), this approach follows Olsen (2005) in its analysis through communication structures and strategic directions, and adds procedures (networks) and personnel to this. The chapter is primarily based on interview data in addition to literature and document analysis.

This chapter acknowledges the ‘stickiness’ of institutions and the difficulties in reorganising (formal) institutions. The conclusion shows that there are multiple problems in the current process of institutionalisation of the independent Commissioner. Generalising the findings to the use of an administrative approach, the frugal framework used here indicates that ‘independence’ cannot simply be proclaimed but also demands attentions for organisation design. Organisational analysis helps to understand the organisation and the organisational weaknesses behind the policy objective.

As is often the case with MLG it gives a perspective on governance, but must be complemented with an approach for analysis, in this case organisational design. In the chapter the approach is limited to organisational values, personnel and communication lines. It provides a basic framework to evaluate one of the key elements of European integration – independence. However, additional work is needed to further develop this framework as well as other components of the organisational behaviour of the Commission.

This chapter comes up with suggestions for organisational redesign of the Commission in order to restore trust in its tasks and responsibilities. With the instalment of the new Juncker Commission these findings might provide useful insights for the ongoing process of reorganisation of the Commission.

The new economic legislation and the role of the independent Commissioner have a direct impact on member state budgets (cuts), with a far reaching societal impact. Therefore, the level of (public) trust is critical in the acceptance of the process. Trust is established inter alia by the organisational implementation of principles of good administrative behaviour such as transparency, capability, independence, etc.

The chapter uses the MLG perspective in order to get a comprehensive picture of the organisational implications to effectively embed the ‘independent’ Commissioner in the organisation. The added value is based on the extensive amount of interviews over a longer period of time (2011–2014) during the operationalisation of the European semester.

This study aims to examine the influence and behaviour of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG)/European Commission, and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Foundation/International Sustainability Standards Board in the standardisation of sustainability reporting arena and their implications for the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) current position.

This paper draws on the arena concept, particularly the work of Renn (1992) and Georgakopoulous and Thomson (2008), to explore the EFRAG and the IFRS Foundation’s behaviour towards the standardisation of the sustainability reporting arena and their implications for the GRI’s current position. Further, the documents and public releases pertinent to the activities and output of the GRI, the EFRAG/European Commission and the IFRS Foundation are used. The documents are screened and analysed based on the key elements of arena concept that emerged, which includes “agenda, claims, network of bodies and group engaged, interaction and behaviour with arena issues (audience, materiality, scope and core priorities, purpose of reporting and relevance to sustainable development)”.

This study reveals the source of motivation and influence of the new standard setters in the sustainability reporting arena and documents the relevance of their behaviour as an actionable strategy to change the arena rule. Particularly, this paper demonstrates the perceived fall away from driving business behaviour towards the pursuit of sustainable development if the GRI and its standards cease to exist.

The pathway to achieve sustainable development and improve sustainability impact disclosure remains a debatable issue among policymakers and users of sustainability reporting standards. This study reconstructs the awareness of different dynamics at play inhibiting the harmonisation of sustainability reporting standardisation and the importance of the GRI in pursuing global sustainable development.

The pattern of behaviour and agenda of sustainability institutions and influential standard setters harnessed in this paper are aimed at enabling the existence of the rules that can uphold the primary focus of the sustainability reporting arena, particularly in achieving global sustainable development.

This paper furthers the understanding of the importance of the GRI in upholding the key tenets and traditional agenda of sustainability reporting and sustainable development.

Many European-level networks and regulatory constellations in different sectors (e.g., energy, telecommunications) without clear anchorage into the European Union (EU) institutional landscape have been subject to increasing efforts by the EU institutions to tie them closer to the EU. They are serving increasingly as platforms for preparing EU policy or for implementing EU decisions, which may result in closer institutional bonds with the EU. This chapter aims at examining the differences and similarities between the process towards more EU-integration in two different domains (i.e., telecommunications and patents) and regulatory constellations (i.e., supranational and intergovernmental).

The chapter analyzes the evolution in the European telecommunication sector and the European Patent System and juxtaposes this analysis with the literature on institutionalization, Europeanization of regulatory network-organizations, and multilevel governance (MLG). It focuses on the role of the European Commission and the interaction with the national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and networks within the institutional framework.

Irrespective of the particular regime (intergovernmental/supranational) in a certain domain or sector, a common trend of closer coordination and integration prompted by the Commission is taking place, which triggers a certain resistance by the national bodies regulating that domain. As long as a specific competence is considered instrumental in the creation of the single market, the Commission has strong incentives to strengthen its influence in this field, even if those competences have been regulated through an independent intergovernmental regime.

The dynamic described in this chapter allows us to reflect upon the MLG conception as developed by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which distinguish between two types of MLG. Type I MLG refers to different levels of governments, more specifically to the spread of power along different governmental levels and the interactions between them. Type II MLG refers to jurisdictions that are both task-specific and based on membership that can intersect with each other. They respond to particular problems in specific policy fields (Marks & Hooghe, 2004). Our analysis shows that the increase in coordination and integration are the outcome of both MLG Type II processes (coordination between two issue-specific bodies) and of MLG Type I processes (tensions between two governmental levels). Furthermore, the negotiation dynamics regarding this increased coordination and integration reveal that the tensions typical of MLG Type I took place as a consequence of the increased coordination between Type II bodies. Put differently, multi-level coordination and integration mechanisms in the EU can be seen as both Type I and Type II processes. They combine features of both categories and reveal that their Type I and Type II features are interdependent.

The analysis in this chapter shows a need for further strengthening the MLG Type I and II conceptual framework by balancing the analytical distinction between the two types with developments about how Type I and Type II are often entangled and intertwined with each other rather than separated realities.

The chapter describes and compares the dynamics in the European telecommunications sector and the European patent system with interesting observations for NRAs and the European Commission with respect to coordination and integration.

The original nature of the current chapter relates to the two selected areas and the addition to the literature on MLG.

First, with respect to the areas investigated the dynamics of the European telecommunications sector have been analyzed also by other authors, but the European patent system is an area which is relatively unexplored in terms of governance research. The combination of the two sectors with a detailed analysis of similarities and differences is highly original and generates interesting lessons with respect to coordination and integration in supranational and intergovernmental regimes.

Second, Marks and Hooghe (2004) distinguish between the two types of MLG as if they are two different constructs that are not related to each other. Our cases and argument cover both types of MLG and show the interconnection between the dynamics taking place in the two types of MLG.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.