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Business Model Analysis is acquiring increasing visibility in the European banking regulatory framework, following the European Banking Authority guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), developed to assess business and strategic risks (EBA, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Starting from a selected literature review, in the paper, the authors analyse business models set up by financial intermediaries, bank and non-banks, for the distribution of investment services, first by comparing European niche players with European banking global players, and second, comparing European niche players among themselves to understand the evolution of business models for the distribution of investment services at European level. The research is supported by the Baffi–Carefin Research Centre at the Bocconi University (Italy), in collaboration with ANASF, the Italian Association of Financial Advisors (Italy).

The authors consider a sample of European financial players from 2009 to 2014. The authors’ focus is on France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the UK; overall the authors’ handmade data set is based on 162 annual reports. The authors follow two main questions: Do the niche players, as they are focused on the distribution of investment services, have an upper limit to profitability, compared to the global players, as risk-takers in many financial areas? How is the business model of niche players changing, facing increasing competition and regulatory pressures?

Answering the first research question, the highest net profitability is found in the niche players group; the global players, as risk-takers, achieve lower remuneration, in contrast with the risk premium theory. The results were assessed over a limited period, however, deemed in line with the company’s strategic planning horizon. Answering the second research question, the authors focus on the case of niche players, using a cluster analysis. The authors identify three different business models: most dynamic niche players, which combine investment services, insurance and welfare services, achieving the highest margins and stability; players mainly focused on asset management, whose key vulnerability is the degree of open architecture, especially in light of future MiFID 2 implementation; and players mainly focused on the creation of well-structured on-line platforms, which offer also brokerage services, thereby reducing their marginality and potentially increasing their business risk.

Despite the limited time series, the authors’ research gives some inputs for those interested in deepening the business model analysis focus on the distribution of investment services and the business and strategic risk assessment, both for the global banks and the niche players (banks and non-banks).

The authors’ results could be of some interest during the strategic assessment of global banks and niche players, both adopting an internal perspective or an external one, as regulator.

By giving some specific insights into the assessment and comparison of business and strategic risks among global and niche players, the authors’ research provides the basis for further research in the field of the distribution of investment services.

The originality mainly regards the business model risk perspective and the focus of the authors’ analysis: the distribution of investment services. This sector, unlike the asset management, does not have an easily recognisable group of comparables at European level, all the European countries analysed have very different business models. This research avails of an original database, that is unique to Europe.

The supervisory stress test evaluates the capital adequacy and profit-generation capacity of systemic banking institutions under baseline and adverse macroeconomic scenarios. This study aims to assess the financial and informational role of European stress tests and substantiate the impact of their disclosures by examining the EU-wide 2018 stress test vis-à-vis the EU-wide 2021 stress test in terms of how and to what extent the stock prices of the stress-tested banks have been affected.

This study applies standard event study methodologies to evaluate the reactions of market participants during the EU-wide 2018 and 2021 stress test exercises. We examine several “large” events in both the exercises for a selected sample of European banks.

The results of our event study analysis show that the EU-wide 2018 and 2021 stress tests come subsequent to considerable abnormal price movements. The announcement of stress test results triggered tangible investor reactions, indicating the informational value of stress tests in reducing bank opacity. This supervisory “toolkit” is considered extremely important, as it provides meaningful insights to the supervisors of the banking institutions and the market stakeholders by improving the transparency of the financial sector, allowing them to segregate banks more effectively.

This study constitutes one of the earliest attempts to shed light on the financial and information role of the European supervisory stress tests by comparing the EU-wide 2018 and the EU-wide 2021 stress test exercises. Moreover, it provides concrete empirical evidence and qualitative analysis to explore certain aspects of the European and US stress tests.

This paper aims to demonstrate how the European regulatory structure of the financial markets has changed after the financial crisis. Drawing from these findings, it discusses how the regulatory system might change and be adapted to a post-Brexit financial market.

The paper takes a systematic/legal approach. First, it analyses the recent reform against the background of European law and corresponding research. In a second step, it discusses the implications of Brexit by examining policy and legal contributions.

The changes to the European regulatory and supervisory structure of the financial markets have proven to be a pacemaker for European administrative and treaty law. Long-standing principles have fundamentally changed. Brexit, on the other hand, even though equally severe might not lead to similar results.

The paper proposes a limited reform to the existing regulatory structure to consolidate developments, ease constitutional frictions and enable the regulatory authorities to react quickly to volatile markets via rule making.

The paper draws attention to an almost unnoticed development in European law. It also illustrates the effects of Brexit on the European financial markets.

This paper aims to investigate how stockholders and bondholders react to the information disclosed on the financial markets during crisis periods. This paper considers the 2011 European Banking Authority’s stress test as it disclosed detailed information about banks.

It was conducted during the European sovereign debt crisis, and this paper uses an event study methodology. This paper analyzes the average cumulative abnormal returns for different subsamples of banks. This paper compares the reactions of stockholders and bondholders to the stress test by considering pre-results announcements (signal generating process) to the publication of the results on the disclosure date, using quantitative data for each individual bank that participated in the stress test (the signal provided to the financial market).

This paper finds that stockholders’ reaction is more sensitive to idiosyncratic components of the disclosed information, whereas bondholders are more influenced by systematic risk. A deeper investigation shows that subordinated bondholders tend to behave quite similarly to stockholders. This specific reaction of stockholders during financial distress may make them more likely than bondholders to impose market discipline during troubled periods.

This paper brings several new insights to the behavior of stock and bond holders during times of financial distress and makes recommendations to regulators that may serve to refine communication to markets to reduce the shock of negative news.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a first impact assessment of the Italian quota law in order to explore whether “gender equality by law” contributes to redefining, albeit in part, consolidating and establishing positions of power and decision making. The paper analyses these dynamics by focusing on a specific economic sector, the banking sector. The analysis strives to determine: whether binding quotas are giving rise to an apparent enforcement by building up new distortionary equilibria (such as new forms of horizontal segregation); what extent the financial crisis has impacted on the rhetoric of female representation, and whether it has pushed towards a “regenerative” organizational change aimed at achieving a more inclusive and egalitarian image.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical debate on gender diversity and quota impact. Section 3 reports macro and micro data on the italian system; Section 4 describes the Italian banking system and gives a first impact assessment on Italian banks of the mandatory gender quotas in Italy (the so-called “Golfo-Mosca law,” named after MPs who proposed the law); some qualitative considerations are carried out on the reactions of Italian banks to the financial crisis in terms of “bridge policies” aimed at corresponding to a higher demand of customer satisfaction and fairness. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the finding of the study.

The Italian banking system is not so dramatically ranked among the EU countries as in the recent past. The gender rebalance in management bodies could be considered rather satisfying. If we compare ten-year-old findings, the number of women on board of directors has tripled. But data clearly show a dichotomy due to significant differences between listed and non-listed banks. In non-listed banks, women are still relegated to an under-represented position, reaching only 13 percent on boards of directors (as against 33 percent in listed banks). The data confirm the results found in non-financial sector that women are significantly better represented on audit boards. In accordance with all previous studies, no relevant changes can be noticed on key-decision roles: no CEOs or Directors general are women in listed banks, and women are always more represented in non-executive functions.

The paper analyses the law experience in Italy as a significant case study by proving that rules such as temporary binding gender quotas (introduced by law in 2011) can be useful, but not always enough to remove blocking or distortive factors in organizational ladders.

In the last decades, many of the most talented and promising young graduates in the developed economies have joined the financial industry. Simultaneously, ill-designed incentives’ schemes have favored the development of a culture in which excessive greed, free-riders’ behavior, unreasonable appetite for risk, and short-term decision making have endangered the economy and, potentially, have laid the foundations for financial, economic, social, and environmental crises.

In this chapter, we review current challenges in the financial industry from the lens of human and social capital. We examine some of the factors that allowed unethical behavior and a short-term financial focus in the financial sector, examining how compensation and an extremely competitive culture became key elements that favored greedy and manipulative behavior and ultimately generated socially harmful human and social capital in the financial sector. Finally, we discuss the emergence of a number of game-changers (namely, Brexit, FinTech, the growing relevance of ethical standards, and the increasing participation of women and millennials in the industry) that might represent potential promotors of change and help restructure and reshape the financial industry.

This paper aims to focus on capital-related macroprudential policies in the context of recent policy discussions on the removal of barriers to the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the European Union (EU).

This study first discusses the link between financial stability and internal resource mobility of cross-border banks. Then, it examines past heterogeneity in structural capital buffers as key macroprudential capital instruments applied in the EU and relate them to costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union.

Observed phase-in patterns of structural capital buffers in the EU are broadly consistent with costs of policy action, degree of foreign penetration and membership in the Banking Union as potential factors. The process of financial integration could be further enhanced through reduced uncertainty in the application of macroprudential policies that constrain capital mobility of cross-border banks.

This paper anchors macroprudential policies into a wider discussion on the mechanism and implications of ring-fencing in the EU over time. It discusses two policy areas, macroprudential policies and proposals for deeper financial integration, that share the same financial stability objective but tend to emphasize different implications of the mobility of capital and liquidity of cross-border banks in the EU. The study provides a discussion of potential implications of the recent adoption of the CRRII/CRDV legislation for future heterogeneity of macroprudential policies in the EU.

This paper analyzes the new EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to determine the level of guidance on instruments to wind-down bad asset portfolios of asset management vehicles. In the absence of such detailed guidance stipulated by the BRRD, the aim is to provide certain practical guidance to future resolution planning and execution.

This paper draws upon experience from portfolio reduction strategies applied at European bad banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. For illustration purposes, the paper use case study data from a bad bank located in the eurozone.

For the new European Commission, implementation and enforcement of the Banking Union within the eurozone is currently a key priority. Present efforts are mainly directed towards minimum technical standards. However, the fundamental question of how to orderly unwind a bad assets portfolio without the usage of public funds remains partly addressed only. While a uniform approach to any bad asset does not seem to be applicable, certain lessons learned from previous financial crises may contribute to a selection of reduction strategies.

This paper draws upon experience from portfolio reduction strategies applied at European bad banks in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It includes case study data from the wind-down of a eurozone bad bank detailing the asset reduction strategies achieved so far. Such per asset class wind-down patterns have not been published and commented on in academia so far.