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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the banking systems in Western, and Central and Southeastern Europe, focusing on the interactive factors of anti‐money laundering, transitional economies and the underground illicit economy.

Provides a comparative analysis of the banking systems in Western, and Central and Southeastern Europe.

The transition economies of central and Southeastern Europe face, and have been confronted for over a generation by, the interlinked problems of the transition stage post‐1989, the alternative or illegal economy, and the vulnerability of banking systems to money laundering. In contrast, by the 1990s, Western European central banks have become established as an essential government organ in macro‐economic policies.

Suggests an interesting lesson that might be gained from the experiences of central and Southeastern Europe and anti‐money laundering since the late‐1990s, where a national bank or central bank has not been essential, indeed has been comparatively unimportant, compared to the developed banking system led by the individual banks.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The objective of this work is to analyse worldwide trends in financial supervision architectures. The focus is on the key issue in the debate – the single supervisor versus multiauthority model – in order to build up indexes of supervision unification, essential to perform studies on the causes and effects of various supervisory regimes. First, the paper introduces a Financial Authorities’ Concentration (FAC) Index. A comparative analysis of 69 countries confirmed that an increase in the degree of concentration of supervisory powers is evident in the developed countries, and particularly in the European Union. Secondly, the paper considers the nature of the institutions to which control responsibilities are entrusted. In particular, the role the central bank plays in the various national institutional settings is examined. An index of the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision is introduced, the Central Bank as Financial Authority (CBFA) Index. Each national institutional structure can be identified with the two above characteristics. Two models are the most frequent: (a) countries with a high level of unification of powers and weak central bank involvement (single financial authority regimes); and, (b) countries with a low level of unification of powers and strong central bank involvement (central bank dominated multiple supervisor regimes). A trade‐off therefore emerges between the degree of financial sector unification and the role of the central bank. Two possible explanations of this relationship emerged: the blurring hazard effect and the monopolistic bureau effect.

The past decade, with its unprecedented surge in financial activity and financial crises, has been one of increased awareness on the part of both regulatory authorities and market participants of the potential of payment systems for propagating and amplifying financial shocks, especially in a cross‐border context. This has led the European Commission to propose, on 30th May 1996, a Directive aimed at reducing systemic risk. (This has been the subject of an earlier contribution by the same author, pub‐lished in Vol 5, No 1 of the Journal.) In the meanwhile, the European Parliament has delivered its opinion and the Council has adopted a common position. This paper examines the contents of this common position.

The focus of this paper is the economic theory of the plans for the European Monetary Union. Part 1 demonstrates that economists, bankers and policy makers know very little about monetary policy. Part 2 explains the errors of the common practice of defining money by its functions. Because any monetary policy must rest on a definition of money it seems reasonable to conclude that a flawed definition might lead to problems with monetary policy. Part 3 applies this insight to the plans for a common currency in Europe. Because of uncertainties about the timing and details of the implementation, some important considerations are necessarily speculative. They are relegated to appendices. Appendix 1 comments on the timing and authorship and responsibility for the official reports with their unspecified authors. Appendix 2 supplies some grounds for doubting the ultimate durability of the European Monetary Union focusing on reasons that are historical, economic and pragmatic. Because the entire movement is driven by politics, not economics, Appendix 3 considers some of the relevant political issues. The conclusions summarize and speculate on possible reasons for successful outcomes.

The purpose of this paper is to identify, categorize and describe the Greek banking payment and settlement systems and the way to SEPA. Also, the purpose is to describe authorities that supervise money laundering through Greek payment systems and identify major categories of suspicious transaction reports and amounts of criminal assets per each category.

The Bank of Greece, central bank of Greece, has explicit tasks in the field of payment and settlement systems. In Greece, there are three payment and settlement systems: large-value payment system (TARGET2), retail payment systems and securities settlement systems.

TARGET2 is based on a technically centralized platform (single shared platform – SSP), which is provided by the central banks of Germany, France and Italy, and it replaces the decentralized structure of the original TARGET system. Migration on TARGET2 took place in Greece on May 19, 2008. Ongoing cooperation between the European System of Central Banks and the banking community through extensive consultations facilitated the smooth migration to TARGET2. Retail payment systems consist of DIAS credit transfers, direct debits, check, ATM transactions and card payments. During the year 2013, DIAS cleared 144.13 million payment transactions with a total value of €184.1 billion. Most of the transactions were credit transfers SEPA compliant. Securities settlement systems operate on the delivery versus payment principle, whereby sales of securities and respective payments are affected simultaneously, as well as the principle of dual notice. Migration of Greek data systems toward SEPA through a regulatory framework will promote the use of common European standards and business practices for a fully automated and efficient processing of payment instruments. Bank of Greece and Greek Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Authority are responsible authorities to supervise illegal activity through bank payment systems. Data show that Greek bank payment systems were used during 2012 for tax evasion and for offences that result in imprisonment for over six months.

Above findings are useful for information technology management, legislative and compliance authorities, investors and person that operate transactions with Greek banking payment and settlement systems.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first study about Greek banking payment systems.

Explores how European monetary systems have become an heterogeneous conglomerate with the passing of time, questioning the failures of the modern gold standard and the international monetary fund. Asks what kind of monetary and economic union is desirable, examining the choice in terms of the monetary and economic systems. Offers practical measures for the realization of a free and stable monetary and economic union which can be taken at community and national levels. Concludes with an examination of the problems of the accumulated US dollar in European central banks.

This study aims to analyze the impact of cooperation between banking supervisory entities on maintaining financial stability, using Single Supervisory Mechanism evolution and performance as instance. Then banking supervisory cooperation and financial stability in Egypt are reviewed.

The qualitative method is used to study and analyze the practices that contributed to financial instability and raised the need for supervisory cooperation. Descriptive qualitative method is used to study the interrelations between supervisory authorities on various levels and its impact on financial stability.

Findings show that maintaining financial stability through strong, consistent complete or semi unified supervisory framework faces challenges. Providing cooperation between different supervisory authorities, effective information sharing, gained experience in the long run contributes to financial stability.

The originality of this research paper arises from the fact that it encompasses the academic aspect through interpreting the developments that occurred to the cooperation in banking supervision in relation to the financial instability times in the Eurozone that led to the establishment of Single Supervisory mechanism, and the challenges it faced. The supervisory cooperation in Egypt is studied as well at international, regional levels and its role in contributing to financial stability. To the best of the authors' knowledge this is the first study that studies the banking supervisory cooperation between Egyptian supervisory authorities and other international and regional authorities.

Completion of the European Single Market Programme in Financial Services has, as expected, set in motion a rationalisation process within the European banking industry, as banks respond to increasing competitive pressures that are having a dampening effect on their traditional business margins. Assesses the importance of these developments in the context of the policy options that are open to the European banking community in the new millennium. In particular, given the prospect of an integrated European economy, now commonly referred to as Euroland, the paper addresses, as its central theme, the potential for the development of pan‐European banks that would then be in a position to configure longer‐term globalisation strategies. Evolution in this direction, if it occurs, is important from a European Central Bank policy perspective, since it would raise systemic risk issues if a small number of European licensed banks became “too big to fail”. We conclude, however, that the most prominent strategic response is likely to be based on the European “regionalisation” of banks and markets rather than pan‐Europeanisation.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.